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# PART I





**Preface to the International Symposium  
American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies  
of American Politics: Comparisons and Differences**

Akita International University held an international conference “American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies of American Politics: Comparison and Differences” on November 21st and 22nd, 2009. Nine presenters with different background – scholars, journalists, and politicians – participated from Indonesia, Japan, and the United States. This conference attracted a large number of the audience, and its summary was published in Akita Sakigake Shimpo on December 11.

The purpose of this conference was to clarify characteristics of Japanese Studies in the United States and American Studies in Japan and to reveal political, social, and historical contexts of respective regional studies in these two countries. Details of the presentations are available in the following papers. Due to some imbalance of presenters, the conference had several studies of Japanese Studies in the United States, some comparative studies, and few on American Studies in Japan. The discussion session after the nine presentations remedied this imbalance by covering the last issue. There, participants discussed not only academic trends but also political, economic, and social factors. Later questions and opinions came from the floor, ranging from images of the United States to US-Japanese relations.

This conference was impossible without the kind support of many people. Akita Prefectural government, Akita municipal government, the Educational Board of Akita Prefecture, the Educational Board of Akita City, and Akita Sakigake Shimpo supported this conference. The committee for AIU fifth-year anniversary recognized this conference as a part of its anniversary project and enabled invitation of presenters overseas. Simul International provided simultaneous translation for all presentations and discussion with Select Professor Tatsuya Komatsu and two graduate students in his class, Mei Hashimoto and Eiko Omi. AIU faculty, staff, and students gave the conference indispensable contributions. Representing the Organizing Committee, I would like to express our gratitude.

Itsuki Kurashina,  
Head Conference Coordinator

Conference Organizer: Mineo Nakajima

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## **Conference Program**

American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies  
of American Politics: Comparisons and Differences

November 21-22, 2009

Place: Plaza Crypton

November 21

Opening Remarks, Mineo Nakajima (President, Akita International University)

### Panel 1. Issues in Japan and the United States

“From United States to United People: Federalism and Citizenship in the U.S.”, Takeshi Akiba (Lecturer, AIU)

“Japan in American Political Discourse: Problem Definition and Policy Analysis since the 1980s”, Alister Howard (Assistant Professor, Temple University)

“American Academic Views of the Yasukuni Controversy during the Koizumi Years”, Norihito Mizuno (Assistant Professor, AIU)

Panel Moderator: Michio Katsumata (Professor, AIU)

### Panel 2. Politics & Society

“American Politics and Lessons for Japan”, Yoshihisa Komori (Editor-at-Large, The Sankei Shimbun)

“Decentralization and Local Governance: Underling Structural Issues”, Hiroshi Saito (Former Governor of Yamagata Prefecture)

“Toward Comprehensive Area Studies in Global Perspective”, Yasumasa Kuroda (Professor Emeritus, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Panel Moderator: Michio Katsumata

November 22

### Panel 3. Study of Japan in the United States

“Comparison Study between American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies of American Politics: An Indonesian Perspective”, Dedy Permadi (Lecturer, Gadjah Mada University)

“The Study of Japan in the United States: Past and Present Perspective”, Kenneth C. Quinones (Professor, AIU)

“The State of Japanese Political Studies in the United States: From Mega-Universities to Small Liberal Arts Colleges”, Ronald Hrebentar (Professor, University of Utah)

Panel Moderator: Michio Katsumata

### Discussion:

Panel Moderator: Michio Katsumata

# From United States to United People: Federalism and Citizenship in the U.S.

Takeshi Akiba  
(秋葉 丈志)

## Introduction

My presentation is about federalism and citizenship. I will look especially at the United States, but I hope it will inspire a conversation about political integration in general, whether in Europe or in Asia. Federalism and citizenship is about the integration of political units that have a conflict over the status of peoples. It is about how those units can unite when there is a lack of consensus over who should count as citizens or what rights a person should have.

From the standpoint of citizenship, the United States was indeed a union of *states* when it was established by the Constitution of 1787. At the time, the Constitution left the definition of citizens largely to individual states. But the United States subsequently expanded the idea of *U.S. citizenship*, under which people share the status and rights of *U.S. citizens*. It gradually became a nation with an integrated body of people, instead of a union of different peoples. This talk is about how different peoples become a united people, from the standpoint of citizenship in a legal and political sense.

## Federalism and Citizenship

Let me first talk about the two key concepts that I would use—federalism and citizenship. Then I will talk about the relationship between the two, especially in the United States. Federalism is a half-way point between separate nations and a unitary nation.<sup>1</sup> United States, Canada, Switzerland are prominent federal nations. In these countries, the component units retain a greater political independence

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<sup>1</sup> A more common usage is “unitary state”, but in order to avoid confusion with *states* in the United States I use the term “unitary nation” here.

than, for example, prefectures in a unitary nation. To give you a comparison, prefectures in Japan are *administrative units* of the nation. They have little independence. There may be some things that they can decide on their own, but that has to be first *authorized* by the central government. The central government decides what the prefectures can decide.

But under federalism, the division of powers between the federal government and the component units is decided and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitution is a compact between the component units and the federal government about what each can do. Neither can unilaterally alter that compact. The central government cannot change the allocation of powers even if it thinks that it is inconvenient or inefficient.<sup>2</sup> Federalism usually involves ethnic, religious, or cultural divisions within a country that cannot be overcome by unification. It is an arrangement that allows these divisions to coexist by reducing the fear that one might try to take over the other.

The other concept I use is citizenship. Citizenship from a constitutional viewpoint has three components: status, rights and protection. **Status** is the recognition that a person is a full-fledged member of a political unit. The person is treated by other members of the political unit as an equal member. Of course, this status has to mean something. So there are **rights** that flow from being a citizen. By becoming a citizen, that person gains additional rights that non-citizens do not possess. Voting rights are usually conditioned on citizenship, although there are some exceptions. Finally, there is **protection**. A citizen has access to government power to enforce his or her own rights. If you are a citizen, the government is obliged to work on behalf of you to punish someone that violates your rights.

How do these two concepts connect? In a federation, there are both federal citizenship and state citizenship. For example, while the European Union (EU) may not yet be as integrated as the United States, it has established EU citizenship in addition to French, German or English citizenship. If we were to apply it to the East Asian Community, there would be an East Asian citizenship in addition to Japanese, Chinese, or Korean citizenship.

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<sup>2</sup> On the distinction with decentralization, see, Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin, *Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008).

The same thinking applies to the other components of citizenship: rights and protection. In a federation there are rights that attach to federal citizenship and rights that attach to state citizenship. These rights are defined by the Constitution. For example, EU citizens have the right to move around any EU country. But only French citizens could vote in French national elections. As for protection, the federal government has the power to protect the rights of federal citizens. The state government has the power to protect the rights of state citizens within its domain.

### **Citizenship under the U.S. Constitution**

Federalism and citizenship has been politically significant in the United States because of two groups whose status have been a matter of conflict. They are *foreigners* and *blacks*.<sup>3</sup> Prior to independence, when the current states in the United States were colonies of Great Britain, each colony accepted or rejected immigrants and naturalized them on their own.<sup>4</sup> Colonies also had different degrees of involvement in slavery and the slave trade. The U.S. Constitution allowed the states to retain some amount of control over the status and rights of both of these groups of people. For the sake of simplicity in this presentation I will just talk about blacks.

The U.S. Constitution allowed the states to retain control over citizenship. First of all, the Constitution did not establish an independent concept of federal citizenship. It did not define who federal citizens were. Instead, it said that citizens of each *state* were to have the rights of citizens in all other *states*.<sup>5</sup> Individual *states* granted citizenship, and as a result of *state* citizenship, that person could claim rights in other states. The federal government could not force a state to grant citizenship and it could not determine the rights of state citizens. All three components of citizenship: status, rights, and protection, were under the control of individual states.

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<sup>3</sup> Although today the term “blacks” is being replaced by the term “African Americans”, I use “blacks” here due to its common acceptance in Japan (the audience to whom this lecture was delivered to).

<sup>4</sup> Officially, only the English parliament could naturalize a foreigner, but in practice, colonies granted status and rights that were equivalent to naturalization on their own. See, James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

A matter of special concern for the states was the status of blacks. Each state retained the authority to define the status of blacks. Southern states retained slavery, which was a complete denial of citizenship. Northern states gradually abolished slavery. In both parts, the free black population grew. But what did being a “free black” mean? Were they citizens, or were they not citizens? Northern states increasingly treated free blacks as citizens, in some instances giving them the right to vote, which even some whites were denied. Southern states denied the idea that blacks could be citizens and placed stringent limitations on their rights. “Free” blacks could not move around freely, and free blacks from other states were often prohibited entry into the Southern states.

### **Free movement and conflict of status**

This arrangement of leaving the definition of citizenship to each state worked fine so long as people remained in their own states. But conflicts arose because people did move around. There were largely three patterns of human movement that destabilized the constitutional arrangement. The first is the movement of free blacks. A free black person may be a citizen in a Northern state, but the South rejected the idea of a black citizen. According to the U.S. Constitution, a citizen of any state had the right of a citizen in another state. So what if a black citizen of New York travelled to South Carolina. Should South Carolina treat him as a citizen? According to the Constitution, it had to. But South Carolina did not agree with the idea and prevented free black persons of other states from entering the state.

South Carolina became so averse to the idea of black people being free to move about, that under a law it enacted in 1822, it detained foreign seamen who were black when they came to South Carolina’s ports. This generated a prolonged international controversy between Britain (which had abolished slavery) and the United States. Even though it had become an international problem, the federal government of the United States was too weak to force South Carolina to open its borders to free blacks.

The second type of movement is the escape of slaves from Southern states to Northern states. Under the U.S. Constitution, all states had to respect the institution of slavery, even if their own state had abolished it. If a slave from the South escaped to the North, the North was obliged to

send them back through the process of extradition.<sup>6</sup> But northern states became increasingly reluctant to do so, generating complaints from the South. During the 1830s and 1840s the relationship between the North and South grew increasingly tense because of the North's refusal to cooperate with the return of fugitive slaves.

The third type of movement is slave transit. In this case, slaves travelled with their masters to the North. This caused many difficulties. As mentioned above, each state had to respect the definition of personal status by other states. So if a slave travelled to the North with their master, the Northern state could not interfere with the status of slaves. But if this was allowed without limitations and Southern owners could move to a Northern state and keep slaves there, then slavery could virtually be spread to the North.

In order to resolve this dilemma, a practice developed in which distinction was made based on the intent of the travel. If a Southern slave owner travelled with his slave to the North with the intent to *settle* permanently, then the slave automatically became free. But if the travel was *temporary* with the intent to return then the slave remained a slave. But this was a fine distinction with a lot of gray area. What is permanent and what is temporary? How do you define and determine the intent? Is there an objective standard? This led to conflicts between Southern and Northern states over the status of blacks.<sup>7</sup> Two examples follow.

### **Interstate conflicts over the citizenship of blacks**

In the late 1830s there was a prolonged controversy between Maryland and Pennsylvania over a fugitive slave. Maryland was a slave-holding state, while Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was a state with a strong abolitionist stance. Worse yet, these two states were neighbors. There were frequent controversies over slaves who escaped from Maryland to Pennsylvania.

In one such incident, Maryland demanded that Pennsylvania return a fugitive slave to Maryland according to the U.S. Constitution.

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<sup>6</sup> *Id.* Thus, the same provision provided for the respect of citizens from other states as well as respect for the institution of slavery.

<sup>7</sup> A book that focuses particularly on this issue is Paul Finkelman, *An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism and Comity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).



Pennsylvania refused. But slave capturers hired by the slave-owner in Maryland found and captured the slave anyway. Pennsylvania then arrested the slave capturers for kidnapping. From the standpoint of Maryland, Pennsylvania was violating the U.S. Constitution by not returning a slave. From the standpoint of Pennsylvania, it wanted to make sure that person who was captured was really a slave. There were instances in which Southerners captured a black person who was actually free and lied that he was a slave. So in order to protect *its citizens* (the free black population of Pennsylvania), Pennsylvania insisted on its right to examine whether the captured person was really a fugitive slave.

This controversy eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which is ultimately in charge of resolving conflicts over the U.S. Constitution. In 1842 the Court decided that Pennsylvania had violated the Constitution by interfering with the return of a fugitive slave.<sup>8</sup> It also said that the federal government can use federal officials to capture a fugitive slave and return the slave to the master. But in a balancing act, the Court also said that, while states cannot *interfere* with the return of a fugitive slave, state officials *may not be forced to cooperate* in the return of a fugitive slave. In response, many Northern states passed laws that prohibited state officials from cooperating, further enraging Southern states.

The other example is the infamous *Dred Scott* case which was decided in 1857.<sup>9</sup> It was one of the events that precipitated the Civil War (1861-1865) between the North and the South. The case started out as a common controversy over slave transit. A slave owner moved from Missouri, which was a slave state, and then to Illinois, which was a free state. He moved with Dred Scott, who was his slave. The standard practice then was to determine that if a slave owner moved with his slave to a free state with the intent to reside there, the slave became free. But in this case the slave owner eventually moved back to Missouri with Dred Scott. At this point, Dred Scott claimed that he was free because he had resided in a free state.

The U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taney tried to resolve the prolonged conflict over the status of blacks by making a clear decision in favor of slavery. First, the Court said that a black person could not be a citizen in any state, even if he was free. So Dred Scott was not a citizen, and because he was not a citizen, he did not have the right to sue in

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<sup>8</sup> *Prigg v. Pennsylvania*, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).

<sup>9</sup> *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).

federal courts.<sup>10</sup> In other words, the Court supposedly could not even hear his claims. Further, the Court added that Northern states were not allowed to deny slavery in the first place, and that slavery should be legal in any state.

The *Dred Scott* decision broke up the delicate compromise between Northern states and Southern states over the status of blacks. Instead of resolving the conflict, the decision led to a sense that a Constitutional compromise between the North and the South was no longer possible. Soon after, the Civil War between the two regions followed, with slavery as the major point of conflict.

### **The Fourteenth Amendment and federal citizenship**

One of the first things that Northern states did after their victory in the Civil War was to redefine the status of blacks through constitutional amendments and legislation. In particular, they tried to ensure that blacks would be treated as citizens across the United States, regardless of which state they were in. Recall the three components of citizenship: status, rights and protection. Northern states tried to make sure that all three components were granted to blacks.

First, blacks were given the *status* of citizenship. After abolishing slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Northern states drafted the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1868), which continues to be the most utilized constitutional provision today for the protection of civil rights. The Amendment for the first time defined federal citizenship in the U.S. Constitution by providing that all persons born under the jurisdiction of the United States were *federal* citizens and citizens of the *state* in which they reside. While it did not use the word blacks, everyone understood that the purpose of this provision was to overturn the *Dred Scott* decision, which had said that blacks could not be a citizen in any state.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, all blacks born in the U.S.

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<sup>10</sup> Under the U.S. Constitution, Article III, federal courts have jurisdiction when the case involves federal law or citizens of different states. *Dred Scott* brought suit under the latter (which is called “federal diversity jurisdiction”). So as a preliminary matter, the court had to establish that parties to the suit were “citizens” from different states. The Supreme Court decision (written by Chief Justice Roger Taney) expanded this preliminary discussion into a full-scale denial of black citizenship.

automatically had *both federal* citizenship and *state* citizenship. Second, blacks were given the *rights* of citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment said that all states had to respect the privileges and immunities of *citizens of the United States*. This meant that all blacks, who were now U.S. citizens, had rights as U.S. citizens that states had to respect. Third, blacks were given the *protection* afforded to citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce its provisions. This meant that the federal government can step in to protect the rights of black citizens if Southern states deprived their rights.

All of this was the product of war which the South only reluctantly accepted. In reality, as the excitement of the war faded, much of this Amendment was resisted and eroded by the South. In just a few decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, its ideals had crumbled. While blacks were nominally citizens, the other two components, rights and protection, did not follow. First, the rights of federal citizens were interpreted narrowly by the U.S. Supreme Court.<sup>11</sup> Second, the power of Congress to protect the rights of federal citizens was also interpreted narrowly.<sup>12</sup> The Court held that Congress could not *directly* engage in the protection of civil rights, but had to act through the *states*. In other words, discrimination between state citizens was to be dealt with by the states.

This meant that blacks had to ask state governments for the protection of their rights. But Southern states were not inclined to protect the rights of blacks as citizens. So in reality, it became much like the situation before the Civil War. Southern states continued to deny citizenship to blacks (though blacks were nominally citizens), while Northern states and the federal government withdrew attention. Blacks had to wait until the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964 before serious federal enforcement of their rights resumed.<sup>13</sup>

### **Citizenship and federalism: EU and East Asian Community?**

As the U.S. example shows, in order for the idea of citizenship to be complete, there needs to be a triangle of status, rights, and protection.

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<sup>11</sup> *The Slaughterhouse Cases*, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).

<sup>12</sup> *The Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

<sup>13</sup> The Civil Rights Act of 1957 provided for a federal supervision of the voter registration process (in order to secure the right to vote to blacks), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed segregation in public facilities and discrimination in employment, among other items.

Without any of the three, the other components fail. A declaration of rights is meaningless if there is no means of enforcement when rights are deprived. The United States has struggled with the idea of federal citizenship because states could not come to an agreement over the treatment of blacks. The initial solution was to let each state decide the status of blacks, on the basis of state citizenship. The U.S. Constitution initially avoided defining federal citizenship or attaching rights to federal citizenship, in respect of the states.

As an exercise in application, consider whether current nations in the process of regional and political integration could form an integrated citizenry. In other words, could an East Asian Community aspire to a federal citizenship?

The European Union, while it is not yet as integrated as the United States, is moving towards such citizenship. In terms of status, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the idea of EU citizenship. So far, it is based on being a citizen of one of the member states. In terms of rights, the same Treaty has established rights that attach to EU citizenship. For example, an EU citizen has the right to free movement across any of the member states. Finally, in terms of protection, the European Union has established mechanisms to protect the rights of EU citizens. The European Court of Human Rights adjudicates claims made by EU citizens regarding the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.<sup>14</sup>

Is an Asian Community citizenship possible? Under this idea, there would be an Asian citizenship in addition to Japanese, Chinese, or Korean citizenship. There would be rights as Asian citizens, which they can assert in any member state. This may include the right of free movement under which Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans are free to move around and settle in any member state. Finally, there would be a mechanism to protect the rights of Asian citizens. For example, there would be an Asian Court of Human Rights that listens to claims by any Asian citizen against any member state.

Historically and politically this is a far-fetched proposition. But few people in the United States imagined in 1787 that blacks would become

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<sup>14</sup> While the European Convention on Human Rights has a broader constituency than the EU, all EU member states have ratified the Convention and have accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.

U.S. citizens and that there would be a black President.<sup>15</sup> Few people in Europe imagined in 1914 (before the two World Wars) that there would be an integrated Europe with the notion of EU citizenship. So I think it is about time for Asia to begin to think about federalism, citizenship and integration.

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<sup>15</sup> In 2008, Barack Obama became the first black person to become the U.S. President.

## **Japan in American Political Discourse: Problem Definition and Policy Analysis since the 1980s**

Alistair Q. Howard

Opening a recent Congressional hearing, the chairman complained that Japan receives only “scant attention” in Washington.<sup>1</sup> While China had become far more important, he said, Japan’s “stagnant economy and politics” had eroded its cachet. As early as 2002, NY Times writer Paul Krugman remarked that Americans now believed “we had nothing to learn from Japan – except how a country can stumble when it lacks adequate business and political leadership”<sup>2</sup> Two decades earlier, however, the situation was reversed. Asahi Shimbun’s editor, for example, said many Japanese “compared America to a sick and ill-humored uncle who is suffering from financial and family problems, paying no attention to chastity or discipline.”<sup>3</sup> It was commonplace for American elites to admire Japan’s economic system. How is this reversal reflected in American political discourse?

In this paper I explore one aspect of the attention Washington gives Japan: the use of statements about Japan to help Americans see *themselves* in a comparative light. Frequently, for example, critics of American education point to better mathematics scores in Japan as evidence that Washington is failing its students. And the present health care debate is replete with allusions to better, more cost-effective medical outcomes in Japan, France and elsewhere. On the other hand, our regulatory and financial systems are compared favorably to those in Japan.

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<sup>1</sup> Chairman’s Opening Remarks, 2009, “Japan’s Changing Role,” In *Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee*, Washington. The chairman is Delegate Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa) The ranking minority member, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) complained that Washington took Japan for granted.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Krugman, 2002b, “Dealing with W,” *New York Times*, 1 October, (31).

<sup>3</sup> Margaret Shapiro and Fred Hiatt, 1988, “Confident Japanese see United States in Serious Decline,” *Washington Post*, 3 July.

And before 2008, at least, conservative economists cited America's healthier banking sector with pride. In each case the advocate is implicitly claiming that it is appropriate to measure ourselves against Japan and, in some cases, perhaps even learn from Japan.

These claims are designed to delineate or define policy-relevant *problems* and sometimes also to discover policy *solutions* abroad. Problem definition is a crucial part agenda setting in any polity,<sup>4</sup> and policy actors use a range of symbolic devices, including stories, history and metaphor to push their concerns up the problem agenda.<sup>5</sup> And as classical rhetoricians knew, comparison (involving similarity, difference, degree) is an essential element of this kind of deliberative or legislative speech. The argument underpinning my research is that international comparisons can and should take a greater role in these debates here in the US. It can be used to help people see their problems in a relative light (the problem definition stage) and also to help generate policy solutions (policy specification stage).

In order to justify this research program, I begin with a more theoretical discussion of policy discourse, problem definition, and international comparison. I offer a framework for analysis of political arguments, specifying the different ways problems are defined and the different kinds of *international comparative argument* (ICA). In the empirical portion of the paper, I summarize my analysis of *problem defining* ICA that includes Japan. Thus, for example, we hear that Americans' household savings rate has declined over time, and we also hear that it is much lower than Japan's. The latter claim is an international comparative argument; the former is an historical argument.<sup>6</sup>

So, in the empirical discussion my unit of analysis is the policy *argument*, specifically those arguments invoking conditions in Japan in overt or implicit comparison to conditions in the United States. To locate these arguments, I searched published content from a diverse set of legislative, executive and media sources. From the legislative branch, I searched economic committees of the House of Representatives and Senate,

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<sup>4</sup> John Kingdon, 1984, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

<sup>5</sup> Deborah A. Stone, 1997, *Policy Paradox : the art of political decision making*, New York: W.W. Norton.

<sup>6</sup> Readers should note that I do not address foreign, diplomatic, or military policy issues, except where these are used to cast comparative light on America itself.

including the Joint Economic Committee, since at least 2000. From the executive branch, I searched presidential election debates since 1960 and campaign speeches from the 2008 election. I also searched articles from the leading twenty editorialists publishing in American newspapers.

Readers should note that my broader research program is neither Japan-specific nor focused on Japan-US relations. Instead, my interest is on the ways foreign comparisons enter political communication. I also focus, in this paper at least, on political economy and the comparisons mentioned in the main economic committees on Capitol Hill. I hope, nonetheless, that my findings will interest participants at the Akita conference. It should do so in part because this research program ‘travels well’—across policies and countries. What would a similar analysis of Japanese policy discourse reveal? Do Japanese policy advocates point to conditions abroad when defining policy problems? Does Japan measure itself internationally? If so, who are the relevant comparators and why? Is it ever taboo to compare Japan to other countries?

### **Policy discourse, problem definition, and framing**

Significant policy change, fortunately enough, demands debate. No rational calculus determines which problems are prioritized by governments, or what solutions are considered. Agendas and decisions are conditioned by institutional and structural settings, group power resources, public preferences, and actors' strategic moves. Yet too often political scientists focus on these variables and fail to take seriously the debate itself. To really grasp politics we need to understand the arguments which help construct interests, preferences, and options: we need to look at the *political discourse*.<sup>7</sup> Introducing this notion to comparative political economists, Vivien Schmidt defined *discourse* as “whatever policy actors say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy program.”<sup>8</sup> In my view a central and under-studied element of discourse (in comparative politics at least) is the ways problems are defined and connected to preferred policies. In his work on American politics, John Kingdon argued that *problem definition* is crucial element in state agenda setting, along with

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<sup>7</sup> On the role of argument and persuasion in international relations see Neta Crawford, 2009, "Homo Politicus and Argument (Nearly) All the Way Down: Persuasion in Politics," *Perspectives on Politics*, 7 (1).

<sup>8</sup> Vivien Schmidt, 2002, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press.



policy specification and political dynamics.<sup>9</sup> To understand what is going on in government we need to carefully examine “what people thought of prevailing socioeconomic conditions, what claims and grievances interested parties brought forward, and how they debated and assessed these problems.”<sup>10</sup>

The notion of *frames*, derived from the social movement literature, can help clarify this process. Frames are “schemata of interpretation” which render events meaningful by enabling people to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” them.<sup>11</sup> Successful advocates understand the need to frame their positions and demands in ways which resonate with public perceptions. At the same time frames can change—they are inter-subjective and dialogically mutable.<sup>12</sup> This idea of ‘reframing’ will figure into my contention that international comparisons are a viable strategy in American political discourse, even if they are not common today.

Like social movements, policy advocates of all kind seek support and participation by framing their issues, claims, and preferences in ways that resonate with the public, or alternatively shape the public’s frames of reference.<sup>13</sup> *Diagnostic framing* is one of the key framing tasks.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> John Kingdon, 1984, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

<sup>10</sup> Charles W. Anderson, 1978, "The logic of public problems: evaluation in comparative policy research," In *Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods*, ed. Douglas E. Ashford, Beverly Hills: Sage.

<sup>11</sup> Erving Goffman, 1974, *Frame Analysis*, New York: Harper & Row.

<sup>12</sup> This means that, while advocates and groups attempt to frame their issues in ways that resonate with the audience (public or elite), the resulting dialogue may result in subtle transformations for both the advocate and the audience change. Framing is interactive.

<sup>13</sup> David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr, Steven K. Worden and Robert B. Benford, 1986, "Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation," *American Sociological Review*, 51 (August):464-481, Robert B. Benford and David A. Snow, 2000, "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assesment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26:611-639.

<sup>14</sup> The SM literature defines three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing (identifying and amplifying problems), prognostic framing (articulating what to do) and motivational framing (actually promoting mobilization). See Rory McVeigh, Daniel J. Myers and David. Sikkink, 2004, "Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social Movements," *Social Forces*, 83 (2)..

Essentially it is an attempt to convince people that their problems are severe enough to warrant policy intervention, and that they should support the group or candidate that will intervene accordingly. Social psychologists have described this as shaping grievance interpretation.<sup>15</sup> Objective situations are plainly given a wide variety of subjective meanings—many of which are not associated with discontent, let alone political activism. Scholars of the American civil rights movement, for example, speak of a “cognitive liberation” by which social situations that are once seen as just or immutable come to be seen as unjust and changeable.<sup>16</sup> A similar process of diagnostic reframing goes on in the broader polity when people begin to see their social, economic or other conditions as problems rather than merely facts of life. Change may be intentional (promoted by some agent) or merely the result of diffuse circumstantial processes (such as global integration). In terms of problem definition, these transformations involve cognitive, normative, and even epistemic changes as new standards of evidence and evaluation are brought to bear on a condition. Our grievance interpretations can change as we acquire new evidence, and perhaps more so as *new kinds of evidence* is brought to bear on some condition.<sup>17</sup>

In short, diagnostic framing is a political process of social construction which is both communicative (persuading) and interactive (helping shape attitudes reflexively). It goes on in organizations (as when a legislative oversight committee selects issues for consideration and rationalizes its choice in a press release), and in individuals (for example, when someone decides that something about their economic situation is relevant to voting choice, and justifies it as such to a pollster).

### **Problem Definition: Evaluation and Comparison for Diagnostic Framing**

But how is a condition framed as a problem? In any problem definition there is, implicitly or otherwise, some kind of comparative evaluation:

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<sup>15</sup> Iain Walker and Heather Smith ed, 2002, *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development & Integration*: New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>16</sup> Doug McAdam, 1982, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, 1977, *Poor People's Movements*, New York: Vintage Books.

<sup>17</sup> Thus, for example, Soviet elites relied on people's sense that life was better than it had been in the past. They encountered troubles when opening to the West brought heretofore unavailable comparative evidence that life was, on the other hand, better elsewhere.

present circumstances are judged by one or more purportedly appropriate standards ('things are this way, they should be that way'). In this sense all problem definition involves comparison, generally to some expectation or goal they have developed or internalized. For individuals this standard is likely to derive from a socially common abstract ideal or prevailing prototype (I should have access to better health care, but do not), or some empirical comparative referent (I should be better off than those folks in the next neighborhood, but am not). Social comparison theory suggests that comparisons to other individuals or groups (or to our beliefs about them) are easier for people than references to some abstract absolute.

What are the possible alternative standards of comparative evaluation? To what do people compare their condition, whether in private reflection or in campaigning rhetoric? The following are the most common standards of evaluation for purposes of diagnostic framing.

1. To analogous conditions for *nearby others*, including family, neighbors and community; to other cities, states, or other regions within the home nation--perhaps expressed in public discourse in statistical terms such as an average; [Within-nation comparison]
2. To some notion of past *historical conditions*, perhaps on a generational time scale ("my parents had it easier") or on a political time scale ("things were better under Clinton"); [Historical comparison]<sup>18</sup>
3. To some abstract *nationally-bounded myth or ideal* about what is possible and desirable (perhaps the 'New Jerusalem' or the Colonial-era 'City on the Hill'); or to some national *constitutional or legally specified condition*, if available (where rights to economic well-being are codified); [National ideal]
4. To an *abstract myth or ideal* which is *not* nationally bounded (for example, to a view of perfect market competition, or to

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<sup>18</sup> See Andrew R. Murphy, 2009, "Longing, Nostalgia, and Golden Age Politics: The American Jeremiad and the Power of the Past," *Perspectives on Politics*, 7 (1).

- some religious or ideological ideal)  
[Supra-national ideal]
5. To some *foreign case* or other: an international comparative argument  
[International comparison]

<b>Table 1: Comparisons in Problem Definition</b>	
<b>Standard of comparison</b>	<b>Form</b>
1. Within-nation	Things are much better in California! We must improve here!
2. Historical	Things were better for our parents! We must reform...
3. National ideal	We're not living up to our national goals! Let's changing things...
4. Supra-national ideal	We're not living up to our religious ideals! We should do more...
5. International (international comparative argument)	Things are better in Japan! We must improve here!

We can easily cite examples of each. At first glance, perhaps the second, third and fourth of this list are most common in public discourse. Certainly the idea that 'things aren't as good as they were' is a pervasive trope across all policy areas in the United States. But how common are international comparisons? And how does Japan figure into these arguments?

Before turning to the evidence on Japan, I review the various functional forms international comparisons take.

### **International Comparative Argument**

In fact, international comparative argument can fulfill several purposes—in both the problem definition and policy specifying stages of policy making. Table 2 sets out varieties of ICA, organized by agenda setting function: is the argument meant to frame a problem, or is it meant to specify one or more solutions? We might label the first '*diagnostic*' or '*prognostic*' framing. That is, the problem is diagnosed or defined, and future prospects are delineated or predicted (do we have a problem at all? How much worse is it likely to get?). We can label the second

‘*prescriptive*’ framing: (what can we do about the problem? What have others done to solve the problem?).

For each function, the argument has various purposes. For diagnostic and prognostic framing, the the argument might help establish some condition as a problem (problem *discovery*), to help establish some problem as worse at home than it is abroad—and therefore worthy of attention (problem *averring*), and finally to help establish a condition as much better at home than abroad—and so not worthy of attention (problem *refuting*). Each function is instantiated in the third column of Table 2.

<b>Table 2: Forms of International Comparative Argument</b>		
<b>Framing function</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Form</b>
International comparative <i>problem framing</i>  (diagnostic & prognostic)	Problem <i>discovery</i>	They see x as a problem, so should we.
	Problem <i>averring</i>	Look how much worse problem x is here than over there...
	Problem <i>refuting</i>	Look how much worse problem x is over there than here
International comparative <i>policy specification</i>  (prescriptive framing)	Policy <i>attesting</i>	It works there, and will work here
	Policy <i>impugning</i>	It doesn’t work there, and won’t work here
	Post facto policy <i>rationale</i>	They did it, and so have we
	Policy <i>demonstration</i>	If we do it here, other countries will too

For prescriptive framing, the argument might *attest* to a policy (we should adopt some foreign solution), *impugn* a policy (we should not adopt some foreign solution) or *rationalize* some solution after the fact (ex post facto rationalization). Finally, there are times when a policy entrepreneur might argue for a policy that he or she wants adopted elsewhere, arguing that *demonstrating* it at home could result in policy diffusion abroad.

In the next section I look for evidence of these kinds of argument in American political-economic discourse when Japan is mentioned. I begin with a brief sketch of elite and popular attitudes about Japan in the US.

## Comparing the US and Japan

Almost twenty years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote about American exceptionalism and Japanese uniqueness—but nonetheless found comparison useful. He remarked on the sense among scholars and other American elites that “Japan will do better than the United States in the future... because its group-oriented culture is better suited to the economic structure of a post-industrial society.”<sup>19</sup> This sense was both political-institutional and political-economic. Japan was supposed to have demonstrated its effectiveness in bureaucratic competence, policy innovation, coordination and implementation.<sup>20</sup> Its political institutions were admired for purportedly their less adversarial nature. Conservatives (if not neo-liberals) admired the country’s national cohesion and integration, and even aspects of its non-socialist state-guided economy.

Most attention was paid to the political-economic and industrial spheres. Indeed, it is now almost 40 years since Peter Drucker argued that American industry should draw lessons from Japan’s management.<sup>21</sup> During the 1980s and early 1990s a number of widely cited comparative studies emerged and leading scholars in the US and Europe explored the cultural and institutional sources of Japan’s apparent comparative industrial advantages.<sup>22</sup> These included better corporate organization and governance, less financial myopia, leaner management, more egalitarian remuneration structures, greater worker participation in quality control. Columnists like Thomas Friedman applauded Japanese

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<sup>19</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, 1994, "Binary comparisons: American exceptionalism--Japanese uniqueness," In *Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance*, eds. Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

<sup>20</sup> Harvey Feigenbaum, Richard Samuels and R. Kent Weaver, 1993, "Innovation, coordination and implementation in energy policy," In *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, eds. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, Washington: Brookings Institution.

<sup>21</sup> Peter Drucker, 1971, "What we can learn from Japanese management," *Harvard Business Review* (March/April).

<sup>22</sup> In comparative political economy (and particularly the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature) Japan is grouped with the coordinated economies but is also clearly quite different from others. Like France, perhaps, Japan is sui generis.

companies for trying to keep workers employed and prioritizing employment over shareholders.<sup>23</sup>

As we shall see below, conservatives were more skeptical. With characteristic national self-confidence, for example, the columnist Charles Krauthammer saw no reason to envy 'Japan Inc.' Perhaps for related reasons he decried the Japan bashing and economic nationalism that was so widespread during the early 1990s. For Krauthammer, Japan's success posed no long term threat, but was on the contrary being driven by America's happy consumers.<sup>24</sup>

### **Japan in Public Opinion Today**

Japan today is less salient for Americans; but is regarded in a broadly positive light. In a 2000 Gallup poll Americans ranked the US as the 'world's leading economic power' (65%) with Japan ranked second at 16%. The same poll in 2008 found 40% thought China was the world's leading power, 33% the US, and 13% Japan [CHECK]. Looking forward twenty years, 10% thought Japan would be the global leader, with 44% for China and 31% for US. Japan's second place ranking in the GDP stakes (4,340,133M versus US 13,201,819) apparently ignored.<sup>25</sup>

Foreign economic relations undoubtedly affect the American public's views of Japan. A survey of legislative questions reveals that the dominant suspicions of the 1980s and 1990s (Japanese trading practices, currency manipulation, and even foreign direct investment in the US) are far less salient today—although not entirely absent. More important, however, are concerns about Japan's holding of US public sector debt and the failure of Japan to raise domestic demand sufficiently to help rebalance the global economy. The symbolic power of Japanese

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<sup>23</sup> Thomas Friedman, 1996, "Japan Inc. Revisited," *New York Times*, 25 February: 15.

<sup>24</sup> In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Krauthammer opined, "It is a blot on America that not two weeks after the official death of our great superpower enemy, our leaders are competing with each other to create a new superpower enemy -- Japan -- to serve as repository of our collective resentments." Charles Krauthammer, 1992a, "America's Case of the Sulks," *Washington Post*, 1 May:7. In 2006 he was still singing Japan's praises as a foreign friend, calling it "a model international citizen -- dynamic economy, stable democracy, self-effacing foreign policy" and America's best ally but for Britain. Charles Krauthammer, 2006, "World War Two is Over," *Washington Post*, 20 October:21.

<sup>25</sup> Alec Gallup, 2009, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2008*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

purchases of American real estate and the erosion of domestic auto companies' market power, however, have been replaced by China's currency maneuvers and export power.

Still, overall Japan is viewed positively by Americans. Gallup's 2008 World Affairs Survey found Japan had an 80% favorable rating and 15% unfavorable rating with a net favorable rating of 65%, comparable to Germany but below Britain's and Canada's mid-80s net favorable.<sup>26</sup> The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 2006 Image of Japan Study showed that Japan was seen as a dependable ally by 69% of the public and 91% of opinion leaders—of whom 85% evaluated US-Japan cooperation positively.<sup>27</sup>

### **Japan in American Legislative Discourse**

What follows is based on a systematic content analysis of legislative branch materials from the key committees with oversight of macroeconomic, finance, industrial, and health care policy. In preparing this paper, I searched hearings since 2000 (and in some cases well before) for all instances of international comparative argument involving Japan. Congressional hearings have the advantage of including, in one place ordered by salient issue, a range of broadly accepted opinion from the interest group and think-tank universe as well as the opinions of legislators. Transcripts and testimony were gathered and coded for a range of variables. I offer a narrative summary and discussion of the material. This is supplemented by a review of leading opinion editorialists and presidential election campaign material (debates since 1960 and speeches from the 2008 campaign).

### **Macro-economic Performance & Counter-cyclical Policy**

Throughout this decade Japan is periodically invoked in macroeconomic policy debates. For the most part Japan was mentioned in problem-framing (diagnostic and prognostic) moments, rather than policy specifying (prescribing) moments. Within the problem-framing moment, it figures chiefly in *problem refuting* and *policy impugning* forms. That is, Japan's poor economic growth was cited as evidence that the American economy was doing comparatively well (prior to the current recession), and Japan's supposed policy failures are used to counter any idea that similar policies be tried in the US.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/survey/summary2006.html>



Perhaps more interesting is the quite *contradictory* nature of the way Japanese experience is used. I comment on the three most interesting contradictions in the following sections. First, there is a tension between the way we think now about the “Japanese model” and the fact that its industrial leaders continue to succeed in ways that are important to ordinary Americans. Second, there has been a curious inversion of the way we view ourselves (consuming imported goods using borrowed money) and the way we view the Japanese (who, it turns out, are not consuming near enough for the health of the global economy). Third, I summarize the way different sides of the American fiscal policy divide have used Japan to justify their preferred policies.

### **The Failed Japanese Model: *Schadenfreude*, but still the same old fears?**

Japan is now portrayed *both* as a failed model (in the sense that we might justifiably have emulated it in the past) and at the same time, as a worrying economic power purchasing America’s external debt. Inevitably the dominant media portrait of Japan’s macro-economy since the mid-1990s was of comparative failure—the end of the miracle. As America’s long boom began in 1992 Japan Inc. remained, as one Senator put it, “stuck in neutral.” And despite regular suggestions that the worst was over, including most recently in 2006, the economy did not resume sustainable growth, and it suffered (as it had not during the 1990s) from a dramatic drop in global trade.

This record is widely represented in comments of Congressional witnesses and members themselves. Neo-liberal and other conservative journalists saw Japan’s fate as a vindication of their supply-side policies. Throughout the late 1990s there was a distinct sense of *schadenfreude* at the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times, as well as eager anticipation that norms of shareholder value, creative destruction, and labor market flexibility were about to break out across Japan.<sup>28</sup> The expected diffusion of Anglo-capitalist norms and institutions did not, of course, occur. In March 2009 David Brooks described Japan’s economy as “horrificing,” and conservatives in both American parties have been especially damning of Japan’s ‘failed’ fiscal stimulus, huge public debt, and zombie banks.

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<sup>28</sup> In addition, comparative political economists seemed to abandon their earlier fascination with Japan and turn instead to the European social market economies.

Yet at the same time, Congressmen voice concern about Japanese (and Chinese) holdings of American debt and the power this may bring in the future. While China raises much greater foreign policy worry, Japan's sizeable holdings mean it is inevitably mentioned in the same breath. There is still a sense that we are 'in hoc' to a foreign country, and that country cannot, it follows, be entirely without merit.

There is also a more immediate source of the contradictory nature of Japan comparisons. While American elites and comparative economists may emphasize Japan's systemic failure, consumers, voters and workers still understand that it is Japanese-branded automobiles and electronics that they are buying. In the real economy, as opposed to the global marketplace of ideas, 'good' jobs still seem to be flowing East—and Congressmen in particular have to face this fact.

### **The good American consumer**

The lack of sustainable domestic demand in Japan raises twin corollaries for Americans who had been told, a decade before, that they must adopt Japanese economic virtues of thrift and industrial competitiveness. First, it became a commonplace during the 2000s that Japan (like other Asian economies) needed to import more to redress global financial imbalances. In part this was because of exchange rate policy and market access, but it also implied something about Japanese consumers –and by extension something about American consumers. Second, domestic savings rates in Japan were far too high. Thus, it seemed, Japanese people were being asked to act like decadent American consumers: save less and buy more stuff from abroad. America's consumer and debt-led economy roared ahead and this could be rationalized, by those who think about these things, by an inverted sense that it was the Japanese who were behaving badly.

### **Japanese deflation: there but for the grace of God go we**

The relevance of Japan to American macroeconomic policy has, for key players in the Congressional hearings, shifted in interesting ways over the past decade. The narrative unfolds over the business cycle, from its low-points in 2001 to the 2009. The central question is whether America is (or was) likely to go the way of Japan. The argument turned on how comparable the two economies are.

On one side were center-left critics of America's bubble economy and economists or journalists who were broadly sympathetic to New Keynesian thought. On the other side were conservative and mainstream economists and policy makers at the top of the Bush Administration and the Federal Reserve. Ben Bernanke plays a central role in this unfolding narrative, which begins with the American recession of 2001.

The progressive economist-cum-journalist Paul Krugman has written more about Japan's economy than any other opinion-editorialist during the period I surveyed. He became, he said, obsessed with Japan because:

“it really bothered me to see a wealthy, politically stable country seemingly unable to pull itself out of a simple demand-side slump...And to me America's prospects of avoiding a similar fate look very good.”<sup>29</sup>

Krugman was concerned both about structural similarities of the two economies and the possibility that America's authorities might make similar mistakes. Thus, in 2002 he criticized the Bank of Japan for refusing to deal first with stagnation and then with deflation, and worried that Greenspan would do the same.<sup>30</sup> Krugman added that the danger was not merely the burst asset bubble (in 2001 the internet stock bubble) but rather one of persistent long-term underperformance: a failure to sustain job-creating growth and prevent capacity under-utilization. He hoped that, forewarned by Japanese experience, the Fed would take appropriate monetary action to restore growth. By keeping rates low throughout the 2000s, the Greenspan Fed did just that—but without the industrial policies Krugman would also have recommended the result was another, much more severe asset bubble, this time in the housing market.

In a separate 2002 column Krugman listed those factors that, at the end of the 1990s, had made America's economy safer: the Federal Reserve Board's scope for lowering interest rates, a stronger fiscal position (ie: an emerging Federal budget surplus), better corporate governance, and stable,

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<sup>29</sup> Paul Krugman, 2000, "Reckonings: Goldilocks and the Bears," *New York Times*, 16 April, (15). Across the body of his work it is notable that Krugman thought Japan's policy failures were understandable given the context and information facing them. His is a nuanced reading of Japan's experience: the full implications of the output gap were hidden by very slow growth between 1991 and 1998.

<sup>30</sup> Paul Krugman, 2002d, "Passing the Buck," *New York Times*, 3 September, (19).

non-inflated housing prices.<sup>31</sup> Krugman's worry was that these conditions no longer held in the wake of Enron-WorldCom, the job-less recovery of the early 2000s, and the Bush tax-cuts. He wrote that "Our own situation is strikingly similar in some ways to that of Japan a decade ago."<sup>32</sup> The irony of course is that at the end of the Greenspan housing boom the relevant factors were much, much worse.

Apparently during the early 2000s economists at the Federal Reserve were also worried that the conventional monetary policy approach of cutting interest rates might one day no longer work. Chairman Greenspan confirmed Krugman's assertion that the Bank was studying what central bankers could do if Japan's deflation were replicated in the US.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Ben Bernanke prepared was advising the Bank of Japan at the time. And the failure of monetary policy is precisely what Bernanke, now in control at the Fed, confronted in 2008.

However, the official line during the early 2000s was that the Japan comparison was inappropriate. Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee that American financial intermediation was much more functional and so liquidity more easily available (typically, his emphasis was on the supply side): "I would say that the issue of Japan versus the United States is really two separate types of problems. We do not have that particular problem."<sup>34</sup> By the same token, Greenspan admitted a year later that Japan showed deflation was possible in a fiat money economy—something economists had previously thought implausible.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Paul Krugman, 2002a, "Mind the Gap," *New York Times*, 16 August, (17).

<sup>32</sup> Paul Krugman, 2003, "Fear of a Quagmire?," *New York Times*, 24 May, (15). Paul Krugman, 2002c, "Crisis in Prices," *New York Times*, 31 December, (19).

<sup>33</sup> The Fed staff conclusion was, apparently, "if you think deflation is even a possibility, throw money at the economy now and don't worry about overdoing it." Paul Krugman, 2002a, "Mind the Gap," *New York Times*, 16 August, (17).

<sup>34</sup> United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs., 2001, *Federal Reserve's second monetary policy report for 2001 : hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, first session on oversight on the monetary policy report to Congress pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, July 24, 2001*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., [Congressional Sales Office].

<sup>35</sup> United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee., 2003, *The economic outlook : May 2003 Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee*,

In a Joint Economic Committee meeting Senator Bennett specifically asked Greenspan to address the situation in Japan and what lessons could be learned.<sup>36</sup> Japan was not a good comparator, he reiterated. The key differences, Greenspan and others said, were in the banking system. In particular, Japanese unwillingness to liquidate bad debt—to take collateral and sell it, thereby forcing debtors into bankruptcy and clearing the debt—was especially problematic. Greenspan described this as a problem of ‘creative destruction’. Japanese banks were unwilling to be sufficiently destructive.<sup>37</sup>

With the housing collapse and 2008-9 recession, Congressional hearings began anew and Japan received more attention. In the House, Chairman Miller warned that Japanese macroeconomic experience is a cautionary tale—it could happen here.<sup>38</sup> The famously pessimistic (and prescient) economist Nouriel Roubini told the Joint Economic Committee in 2009 that we face a real risk of a Japan style recession.<sup>39</sup> The scenario was that even recapitalized banks might fail to lend their newfound liquidity. Krugman’s fears of eight years before seemed all the more relevant.

Again, mainstream economists and policy makers rejected the comparison. Japan was not relevant because their decade-long stagnation was compounded, if not caused, by bad monetary policy (late easing by the monetary authorities).<sup>40</sup> Japan wasn’t a good predictor of America’s fate because the banks themselves were too strong and were not allowed to fail. The Economist newspaper even reported, with only mild

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*Congress of the United States, One Hundred Eighth Congress* Ibid.: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor (2007), 2008a, *The impact of the financial crisis on workers' retirement security : field hearing before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, hearing held in San Francisco, CA, October 22, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Chairman Miller

<sup>39</sup> United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee., 2009, *Faltering economic growth and the need for economic stimulus : hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, October 30, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>40</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget., 2008, "Using Fiscal Policy to Bolster the US Economy," Washington: GPO.

skepticism, a 2002 Credit Suisse First Boston argument that Japan's slump was "in some ways" worse than America's Great Depression.<sup>41</sup>

However, by September 2008 Bernanke himself was suggesting that Japan might, in fact, hold portents for America's future. Financial crises of the sort seen that year, he said, had been accompanied by dreadful real-economy effects in Japan and elsewhere—all the more need for action in the United States. Thus Bernanke invoked Japan as a relevant comparator in describing how severe things were (or were likely to become) in the US.

And for quite different reasons, other conservatives argued that Japan *is* a good comparator—as anti-model for America. The Republican Congressman from Texas, Jeb Hensarling, repeatedly came back to Japan during the various House Budget Committee hearings: because their stimulus didn't work, neither would ours!<sup>42</sup> The Japanese stimulus efforts, he told witnesses in several hearings, raised per capita debt, reduced per capita income, and increased child poverty.<sup>43</sup> "What can we learn from their experience?" he asked.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> CSFB claimed that measures of output, real equity values and corporate profits in Japan remained lower in 2002 than they were immediately following the stock-market bubble in 1989. By contrast, the argument goes, output recovered to its pre-1929 levels by 1937 in Depression-era USA. Moreover, Japanese output was lower relative to extrapolated productive capacity had growth remained at its 1980s levels of approximately 4%. Of course, indicators of the real economic health of individuals (unemployment, for example), showed that Japan was much better off. And in any case, it is not clear that assuming indefinite growth of 4% p/a is appropriate given that this is unsustainable. 2002, "Checking the slumpometer," In *The Economist*, London, 1.

<sup>42</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget., 2009c, *Rising food prices : budget challenges : hearing before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, hearing held in Washington, DC, July 30, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>43</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget., 2009b, *Building a foundation for families : fighting hunger, investing in children : hearing before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, hearing held in Washington, DC, February 12, 2009*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>44</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget., 2009a, *The economic outlook and budget challenges : hearing before the Committee on*

### Japan as fiscal example?

But again, Japan offered confusing lessons. Democratic Rep Ken Bentson (D-TX-25) argued against deficit spending in 2001. “I don’t think that either of us would...want to mimic the Japanese in their approach,” he told his witness (Dan Crippen of the Congressional Budget Office). Like other conservatives, Bentson worried about the debt burden and its inflationary impact. As Crippen had said, however, “there is certainly, we assume, a limit to how much a government can borrow, although Japan’s activities make one wonder what that limit might be.”<sup>45</sup> Elsewhere both Greenspan and Bernanke had made the same point: it does seem possible, based on Japan’s experience to have massive fiscal borrowing and monetary expansion without inflation.

Krugman noted in 2002 that it was easy to make fun of Japan today—“all those bridges to nowhere.”<sup>46</sup> And anti-Keynesians among Congressmen and think-tank witnesses continue to regularly invoke Japan as a case of failed infrastructure spending.<sup>47</sup> In the next section I turn to the related area of industrial policy.

### Industrial Policy, Technology, Environment and Energy

While the Japanese industrial policy model as a whole was admired and feared during the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis now is on particular areas of green technology, energy and education policy as it relates to industry. For the most part, it is Democrats who cite the first, Republicans who cite the second, while both mention education.

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*the Budget, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, hearing held in Washington, DC, January 27, 2009,*

Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>45</sup> House Budget Committee, Sep 5 2001 p 97, 96

<sup>46</sup> Paul Krugman, 2002b, "Dealing with W," *New York Times*, 1 October, (31).

<sup>47</sup> United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee., 2008, *What should the federal government do to avoid a recession? : hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, January 16, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Rep. English United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee., 2009, *Faltering economic growth and the need for economic stimulus : hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, October 30, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Veder, AEI

In these policy areas the Japan comparator supports *problem discovery* (“they see efficiency as a problem; so should we”), *problem averring* (“their automobiles are more efficient than our own”) and *policy attesting* (“their green industrial policy is working and so we should adopt it”).

The content of presidential election debates demonstrates the shift from admiration of the Japanese model to admiration of specific efforts on the green technology and/or training and education. President Clinton, running for office in 1992 as Japan’s lost decade began, admired Japan’s state partnering with business (he also mentioned Germany).<sup>48</sup> He also cleverly played the Japanese PM’s widely reported sympathy for America.<sup>49</sup> Al Gore argued in 1992 and again in 2000 that Japanese help for green technologies was something we should emulate: “You know the Japanese are breathing down our necks on this.”<sup>50</sup> In 1992 he argued that American regulations were unnecessarily lax, asking why Keidanren was “arguing for tougher environmental standards than those embodied in US law?” and why MITI was calling on Japanese companies overseas to go beyond local environmental rules. He answered his question colorfully:

“Well, maybe they're just dumb about business competition. But maybe they know something that George Bush and Dan Quayle don't know -- that the future will call for greater efficiency and greater environmental efficiency.”<sup>51</sup>

Sixteen years on, Candidate Barack Obama repeatedly argued that Japan was ahead in the production of fuel efficient vehicles and other green technologies—although Germany, South Korea, and even Spain shared in his admiration. In three of the four debates against John McCain Obama mentioned that Japan (and South Korea) was ahead in high-efficiency car production.<sup>52</sup> The only other country he mentioned on industrial policy during the debates was China, which, he pointed out, now has a space program as well as admirable science and mathematics teaching.<sup>53</sup> Obama was even more admiring of Japan’s green industrial credentials in his campaign speeches. Its car companies, he said in 2007, are “running

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<sup>48</sup> The Third Clinton-Bush-Perot Presidential Debate, October 15, 1992.

<sup>49</sup> The Second Clinton-Bush-Perot Presidential Debate, October 15, 1992, Second Half

<sup>50</sup> The Second Gore Bush Presidential Debate, Oct 11, 2000

<sup>51</sup> The Gore-Quayle-Stockdale Vice Presidential Debate, October 13, 1992.

<sup>52</sup> The McCain Obama Presidential Debates.

<sup>53</sup> The First McCain Obama Presidential Debate, 26 September 2008



circles around our own.”<sup>54</sup> Elsewhere, has asked whether clean energy jobs would “flourish in countries like Spain, Japan, or Germany? Or will we create them here, in the greatest country on Earth, with the most talented, productive workers in the world.”<sup>55</sup> Finally, in his First State of the Union Address he argued that “We invented solar technology, but we've fallen behind countries like Germany and Japan in producing it.”<sup>56</sup>

Conservatives are generally hostile to industrial policy, except where it allows business to do things that are not possible in the US. Indeed, Republicans are happy to initiate the comparison in these cases. Thus, Dan Quayle argued that American liability laws imposed dreadful costs on companies which Japanese and German competitors did not suffer.

However, the most prominent area where Republicans initiate unflattering comparisons to Japan is on energy, and in particular their effectiveness in constructing nuclear power but also on Liquid Natural Gas terminals.<sup>57</sup> It is no coincidence, perhaps that these are areas where American regulatory standards are particularly constricting. Candidate Ronald Reagan said that nuclear power in the US was held back by regulation and permitting requirements—and that Japan (and Western Europe) were able to add nuclear generating capacity in half the time.<sup>58</sup> John McCain made the same point about nuclear reprocessing.<sup>59</sup>

Turning now to evidence from Congressional hearings, Japan appears only selectively. Witnesses or Congressmen occasionally offer up positive comparisons of infrastructure (Japanese broadband networks are

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<sup>54</sup> Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Real Leadership for a Clean Energy Future, Portsmouth NH, 8 October 2008

<sup>55</sup> Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: New Energy for America, Lansing, MI, August 04, 2008

<sup>56</sup> State of the Union Address, 24 Feb 2009. The Atlantic Magazine contested his assertion that Americans invented solar power; apparently Britain and France have a better claim. Likewise, Obama implied in the same speech that Americans had invented the automobile, neglecting German invention in this area.

[http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/02/america\\_invented\\_everything.php](http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/02/america_invented_everything.php)

<sup>57</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services., 2006, *Monetary policy and the state of the economy : hearing before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, second session, February 15, 2006*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>58</sup> The Carter-Regan Presidential Debate, October 28, 1980.

<sup>59</sup> The Second McCain-Obama Presidential Debate, October 7, 2008

up to 30 times faster, apparently);<sup>60</sup> or notice that they invest more in advanced automotive technologies; or that their scientific and technological activities are rapidly improving (as with patents and Nobel prizes).<sup>61</sup> Gone is the awe and resentment of the 1980s and 1990s.

Comparisons of training and education come from both sides of the political aisle. As one might expect, the comparisons (which are also to South Korea and others) tend to be justified in terms of economic competition. A witness from the National Governors' Association reported survey findings by Republican pollster Frank Luntz that:

“while Americans believe we have the most innovative nation in the world at the moment—ahead of China and Japan—they see America losing ground in 20 years. Why? According to the poll, Americans believe that other nations are more committed to education.... America cannot lead the new global economy if our educational system is lagging behind.”<sup>62</sup>

Overall, of course, there is little overt admiration for Japanese political economy on the American right. Responding to liberal/progressive calls for industrial policy in the US, the charge is invariably that Japan has

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<sup>60</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor (2007), 2008b, *Building an economic recovery package : creating and preserving jobs in America : hearing before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, hearing held in Washington, DC, October 24, 2008*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. Witness President of Chris Hansen, American Electronics Association

<sup>61</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce. Subcommittee on Education Reform., 2004, *Strengthening vocational and technical education : hearing before the Subcommittee on Education Reform of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, May 4, 2004*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>62</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor (2007). Subcommittee on Higher Education Lifelong Learning and Competitiveness., 2007, *The Higher Education Act : approaches to college preparation : hearing before the Subcommittee on Higher Education, Lifelong Learning, and Competitiveness, Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, hearing held in Washington, DC, March 22, 2007*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

failed. Thus, it tries and fails to ‘picks winners and losers,’ or is overly protective of industry,<sup>63</sup> or restricts economic flexibility. Each of these aspects of industrial policy, conservatives (and neo-liberals) charge have reduced growth and productivity in Japan.

Even in op-ed pages of newspapers these charges are sometimes quite specific. Charles Krauthammer argued in 1993 that Japan’s industrial policies were no model for the US: “government subsidies made almost no contribution to Japan's greatest successes: autos and consumer electronics.”<sup>64</sup> In 1999 the columnist Morton Kondracke, for example, described industrial policy as “a term from a bygone era, the 1980s”.<sup>65</sup> Republicans opposed it, he said, and were proven right “when Japan bet big on high-definition analog television while U.S. private-sector companies leapfrogged to digital TV. At about the same time, the Japanese "miracle" evaporated and the U.S. economy soared.”

Reflecting on our differences, Krauthammer wrote in 1987 that America was more creative scientifically and more dynamic entrepreneurially: “What we lack is their talent for rote productivity, their grim-faced efficiency, their assembly-line discipline.” Given the proper encouragement, our youth’s competitive spirit would win the day. Doubtless he would argue that his predictions were borne out by the history of the internet boom.<sup>66</sup> Around the same time, however, Keith McFarland of Business Week remarked that US manufacturing quality improved “primarily because America was getting its clock cleaned by the Japanese.”<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce., 2004, *The changing nature of the economy : the critical roles of education and innovation in creating jobs & opportunity in a knowledge economy : hearing before the Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, March 11, 2004*, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

<sup>64</sup> Charles Krauthammer, 1993, "Unintended Consequences of Reform," *Washington Post*, 5 March:21.

<sup>65</sup> Morton Kondracke, 1999, "Bush Improves, Everyone Panders," *The Daily Ardmoreite* 17 December.

<sup>66</sup> Elsewhere, Krauthammer colorfully compared Disney and Japan. Disney, he said, was “a triumph of discipline and simplification—a vision of Japan in America.” Charles Krauthammer, 1992b, "Disney World: A Vision of Japan in America," *Washington Post*, 24 January:23.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in William Safire, 2006, "Clean Your Clock," *New York Times Magazine*, 12 March:20.

## Conclusion & Discussion

This brief narrative has shown the changing and contradictory ways Japan is mentioned in American policy discourse. Historically Japan was invoked both as a diagnostic and prescriptive arguments (we're doing worse than them and we can learn from them). The great change has been from 'problem averring' argument in the 1980s and early 1990s (America's industry suffers in comparison to Japan's) to 'problem refuting' argument in the 1990s and 2000s (America's macroeconomic performance is fine compared to Japan's). Now Americans look at Japan in order to feel better about themselves rather than worse about themselves—at least for macro-economic policy if not energy and environmental policy. In contrast to the 1980s, today's Washington elites think they have little to learn in prescriptive terms from Japan. Where policy alternatives were invoked it was generally to show what we should *not* do: it was 'policy impugning.' Thus, for fiscal conservatives, we should not borrow and spend on fiscal stimulus because it does not work, as we see from Japan's lost decade. On the other hand, ironically, some economists argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, significant debt-financed fiscal expansion might be possible without inflationary effects (because it did so in Japan).

Overall, it may be that, in American politics, comparison for problem framing may be more likely than for policy specification. In other words, while we may resist importing foreign solutions, we can at least measure ourselves against foreign outcomes. Still, some believe that international comparisons are 'excluded arguments' in American politics. That is, Americans don't know much about what happens abroad, and care even less. Comparisons are unlikely to succeed and therefore rarely if heard. This was not the place to explore that view, and discussions of Japan give little evidence either way. But what we can say is that comparative argument should be more feasible today than ever before. There is much more international information available and it is much easier to access than ever before. Thus, international organizations and governments compile vast databases of comparative information and these are ever more easily available online. Many groups now compile indices of the indicators most likely to support their agenda. These offer tabular rankings, often with lengthy comment and suggestions for further reform. What they lack in nuance and context is made up in ease of availability. Indeed, they are essentially costless to access and, with some practice,

can be accessed immediately in the classroom or library.<sup>68</sup> Further research is needed to see whether these kinds of sites are beginning to enrich our policy discourse.

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<sup>68</sup> Some of the most popular in political economy are: The UN's Human Development Index; Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index; World Bank's Business Regulation Index; World Economic Council's World Competitiveness Index; Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index; Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index. A particularly useful innovation online is the meta-statistical website NationMaster, which offers a vast array of comparative data in both tabular and graph format. It offers comprehensive searching and, most interestingly, can produce scatter plots of two indicators. This has proven to be a tremendous teaching tool.

## A Perspective on Japanese Studies in the United States: American Academic Views of the Yasukuni Controversy during the Koizumi Era

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### Introduction

The controversy over the Japanese prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine colored Japanese domestic politics and relations with East Asian neighbors for the first several years of this century. In the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in April 2001, Koizumi promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as the premier on August 15. After his sweeping victory in the election, he visited the shrine once a year—six times in total until he left office in September 2006—although it was not until his last year when he visited the shrine exactly on the promised date.

Koizumi's visits to the shrine became the target of domestic and international controversy. Specifically, after he publicly promised the visit during the presidential election, the prime ministerial visit to the shrine received both domestic and international attention. Confronted with indignant responses from some neighboring countries, Koizumi seemed to attempt to ease the tensions at home and with the neighbors, especially with China by emphasizing that his visits were personal and by moving up a visit to the shrine to August 13, two days before the promised day, in the first year of his term.<sup>1</sup> Such attempts failed, and he continued to be met with wrath against his visits. Furthermore, the Yasukuni controversy was not a mere matter between the Japanese premier and his critics: Japan had to remain in a hostile relationship with its neighbors at both official

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding the inside stories about his Aug. 13 visit, see Tomisaka Satoshi, "Koizumi 'Yasukuni sanpai X-de' no uchimaku:'8.15' o nerau Koizumi, 'A-kyu senpan' no izoku wa ima," *Bungei Shunju* (August 2005): 145.

and civil levels until his successors decided not to inherit his confrontational line, either tacitly or openly.

The purpose of this article is to state the following two observations: First, it will survey how American researchers and scholars in or related to Japanese (and East Asian) studies have discoursed on this most heated topic in Japanese and East Asian international politics at the dawn of the new millennium. In addition to Japan and other East Asian countries, the Yasukuni controversy caught the attention of American journalists and academicians. To avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary to note that this article has no intention of claiming that these American academic views on the Yasukuni issue coincide with those in the White House, on Capitol Hill, or in the mass media.

As its second objective, this article will discuss how the academic discourses on the controversy represent the current state of Japanese (and East Asian) studies in the United States as this pertains to wartime history issues. Since the Yasukuni controversy is closely linked with and is itself a definite part of the so-called controversy on historical epistemology (*rekishi ninshiki mondai*), American scholars' views of the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine would simultaneously project their perceptions of Japanese wartime experiences and conduct in the 1930s and early 1940s, including the history of the shrine.

### **“For” and “Against” Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni**

Kevin M. Doak, Japanese studies at Georgetown University, approves of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. He judges that visiting Yasukuni should be a personal decision, maintaining in his article published in 2008:

From my perspective as a Catholic, the visits to Yasukuni shrine by successive prime ministers do not constitute a challenge to the constitutional separation of religion and state. Visits to Yasukuni do not violate the individual’s freedom of religion, whether that individual is Buddhist, Christian, or an adherent of any other religions; and just because the Emperor or Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or Diet members visit Yasukuni, it cannot mean that their actions violate, or pose a threat to, the religious rights of others.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Kevin M. Doak, “A Religious Perspective on the Yasukuni Shrine Controversy,” *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past*, ed. in John Breen (New York:

Doak also mentions:

I do not feel threatened in the slightest by Japanese people treating Yasukuni to mourn the war dead using traditional Shinto methods; in fact, I welcome it. After all, offering up one's family friends or fellow countrymen is the most sacred of acts. Former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro made a point of stating he visited Yasukuni precisely to pay his respects to those men and women who gave up their lives in the last war.<sup>3</sup>

For Doak, Koizumi's way of visiting Yasukuni is even a "halfway measure" in terms of showing respect, particularly, for those who sacrificed their lives for their country. Doak claims that Koizumi should not have hesitated to enter the sacred site of the shrine and that he could have visited not once a year but every month or even every week.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, Doak's position does not seem to win much support from other American scholars. In his message to H-Japan, "an international, nonpartisan electronic discussion group" in September 2001, weeks after Koizumi's first visit to Yasukuni, Chalmers A. Johnson, professor emeritus of University of California, San Diego and one of the greatest authorities on Japanese (and East Asian) studies in the United States, states:

I want to say to Mr. Koizumi and to the Japanese government in general: Please, no more gimmicks! We are tired of the Japanese never speaking their true thoughts (as, for example, on the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming and on the US's proposed weaponization of space under cover of a missile defense). The change from the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni on August 15 to August 13 was merely another formalistic gimmick. It makes no difference.<sup>5</sup>

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Columbia University Press,  
2008), 52.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 53-54.

<sup>5</sup> Chalmers A. Johnson, posting to H-Japan discussion on "the issues of Yasukuni and American imperialism," September 5, 2001, <http://www.h-net.org/~japan/> (accessed October 18, 2009).



Johnson then maintains, “The Prime Minister should never have gone to Yasukuni in the first place and should not have gone this year at any time.”<sup>6</sup> In an interview with notable Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria in August 2001, John W. Dower, modern Japanese history at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), indicated that he would have approved Koizumi’s choice to visit the shrine, though conditionally, as he mentions:

Almost every Japanese family lost someone in the war, and they must be able to mourn those people. But what Koizumi needed to do was not just go to Yasukuni, but to use it as an occasion to give a great cathartic speech about what Japan did to its neighbors and to its own people during World War II. He could have done for his country what Richard von Weisacker did for Germany.<sup>7</sup>

However, upon discovering that Koizumi did not act on his suggestion, Dower took a more critical stance in subsequent years. In May 2006, the historian—renowned for his series of works on Japan’s wartime-related topics—showed no tolerance to the Japanese premier’s visit to Yasukuni. He states in a condemnatory tone:

It is so that the dead have to be mourned, but why does Yasukuni have to be the place for that? It is linked with historical perception of World War II as a holy war in the Japanese perspective. To visit there would not be a mere mourning for the war dead. The [prime ministerial] visit mixes mourning with politics.<sup>8</sup>

Jordan A. Sand confronted his colleague in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Georgetown University. He does not deny that a prime minister has a right to visit Yasukuni; rather, he counters by contending that Japanese politicians continue to visit the shrine despite their awareness of political implications and their actions’ predictable diplomatic effects. Sand understands that the Japanese government has

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “Keeping the War Alive,” *Newsweek*, August 27, 2001, <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/082701.html> (accessed October 10, 2009).

<sup>8</sup> John W. Dower, “‘Rekishu ni mukiau’: ‘senso’ wa sokatsudekitanoka, Dawa kyoju,” interview by Miura Toshiaki, *Asahi Shinbun*, June 25, 2006, quoted in *Keijiban: kono kuni no katachi*, <http://www5e.biglobe.ne.jp/~konjak-1/konjakav/0879453307288749.html> (accessed October 10, 2009).

made no compensation for individual victims for Japanese colonialism and wars of aggression and that not a few Japanese politicians have never admitted their sufferings. The Asian-Pacific War remains a political issue between Japan and its past victims, and the kernel of the Yasukuni issue is how the Japanese government finds an interpretation of the past acceptable for Asian countries rather than arguing on the Japanese tradition of mourning, defining the visit as private or official, or judging it as a religious action or not. Sand also maintains that efforts to search for an ethical stance would have to start from distinguishing an individual's right to mourn and a state's responsibility for domestic and foreign victims.<sup>9</sup>

Sand refuses to even regard the Yasukuni shrine itself as a site for individual mourning, asserting:

The *raison d'être* of the shrine is to maintain the continuity between the wartime empire and the postwar regime in a emotional and spiritual level. The shrine is nothing but a place for the sake of mobilize current and future Japanese citizens to die for the state of today and the future. In the first place, the shrine was not facilities for private mourning. Despite significant changes of the Japanese society and worldview after 1945, it did not turn such place.<sup>10</sup>

### Proposed Solutions to Settle the Yasukuni Controversy

In addition to Johnson, Dower, and Sand, others who criticize Koizumi claim that the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni should be suspended at least to settle the dispute that Koizumi's visits induced between Japan and its neighbors. Another MIT professor in political science, Richard J. Samuels, believes that the suspension of the prime ministerial visits would be one process to improve Japan's poor reputation in East Asia due to its unwillingness to confront history.<sup>11</sup> John G. Ikenberry, political science and international affairs at Princeton University, shares Samuels' idea and suggests:

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<sup>9</sup> Jordan A. Sand, "America yori mita 'Yasukuni mondai': Doku-shi ni hanronsuru," *Kato Tetsuro no nechizun karejji*, May 3, 2007, <http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/nokato/data12.html> (accessed September 20, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Richard J. Samuels, "Waiting for Goldilocks: Getting Japan's Foreign Policy Just Right," *Audit of the Conventional Wisdom* (October 2006): 2.

Japan needs to find an honorable way to end the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni -- or quietly encourage the Shinto officials who run the shrine to remove the 14 names. But more than this, the next prime minister should try to make historical reconciliation a hallmark of his time in office.<sup>12</sup>

If the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni were suspended, would it cool down or cease the domestic and international dispute over the prime ministerial visits to the shrine and other history-related issues? In August 2006, Doak anticipated that no matter what Japan does, China is unlikely to stop protesting.<sup>13</sup> The recent suspension of the visit to the shrine by Koizumi's three short-lived LDP successors—Abe Shinzo (t. 2006-2007), Fukuda Takeo (t. 2007-2008), Aso Taro (t. 2008-2009), and now Hatoyama Yukio of the Democratic Party of Japan (t. 2009—)—seem to have made China more taciturn than before. This might prove that Doak's opponents had keen insight into the effects on Sino-Japanese relations with the suspension of prime ministerial visits. However, it would be premature to regard the current relative calmness over the history-related disputes as the demise of the controversy on historical epistemology, including the Yasukuni controversy.

John H. Miller of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies refuses to be optimistic about Japan's liberation from the history problem, including the Yasukuni issue. He believes that the history problem can be "reduced to more manageable proportions by limiting flash points exploitable" by "growing Japanese apology fatigue and the apparently ineradicable suspicion and hostility of its neighbors," and mentions:

The history problem will not go away with generational change and the passage of time. It cannot be exorcised by claims that "Japan has faced its past." It cannot be resolved through dialogue and goodwill gestures. It cannot be finessed by clever diplomacy and grandiloquent summit communiqués. And it cannot be overcome by

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<sup>12</sup> John G. Ikenberry, "Japan's History Problem," *The Washington Post*, 17 Aug. 17, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/16/AR2006081601427.html> (accessed October 19, 2009).

<sup>13</sup> Doak, interview by Hyakawa Toshiyuki, "'Yasukuni' to sengo Nihon: Bei Jojitaundai Kebin Doku kyoju ni kiku chu" *Sekai Nippo*, August 29, 2006, <http://www.worldtimes.co.jp/special2/yasukuni/main.html> (accessed October 5, 2009).

more apologies and greater shows of contrition.<sup>14</sup>

Nor would it mean that the Japanese no longer expect their political leaders to visit the shrine. John K. Nelson, University of San Francisco in religious studies, notes:

Until the individuals and organizations affiliated with Yasukuni Shrine discover alternatives of an equally empowering or emotionally satisfying scope, we should not be surprised that the shrine continues to provide solace and legitimacy through its seductive embrace of nation, social memory, and the moral certitude of ritual practices.<sup>15</sup>

A Sino-Japanese joint poll survey conducted by Genron NPO and China Dairy (*Zhongguo Ribao*) in the summer of 2008 proves the validity of Nelson's observation. It shows that 72.2 percent of one thousand Japanese respondents over 18 years of age approved of the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni.<sup>16</sup>

Scholars who are critical of the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni do not believe that the suspension of the visits would be the only necessary action to put an end to Japan's discord with its neighbors over historical issues. Johnson mentions:

Japan should long ago have built a genuine war memorial to its citizens who lost their lives during World War II, just as former Okinawa governor Masahide Ota did in a truly magnificent monument at Mabuni for all the people on all sides of the war slaughtered in the Battle of Okinawa, a futile battle fought only to buy a little more time for Hirohito, who had already acknowledged that the war was lost and that Japan had to seek peace terms. Until such a national memorial is built, the Prime Minister should continue to attend the annual memorial ceremony at the Budokan in Tokyo and

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<sup>14</sup> John H. Miller, "Japan's Burden of History: Can it be Lifted?," Occasional paper of Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (October 2002), <http://www.stormingmedia.us/17/1727/A172714.html>, 10-11, (accessed October 28, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> John K. Nelson, "Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 62, no.2 (May 2003): 464.

<sup>16</sup> "2008-nen dai 4-kai Nitchu kyodo seron chosa," [http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=345:canvass4th2008&catid=83:canvass4th2008&Itemid=160](http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=345:canvass4th2008&catid=83:canvass4th2008&Itemid=160) (accessed October 25, 2009).

pay his or her respects at the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery. These are appropriate places for the leader of an ostensibly democratic country to do his or her duty to national martyrs.<sup>17</sup>

Ikenberry suggests that Japan should not only stop the provocative visit to the controversial shrine but also invite leaders of China and Korea [to Japan?]. He expects that the gathering of the top leaders of the three neighboring countries would bear great fruit, though he does not specify what form that might take.<sup>18</sup> Ezra Vogel, professor emeritus at Harvard University, also regards the cessation of prime ministerial visits as part of the process to improve Sino-Japanese relations:

Given the sensitivities of the Chinese about the issue, the termination of visits to Yasukuni by the Prime Minister, acknowledgement of the role of Japanese troops, and open discussion of the events of World War II are prerequisites for Japan to put relations with Asia on a solid constructive basis. Next year [2005] is the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of World War II. If the Japanese Prime Minister does not visit Yasukuni and deals more fully with the issues of Japan's invasions of Asia, it could be an excellent opportunities to move forward relations with Asia. If not, Asian criticism of Japanese militarism is likely to continue.<sup>19</sup>

Acknowledging the popular Japanese sentiment for the Yasukuni Shrine, Mike M. Mochizumi, political science and international affairs at George Washington University, suggests that the shrine should be reformed to continue to be kept or ensure its position as a place for national mourning and flee from the dispute inside and outside Japan. He long considered that nonreligious facilities should be constructed to mourn the war dead and would have more consistency with the postwar Japanese pacifist spirit. In September 2006, upon noting that Japanese popular sentiment to Yasukuni would not welcome such idea, Mochizumi proposed a different constructive solution to cope with the Yasukuni issue. He feels that even if new non-religious facilities were constructed, the emotional dispute

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<sup>17</sup> Johnson.

<sup>18</sup> Doak, interview by Hayakawa Toshiyuki, "'Yasukuni' to sengo Nihon: Bei Jojitaundai Kebin Doku kyoju ni kiku jo" *Sekai Nippo*, August 28, 2006, <http://www.worldtimes.co.jp/special2/yasukuni/main.html> (accessed October 5, 2009).

<sup>19</sup> Ezra Vogel, "China as Number One: A Harvard Professor Warns Japan That It Needs to Respond to China's Rise as a World Economic Power," *Fortune* (Asian edition), December 13, 2004, 71.

would remain at home as far as Yasukuni itself exists. Hence, he takes a stance to accept Koizumi's explanation about his intent of mourning for the war dead by visiting Yasukuni, and he understands that the Japanese premier refuses to share the historical perception presented at the museum attached to the shrine named Yushukan. However, he points out a serious gap between Koizumi's intent and Yasukuni as a historical legacy, proposing that prime ministers should stop visiting the shrine, temporarily, until it is reformed. He also states that no matter what conclusion debate on new nonreligious facilities comes to, reform would be necessary for Yasukuni to become more consistent with Japan's pursuit of pacifism today and in the future. What Mochizumi specifically considers is legislation to redefine Yasukuni, which has been a religious corporation since 1946, as a cultural facility. Although it is quite unlikely that he is ignorant of LDP's frustrated similar attempts in the past, he believes that such reform would resolve the aforementioned serious gap and enable even the emperor to come back to mourn for the war dead.<sup>20</sup>

### **Japanese Studies in the United States through the Looking-Glass of the Yasukuni Issue**

As mentioned previously and as Mochizuki and Gerald L. Curtis in Japanese politics at Columbia University also point out, the disapproval of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni seems to be in the majority, at least in the academia in the United States.<sup>21</sup> With no clarification of whose position or opinion it favors, in the following pages, this article will give insight into what would be possibly projected through the views of the scholars referenced in previous pages on the Yasukuni controversy regarding the current state of Japanese studies in the United States.

The aforementioned American scholars' discourses might give the impression that they share a common or similar historical perception or attitude toward Japan's wartime conduct and experiences in the 1930s and 1940s. In other words, they understand that notorious Japanese wartime conduct such as the so-called Rape of Nanjing and the Japanese military's or government's commitment to the alleged forced recruitment and enslavement of comfort women are fixed, historical facts that leave little scope for further scholarly debates and investigations. Johnson demonstrates this aspect quite explicitly:

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<sup>20</sup> Mike M. Mochizuki, "Beikoku wa do miteiruka," *Ronza* (September 2006): 72-73.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 68-69; Gerald L. Curtis, "Futatsu no taikoku no kyozon o kangaerubekida," *Sekai*, no 756 (September 2006): 120.

My real objection to Yasukuni is not that it confuses church and state in violation of article 20 of the Constitution. Much more serious is that it honors one of the most bloodthirsty and cruel armies of 20th century Asia, one that has a reputation comparable to that of Pol Pot's army in Cambodia and that created conditions of such savagery and devastation in China it helped to bring the Chinese Communist Party to power. It is not accidental that the torii of Yasukuni are made of steel. This is an army that on the continent of Asia was most effective against unarmed civilians, that routinely bombed undefended cities, that performed medical experiments on prisoners of war, that raped and slaughtered the civilian population of China's capital city, Nanjing, after it had surrendered, and that could not go into battle without being serviced by 200,000 Korean and Chinese ianfu ("comfort women," one of the most despicable euphemisms to come out of World War II anywhere)--and that still cannot apologize for what it did. It is not that Japan in World War II did not have a case; it is that it totally discredited its case by the methods it employed.<sup>22</sup>

Jordan Sand decides, "Few historians doubt the massacres which Japanese soldiers committed against unarmed citizens in Nanjing, in the entire battle fields on the Chinese continent and in such Southeast Asian cities as Manila and Singapore."<sup>23</sup> For Sand, however, their minor views or interpretations seem to be negligible, when he blames the Japanese government of its failure in compensating for individual victims for Japanese colonialism and wars of aggression; he insists that the Japanese government share a historical interpretation acceptable for other Asians.<sup>24</sup>

Vogel seems to request that Japan surrender to a historical perception acceptable for China. He proposes, "The Japanese should offer to sponsor joint studies with Chinese about what actually happened [and] should be willing to engage in broad public discussions."<sup>25</sup> However, he also suggests that in addition the "termination of visits to Yasukuni by the Prime Minister," Japan should acknowledge what Japan did in its invasion of China to "put relations with Asia on a solid constructive basis."<sup>26</sup> It would be quite obvious that in his vision, "joint study" and "public discussions" are not occasions either of fact-finding or for

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<sup>22</sup> See Note 6.

<sup>23</sup> See Note 10.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Vogel, 71.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

conciliation of conflicting historical interpretations. Rather, they would be Japan's unilateral acknowledgement of its conduct in the process of invasion of China as fixed, historical facts.

Samuels also understands that Japan, including the Yasukuni Shrine, does not share the same historical perceptions as he does. He alleges that Japan is not willing or unable to confront its history squarely. This accusatory assertion is directed against the shrine as a place "where Class A war criminals and a revisionist version of the Pacific War are enshrined." Admitting the presence of "sincere mourners of Japan's war dead" at Yasukuni, he believes that they are "manipulated by aggression deniers."<sup>27</sup> For him, a "revisionist" approach is an attempt to negate or distort the fixed, historical fact of Japanese aggression in the 1930s and early 1940s.

Expressing some sympathy with the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, Gary Leupp, Japanese history at Tufts University, states:

The proximate cause of the current wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations is the decision of the archconservative Japanese Education Ministry to approve for middle school use a history textbook that whitewashes the record of Japanese aggression in East Asia. Specifically, it downplays the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and other atrocities, ignores Unit 731's germ warfare experiments, and omits discussion of the tens of thousands of (principally Korean) "comfort women" forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military from 1932. ... But the fact that the government endorsed the text naturally infuriates the Chinese and other victims of Japanese imperialism.<sup>28</sup>

Since these scholars are Japan or East Asia specialists but not necessarily experts on specific topics related to history disputes, their historical perceptions are perhaps based on their readings of secondary source materials rather than their own research.<sup>29</sup> In that case, it would be

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<sup>27</sup> Samuels, "Japan's jujitsu leader," *Boston Globe*, June 28, 2006, <http://www.boston.com/> (accessed October 3, 2009).

<sup>28</sup> Gary Leupp, "A Long History: the Anti-Japanese Demonstrations in China," in *Counterpunch*, April 23/24, 2005, <http://www.counterpunch.org/leupp04232005.html> (accessed November 4, 2009).

<sup>29</sup> One of exceptional cases is Jordan Sand's article published in 1999. See Jordan Sand, "*Historians and Public Memory in Japan: The "Comfort*



necessary to take a look at the current state of the achievements by other American scholars on such wartime-related topics such as the so-called Rape of Nanking. In recent decades, especially the last years of the previous century, we have seen more publications on those controversial topics.<sup>30</sup> Even so, as for the Nanking issue, Australian scholar David Askew, law at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, points out that the accumulation of the Japanese scholarship on that topic is far richer than the scholarship on the same topic in the United States.<sup>31</sup> It would not be difficult to find the same or similar situations in Japanese and American works on other controversial topics such as the comfort women and Yasukuni issues.

In terms of the diversity of interpretations, the works by the scholars and researchers of the two countries also show vivid contrasts. In the study of the Nanking Incident in Japan, diverse interpretations—usually categorized into three schools—exist, and each school has a variety of arguments and interpretations.<sup>32</sup> Needless to say, this sort of diversity can be also found in other major issues related to the history controversy, including the Yasukuni issue.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, American scholars are mostly unanimous that alleged atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army in the capital of the Republic of China in 1937–1938 are undeniable historical facts and make little attempt to scrutinize such questions as what those atrocities were actually like and how many were

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*Women" Controversy: Introduction,"* History & Memory, volume 11, no 2, Winter/Fall 1999: 117-126. Even this article is not, however, an archival research result on the comfort women issue.

<sup>30</sup> One of the easiest ways to find recent publications on the Nanjing issue in the United States is to search WorldCat, <http://www.worldcat.org/>.

<sup>31</sup> David Askew, "The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends," *Electoric Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies* (April 2, 2002), <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew>.

html (accessed October 13 Oct, 2009).

<sup>32</sup> Kitamura Minoru, *The Politics of Nanking: an Impartial Investigation* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007); Gregory James Smits, "Japanese Views of the Second Sino-Japanese War: Through the Lens of the Nanjing Massacre and Events Connected with It, *East Asian History*, [http://www.east-asian-history.net/textbooks/MJ/war\\_views.htm](http://www.east-asian-history.net/textbooks/MJ/war_views.htm) (accessed September 29, 2009). These two scholars give us concise explanations about the three schools.

<sup>33</sup> One of the best ways to find recent publications on this topic in Japan is to search the online catalog of The National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan), <http://www.ndl.go.jp/>.

victimized, which are the points in heated dispute among their Japanese counterparts.<sup>34</sup> Although a few books published or sold recently in the United States challenge this popular view, all are the work of Japanese scholars and historians.<sup>35</sup> The same or similar situations can be noticed in the studies of comfort women. Abduction and enslavement of Asian women and girls as comfort women, often referred as “sex slaves,” seems to be widely believed to be more or less an unquestionable fact among the American scholars.<sup>36</sup> For example, Alexis Dudden, modern Japanese and Korean history at University of Connecticut, has written books on Japanese colonialism in Korea and Japanese-Korean frictions in the past and is likely to have more expertise on historical issues than such aforementioned scholars as Johnson, Vogel, and Samuels.<sup>37</sup> She also shares the same stance as those non-experts on the specific controversial issue, consistently blaming that the denial of the government or military involvement in the coercive recruitment of comfort women during the war.<sup>38</sup>

To avoid misunderstanding, it needs to be clarified that this article insists that the entire Japanese (and East Asian) studies in the United States is completely under this monotone trend. Some American scholars,

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<sup>34</sup> Joshua Fogel ed., *The Nanking Massacre in History and Historiography*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. Also see Askew’s article.

<sup>35</sup> Tanaka Masaaki, *What Really Happened in Nanking? : The Refutation of a Common Myth*, (Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2000); Yamamoto Masahiro, *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000). Also see Kitamura’s work.

<sup>36</sup> Search recent publications on this topic in WorldCat.

<sup>37</sup> Alexis Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005); *Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

<sup>38</sup> Idem., “Abe’s Violent Denial: Japan’s Prime Minister and the ‘Comfort Women,’” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/prime-minister-abe%E2%80%99s-new-clothes> [tp://japanfocus.org/-Alexis-Dudden/2368](http://japanfocus.org/-Alexis-Dudden/2368); “US Congressional Resolution Calls on Japan to Accept Responsibility for Wartime Comfort Women,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, <http://japanfocus.org/-Alexis-Dudden/1908>; “Prime Minister Abe’s New Cloths: Halfhearted apologies for past behavior can raise questions about Japan’s present and future role,” *Yale Global Online*, March 28, 2007, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/prime-minister-abe%E2%80%99s-new-clothes> (accessed October 11, 2009).

including Japanologists (or Asianists), responded to Iris Chang's *The Rape of Nanjing: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* with criticism of her one-sided approach, use of sources, and some many factual misunderstandings.<sup>39</sup> The author of this article remembers an open debate over Chang's work as a "good history book" for ordinary readers that occurred among the members of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS). Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi's work on the alleged 100-man killing contest (*hyakuningiri*) between two Japanese army officers shows that there is certain diversity to different and conflicting views in the American academia.<sup>40</sup> Although he is in the minority, Doak himself would also demonstrate that diversity is by no means absent in the American academic views of the issues related to the History controversy.

However, it would be still true that such diversity is limited, and "labeling" without solid academic rationale by some American East Asianists, including Japanologists, can be evidenced. When the free copy of the English translation of Tanaka Masaaki's work on Nanking titled, *What Really Happened in Nanking?: The Refutation of a Common Myth* was mailed to AAS members in 2001,<sup>41</sup> some responded by alleging it as the plots of "ring wings" or "right-wing deniers" to disseminate revisionist theory, and their discussions extended even to who "leaked" the mailing addresses of the AAS members.<sup>42</sup> NHK's alterations or self-censorship of its own program on the mock trial on the comfort women issue—held by VAWW-NET Japan (Violence against Women in

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<sup>39</sup> Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997). For example, see David M. Kennedy, "The Horror: Should the Japanese atrocities in Nanking be equated with the Nazi Holocaust?," *The Atlantic Monthly* vol. 281, no. 4 (April 1998): 110-116; Joshua A. Fogel, review of *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, by Iris Chang, *The Journal of Asian studies* vol. 57, no. 3 (August 1998): 818-820; Roger B. Jeans, "Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan". *The Journal of Military History* vol. 69, no. 1 (January 2005): 149-195.

<sup>40</sup> Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971-75," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 307-340.

<sup>41</sup> Smits; Yoshida Takashi, *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 177. Regarding the bibliographical information of Tanaka's book, see Note 36.

<sup>42</sup> For example, see series of dialogues exchanged among those who received the free copy of the book in the "international electronic discussion group" named H-Asia, <http://www.h-net.org/~asia/>.

War – Japan Network) and suspected political interference by such prominent LDP members as Abe Shinzo and Nakagawa Shoichi—came under domestic and international media attention early in 2006. Some American Asianists again regarded it as an attempt to deny or whitewash Japan’s dark past and call it with the same vocabulary.<sup>43</sup> The Yasukuni controversy cannot be free from such labeling, either. Those who support a prime ministerial visit are “the right” or “the neofascist right.”<sup>44</sup> The interpretations which Yushukan, the museum attached to the shrine, employs are called “revisionist,” although such term is seldom used in a positive sense in the debates related to Japan’s wartime past.<sup>45</sup>

### Remaining Questions

Questions engender further questions. Why is such limited diversity in the American academic views of the issues related to the history disputes? As for the Yasukuni controversy, why do these American scholars, including some aforementioned big names in the field of Japanese and East Asian studies—and perhaps others in the same trade—tend to disapprove of prime ministerial visit to the shrine? Why is there such a divide between the Japanese and American academia over views of wartime history-related issues?

Scholars and researchers of both countries are supposed to enjoy academic freedom, which has generated less variety in American approaches to these issues. Is this simply because, as far as this field is concerned, American academia or Japanese studies in the United States are behind the Japanese academia or counterparts in terms of the quantity and quality of research achievements? Does the insufficiency of academic exchanges between the scholars of both countries limit the influx of the more diversified Japanese views to act as stimuli on American academia?

Doak makes an observation on the reason for his isolation over the issue of the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni within the American academia,

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<sup>43</sup> See series of member dialogues in H-Asia and H-Japan.

<sup>44</sup> Johnson; Curtis, “War Shrine First Test for New Japanese Premier,” *NPR*, September 26, 2006, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6145772> (accessed November, 2009).

<sup>45</sup> Steven T. Benfoll, “Why Can’t Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory Since 1945,” *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Spring 2002), <http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/115/40/> (accessed October 28, 2009).

mentioning, “Left-wings (or Leftists) command the academia, especially the humanities, in the United States.”<sup>46</sup> Although it is not clear what Doak means by the term, is there an ideological cause behind the relative monotone of the American academic discourse on history-related disputes? Do such ideological inclinations urge American scholars to stand against the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni or even take a critical stance toward Japanese wartime conduct and postwar treatment?

Aside from the doubts on ideological causes, the gap of diversity between the Japanese and American academia might simply reflect a national divide over historical perceptions between the two countries. At the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 1995, Mike Mochizuki points out that Japan and the United States still need to make an effort to fill a perception gap over the war.<sup>47</sup> The poll survey conducted by the Associated Press and Kyodo News in 2005 indicates that the gap remains, for instance, as witnessed by conflicting views of the two countries on the dropping of A-bombs.<sup>48</sup> Although Doak mentions that his opinion on the prime ministerial visits is likely the majority opinion among the general American public,<sup>49</sup> it would be unlikely that ordinary American citizens—whose majority still regards the war with Japan as righteous and justifies the bombings—would support or tolerate the visits of the premier of the ex-enemy nation to the shrine honoring such war criminals as Premier General Tojo Hideki, who started the war. If the majority of American scholars are captives of such ethos of American society, there is little doubt on the alleged Japanese brutality and war crimes, so critical views of the prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni would not be surprising.

A further conjecture might be made from a different angle: What would be wrong with the lesser presence of diversity? More diversity could not be unconditionally better than lesser a one, needless to say. Given that popular views and interpretations that American scholars share are based upon fixed historical facts, proven by reliable research and evidence, this would mean that the relative diversity found in the Japanese academic discourses is colored by fallacies.

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<sup>46</sup> Doak, “‘Yasukuni’ to sengo Nihon chu.”

<sup>47</sup> Ino Shuji, “Sumisonian genbakuten ronso o kenshosuru,” *Kagaku to shakai o kangaeru doyo koza*, vol. 1 (May 1997): 8, [http://www.csij.org/01/archives/war\\_02.pdf](http://www.csij.org/01/archives/war_02.pdf) (accessed October 3, 2009).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Doak, “‘Yasukuni’ to sengo Nihon chu”

### **Concluding Remarks: Japanese Studies in the United States and U.S.-Japanese Relations in the Future**

Fallacies harboring political, ideological, or any other intent and biases would certainly be a serious challenge to “That Noble Dream.”<sup>50</sup> However, has the American academia—Japanese (and East Asian) studies—accumulated enough research to refute Japanese fallacies and conclude the history controversy even at the academic level? The reality is that the United States is not still the capital of the study of the controversial history issues as Askew refers to the case of the study of the Nanjing Incident, and debates and disputes in fact continue to be never-ending, exemplified by the joint studies projects by Japanese, Korean, and Chinese scholars.<sup>51</sup> American experts on Japan (or East Asia) perhaps understand what kind of images such vocabularies as “right-wings” against their Japanese opponents and “progressive” for their Japanese allies could engender in the postwar Japanese political and social context. And they should be enough to construct academic discourses without such vocabularies.

How could the current state of Japanese (and East Asian) studies be reflected on teaching controversial history-related topics in the United States? Jordan Sand mentions “As historians, in everyday teaching, we would have to choose what should be transcended to the next generation, and what should be left in oblivion what lessons should be drawn from history we teach.” In limited amount of time, as Sand says, college instructors would inevitably have to make a decision on what should be taught.<sup>52</sup> With the respect of the significance of history courses in a college level, studying history would (should) be a hopefully good opportunity for students to try to get a lesson from what our ancestors did and experienced, no matter how reality in history classrooms is. Nevertheless, instructors would simultaneously have to be aware of potential risks engendered by selectiveness. How would selective approach, applied to introduce interpretations on such controversial topics

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<sup>50</sup> Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

<sup>51</sup> See the report by Nikkan Rekishi Kyodo Kenkyuu Inkaidai-ikki (2002-2005), <http://www.jkcf.or.jp/history/report.html>, and Nitcho rekishi kyodo kenkyu hokokusho, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/pdfs/jc\\_rekishi\\_04b.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/pdfs/jc_rekishi_04b.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> Sand.

as the Nanjing Incident and so on, affect students' historical perceptions? Wouldn't selective teaching become a synonym for keeping students blind somewhat or even for brainwashing? With such a teaching style, what lessons would history instructors expect their students to glean from the past? What views would intellectually naïve youngsters have if the Yasukuni controversy were discussed based on such selective teachings of historical backgrounds?

Robert G. Sutter, Georgetown University, observes that war-related history issues have been solved already between Japan and the United States. That might be so on a level of the governmental relations between the two countries.<sup>53</sup> On other levels, the perception gap over historical issues across the Pacific has not yet disappeared and could threaten US-Japanese relationship.<sup>54</sup> The historical perceptions projected in resolutions of the U.S. House of Representatives on the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the VJ Day in September 2006 would contradict, though not wholly, the Japanese perceptions: The representatives glorified the American military role in the Pacific theatre and spoke of comfort women, requesting (in January 2007) that the Japanese government apologize and accept responsibility for "sexual slavery."<sup>55</sup> In 2006, the U.S. House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde repeatedly warned Koizumi against visiting Yasukuni: He sent a letter to the Japanese ambassador in which he reportedly defined the shrine as the symbol of militarism that caused the war in the Pacific.<sup>56</sup> As mentioned above, on a popular level as well, perception gaps over war memories are still visible between the citizens of the two countries.

Furthermore, if Jordan Sand's idea of teaching history is widely practiced in American college classrooms, what consequences would it bring? If selective—or one-sided—narratives continue to be indoctrinated, and if other narratives which instructors do not favor are ignored, students

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<sup>53</sup> Komori Yoshihiro, "Amerika wa'Yasukuni' ni hantaishinai," *Voice*, (August 2006): 209.

<sup>54</sup> Tokudome Kinue, "Passage of H. Res. 121 on 'Comfort Women,' the US Congress and Historical Memory in Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, <http://japanfocus.org/-Kinue-TOKUDOME/2510> (accessed November 1 Nov, 2009).

<sup>55</sup> U.S. House of Representatives, *H.Res.360 for the 109 Congress*, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.res.360> (accessed November 1, 2009); *H.Res.121 for the 110th Congress*, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.RES.121> (accessed November 1, 2009)..

<sup>56</sup> Tokudome.

would understand, with little or no doubt, that the former ones are fixed historical facts. This way of history education should be taken up for discussion in terms of academic integrity not only in the case of the issues related to Japan's wartime conducts but also in any other issues in the middle of conflicting arguments and interpretations, though it would be quite unanimous that brainwash is no means the objective of college education, at least, in such democratic societies as the United States. Sand's pedagogy might also contribute to sustaining and even widening the national divide over memories of the past further between Japan and the United States on certain levels, and in that case, who could guarantee that the discrepant memories and interpretations of history could shake and even undermine any level of relationships between the two countries across the Pacific in the future?



## American Politics and Lessons for Japan

Yoshihisa Komori

(古森 義久)

Studies of both Japanese and American politics, the overall theme of this Conference, and in particular the title of this panel, “Politics and Society,” cannot be more timely and relevant because at this moment in both countries political discourse affecting their respective societies is heating up to an unprecedented degree.

Both countries recently have witnessed dramatic political change in their governments. We now see an effort to catapult the shifts in political leadership into equally dramatic changes to their societies.

Before elaborating on the political dynamics of the two countries and their implications, it is important to point out that Washington, DC is the political capital of the United States. Most often, the primary function of a Japanese newspaper correspondent stationed in Washington, including this author, is to report on American news developments for the newspaper’s readers in Japan. This reporting naturally includes developments regarding the American government’s executive and legislative branches, which in another word is “Politics”. Such political reporting cannot be complete without shedding light on the citizens’ reaction including the discourse of American society with its government.

The observations and analysis of some aspects of American politics and society discussed in this paper along with comparison with and implications for Japan are based on several years’ experience as a political reporter in Japan as well as assignments as a foreign correspondent in the United States and in other countries.

This presentation covers five topics including political structure and discussion of current hot-button subjects. It begins with a review of the structural features of American politics.

## 1. Two-Party System

The first structural feature is the two-party system. This is clearly one of the most distinctive features of American politics and, given what has transpired in recent Japanese elections, it has new relevance to the study of Japanese politics. For those who are familiar with American politics this feature is well known but in the interest of engaging all readers in the discussion, a brief review of the American two-party system is in order.

In the United States, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party (under various historic names) have been vying for governance for more than two centuries. These two parties compete for both executive and legislative power from the Presidency down to the level of local townships. Most American politicians and informed citizens speak of this competition with reverence. The term “two party system” seems to rank with *FREE ENTERPRISE*, the *AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE*, *CHECKS AND BALANCES*, and the *AMERICAN DREAM* as an unassailable political phrase.

This system, ubiquitous in the United States and Great Britain, is seldom found in such active practice elsewhere. The term is therefore often used as a contrasting phrase when discussing countries with governments that are based on one-party rule or single-party domination.

One of the virtues of the two-party system is said to be the inherent cleansing process of having “*INS*” and “*OUTS*” in government. Mr. Thomas Reed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the 1890s once put it bluntly: “*The best system is to have one party govern and the other party watch.*”

The two-party system like any other political system has negative aspects, too. It can produce blatantly partisan behavior wherein one side makes its decisions by placing party advantage above the public-interest. Rigid party affiliation also is thought sometimes to constrain free expression of individual views, although members of a party can and occasionally do leave their party over their differences, sometimes joining the opposition party and at other times becoming an “Independent” based on the principles viewed as important by the individual politician and his or her voting constituency.

In Washington, practically every American you meet is either a Democrat or a Republican, with clear lines drawn and almost nothing in between. This author’s first real exposure to such partisanship took place when, on

leave from the newspaper, he was employed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as a Senior Associate in 1981. At this liberal and Democratic Party- oriented think tank a lone Japanese reporter taking a year's sabbatical for research found himself surrounded by former officials of President Jimmy Carter's Administration who joined the same research institution because their government jobs ended when President Carter left office. The new President was a Republican, Mr. Ronald Reagan, who had just defeated the Democratic incumbent, President Carter, in a landslide election.

At the Carnegie Endowment, the bitter feelings of new colleagues from the former Carter Administration dominated as they responded to their candidate's election loss by leveling the most scathing criticism against Mr. Reagan and his policies verbally and in writing, literally all of the time. So strong were their protests against the new President that anyone would have believed that Mr. Reagan would be the worst and most unpopular American President in history, or something close to it. The reality, as it turned out, was quite the opposite. What they subjected other colleagues to was simply their obviously partisan pain at having lost political power.

Digression aside, it must be stressed that, all in all, the American two-party system seems to function very smoothly and healthily, consistent with the democratic principles upon which the nation was built. Both parties are deeply rooted in the many layers and flavors of American society, encompassing people from literally all ethnic backgrounds and walks of life.

Today this American experience holds new relevance for Japanese engaged in political studies in Japan. The implications of the August elections and new government taking control in September are that Japan has shifted toward something that looks more like a two-party system.

The shift is significant. Throughout most of the postwar period, the configuration of power in Japan's Diet has been one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP. Yale University Professor Warren Tsuneishi once called it "*the one-and-one-half party system*" characterized by "a dominant party that monopolizes power and alone knows how to govern while opposed by a permanent minority group that at times seems '*positively afraid of power*'."

The stage was set for this shift when the dominant party that for so long monopolized power became divided. A group that split-off from the

LDP then joined forces with what once was a permanent minority group to form a new major opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, or DPJ. After making earlier inroads, the DPJ soundly defeated LDP in the last general election in August 2009 and came to power. This is the first time that an opposition party has come to power with a clear majority since the end of the post-war Occupation.

The result is the beginning of a convergence of the types of political systems at work in Japan and the United States. While it remains to be seen whether Japan will further head in the direction of an American style two-party system, more Japanese attention will surely be paid to the American model.

## 2. The Role of “Ideas”

The second feature worthy of highlight is the particularly salient role of “ideas” in American politics. American elections and other political activities contain a strong policy orientation that is based on opinion and ideological differences between the parties.

This is somewhat true of any country in the world, as the British Prime Minister in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Benjamin Disraeli noted when he once remarked, “Party is organized opinion.” Yet, in the United States the correlation between political parties and policies based on ideology is particularly distinct, broadly permeating American public and private life. It certainly functions much more consistently and transparently than in Japan. On the part of the American electorate, ideology is an important factor in choosing a party or a candidate and government representatives who abandon the ideas that got them elected do so at their peril.

If the word ideology is too heavy, remember that at its root is the word for “ideas.” One can also think of it as including the concept of a set of “beliefs” or “values”, or a set of “ideas and opinions”, or even “philosophy”. Ronald Reagan observed in 1978, two years before being elected President that *“I think ideology is a scary word to most Americans, but a basic political philosophy is the reason for a Party existing.”*

“Liberalism” and “conservatism” are the two words most frequently used in the American political lexicon when referring to the ideological underpinnings and differences of the Democratic and Republican parties. However, the ideas these two words represent have changed over time and it is not easy to define either in terms of political ideological trends. Franklin D. Roosevelt, a revered godfather of modern-day American

liberalism once defined it in the following way during the campaign for his first presidential term. *“Civilization is a tree which, as it grows, continually produces rot and dead wood. The radical says: ‘Cut it down.’ The conservative says: ‘Don’t touch it.’ The liberal compromises: ‘Let’s prune, so that we lose neither the old trunk nor the new branches’.”* The contemporary conservative in 2009 would argue that *“we (conservatives) would prune it ourselves only enough to bring about the natural growth and health of the tree.”*

On domestic issues the extent of government intervention and expenditure is the most notable criteria distinguishing liberals from conservatives. It is the “big government” vs. “small government” argument. In this sense, a liberal is often defined as one who believes in more government regulation and intervention to achieve societal objectives including those for individuals in their private life. The modern-day conservative generally opposes government intervention and regulation of the economy and private life. He favors letting state and local governments exercise more power over federal action and emphasizes fiscal responsibility at all levels, most notably in the form of balanced budgets. On a broader basis, the conservative is described as a defender of the status quo who, when change becomes necessary, is said to prefer that it comes slowly and in moderation, whereas the liberal would jump head-first into a proposed change on the faith that good intentions will bring about success.

Under the current two-party system in the United States the Democratic Party tends to promote liberal policies and the Republican Party conservative ones in their respective agendas. At the same time, there are grades of ideological differences within each party that add a complex and important dimension to the debate and help assure that nearly every point of view is given consideration. Overall, though, the main ideological division and a philosophical split of ideas between the parties are clear.

The line-up of liberal-conservative ideas and consequently the Democratic-Republican Party divisions are particularly clear on domestic issues. Government spending and social issues that affect the personal life of ordinary citizens such as abortion, same sex marriage, gun control, taxes and the public role in health care are prominently placed on the liberal-conservative spectrum.

As a result, ordinary citizens closely identify themselves with a party and its ideology through the issues they are faced with in their daily life. At

the same time, and this is important, the values and beliefs of members of each party's constituency influence the positions taken by the parties and candidates. The parties respond to this pressure because they know that their ideological positions are the primary factor individual citizens consider when participating in the political system and deciding for whom to vote in an election.

This also differs from the situation in Japan where, up to now, party image as opposed to a party's substantive policies have played a more significant role. Under the multi-seat electoral system for the Diet that lasted from the beginning of the post-war period until 1993, candidates running from the same political party within the same district did not have an incentive to address their party's policies. Instead, they tended to appeal to their constituents on the basis of what they could do for their community.

Even at present under the single-seat electoral district system, both major parties still have members from varied ideological backgrounds as a result of frequent realignment for the purpose of pursuing power. The coexistence of conservatives, liberals and socialists within the same party constrains it from articulating major policies.

Moving back to the American system, it is easy to see how the American political structure works when one takes a look at how it applies to current domestic issues driving American politics.

### **3. The Politics of Domestic Issues – The National Health Care Debate**

In Japan, perhaps the best known American domestic issue is the Obama Administration's effort to promote health care reform. This issue shows the connection between the political system and the way people choose to live, in other words, the linkage between politics and society.

It also demonstrates the clear juxtaposition of different sets of values and ideologies between liberals and conservatives. These differences frequently develop into an outright clash, in turn revealing some of the unique characteristics of American politics which were addressed in the discussion above of the role of "ideas."

President Barack Obama announced his plan to promote an overhaul of the American health care system in March, 2009, less than two months after he took office. The Democratic leadership in Congress also

jumped in and began to work on the issue. Mr. Obama's ultimate goal was stated to be simply the adoption of universal health insurance coverage for all Americans, an idea based on good intentions that few can disagree with. The devil is in the details, including how big the Federal Government should become in order to accomplish this, and that is where the debate lies.

The question comes down to how health care reform can be achieved without overburdening American workers with new taxes, higher costs for health care and worse health care service. Since the two parties are polarized on these details, the role of the public in influencing their representatives is being taken more seriously.

Let us step back for a moment for some background on why this is an issue. In contrast to Japan, the United States has no universal national health insurance program for its citizens. You might therefore assume that the United States has no government health insurance at all but that is not the case either. The U.S. system is based on private insurance purchased in the open marketplace, with a safety net of Federal Government insurance programs known as Medicaid and Medicare available to the very poor, people with certain disabilities and people age 65 and older.

There is also a very large, top-notch federal health insurance program based on private insurance packages available to all federal government employees, and to federal judges, Congressmen, Senators and others working on Capitol Hill. Most other people have private health insurance provided by their employers, another group they belong to or by themselves. When a business, individual or family selects an insurance plan, the cost of the insurance is frequently the most significant factor.

Nevertheless, under the circumstances existing before adoption of the new health care law, it was fairly well accepted that somewhere between 15 and 47 million people living in America do not have any health insurance. The numbers for this vary depending on whether or not illegal immigrants (estimated at nearly 10 million) and those eligible but not signed up for other existing health programs are included. Therefore President Obama's attempt to materialize a program of "universal health coverage for all Americans" provides a good illustration of applying liberal ideology based on the faith that "good intentions" for such a seemingly noble and humanitarian undertaking should be welcomed by everyone.

It was not the first time liberal Democrats tried to tackle this issue. As early as in 1945 when Democrat Harry Truman was President, Democratic members of Congress with the strong backing of Mr. Truman, introduced a bill providing for compulsory government health insurance, but it was defeated. More recently in 1993, Hillary Clinton, then First Lady, with the backing of her husband President Bill Clinton, also attempted to push legislation for universal health care. The attempt failed disastrously and was so unpopular with the general public that in the midterm election the following year, conservative Republicans scored an historic victory and took back control in the Congress.

President Obama is in the fortunate position of having Democrats solidly in control of both houses of the U.S. Congress, which gave him an edge over his predecessors and ultimately forced passage of the new health care law. However, his political sway over Democrats in Congress is balanced by the war of “ideas” in American politics.

Both before and after passage of the health care law, President Obama encountered fierce opposition to his health care proposals which ultimately forced him to compromise for a new health care law that falls short of achieving his stated goal of “universal health care”. This opposition came not just from his political rivals in Congress, but from those who consider themselves “Independent” of either party and Democrats who have more conservative constituencies as well.

Why such opposition? It is likely because most Americans revere the core principle upon which America was built: individuals, not the government, should be in control of their own lives. One of the most popular conservative Presidents in American history, Ronald Reagan, stated in his 1981 inauguration speech that “government is not the solution to our problem: government is the problem.”

The failed 1945 compulsory health care bill was attacked by its opponents as “socialized medicine,” a medical system under socialist rule interpreted by ordinary Americans as the government too tightly controlling individual citizens’ medical care. More than sixty years later the effort by Mr. Obama and his Democratic colleagues in Congress was given the same label. Critics of the Obama health care plan see it as too expensive, too much government intervention into the practice of medicine, and too much government control of people’s private life.

The huge scale of government expenditure that Mr. Obama’s health care plan calls for has also made many people nervous. The cost is estimated



to be more than 1 trillion dollars over a 10-year period, which would be more than a third of the annual federal government budget. The prospect of this much money being entrusted to the federal government so soon after the \$800 billion economic stimulus package was adopted, and in the face of escalating unemployment, has caused concern about the financial health of the nation on the part of many experts and individuals on both the liberal and conservative sides of the debate.

After months of arm twisting, changing strategies and promising special favors to holdouts if they would vote for the bill, late on Sunday night, March 21, 2010 the House of Representatives passed the Senate version health care bill, paving the way for the Obama health care plan to become law. The result was extremely close: 219 FOR and 212 AGAINST the legislation, with the vote turning on intense pressure from the President who made personal visits to change the vote of a small group of Democrats that had opposed it. The President signed the new law into effect in a grand ceremony two days later. However, the strong-arm strategy used to win this law would come at a high political cost.

Generally when an unpopular bill is signed into law, public opposition quickly fades and voters begin to support the new idea. In this case, though, the new health care law continued to be extremely controversial. Six weeks after being signed into law, public opinion polls revealed that, despite the President's efforts to persuade the public otherwise, 54% of voters favored repeal of the health bill and nearly 60% believed the new law would worsen the national budget deficit and increase their own health care costs.

The President's plan passed in the Congress by a vote almost exclusively along party lines. In order to get enough Democrats to vote FOR the bill, the President made a personal appearances to "encourage" party members and House Democratic leaders made last-minute ideological concessions to change the language so it appears to prevent federal payments for abortions under the proposed new insurance. Without this, the number of Democrats opposed to the bill would have blocked it from passing despite the President's involvement. Even with these concessions and the President's appearance, thirty four Democrats voted against it.

The voting public factors at play in this issue make it an extremely interesting one to examine and also take the discussion into the next area of consideration.

#### 4. Politics and the Role of the Public

The juxtaposition of liberal good intentions with traditional American independence from government control and fiscally conservative ideals has set up the health care issue as a perfect foil to examine how people and their government interact. Although President Obama is still exceedingly popular with large segments of the public and the predominantly liberal American press who give support and little critical analysis of his plans, alternative information sources have helped fill in the gaps. In American politics, it is the voters who get the last say.

Independents and moderates have joined forces with conservatives and expressed opposition to the Obama health care reforms and politicians who voted them into law through town hall meetings and “Tea Parties” – protest activities that have taken place all across the country and in Washington D.C. The Tea Parties were modeled after the old Boston Tea Parties that were a rebellion against British colonial rule, and which led to American independence.

The unique American “talk radio” role in this, and particularly conservative talk radio, is said to be significant. Talk radio in America garners an audience of close to 60% of all Americans, or 187 million listeners each week, as measured by the Arbitron National Radio Services. The result is that control of the information and ideas about any issue is diluted and advocates and detractors have to compete for the public’s support of their ideas. This, in addition to other critical coverage of the President’s initiatives in similarly formatted television programs, recently caused Mr. Obama to lash out at one highly popular conservative-leaning cable television channel, Fox News, whose viewership in recent years had increased several-fold over all other cable television news sources, contributing to an increase in pressure on the government from the citizen level.

One might wonder whether the popularity of one TV news network or talk show over another or protest activities such as “Tea Parties” have any real meaning in this discussion. The answer is clear, and while we may not see it in the current Congressional party-line votes, the impact can be seen in subsequent elections.

The first case in point was a relatively small scale election held on November 3, 2009 before the health care bill became law. Two important governorships and a handful of congressional seats were at stake. Strong Republican victories in Virginia and New Jersey where

the President had campaigned hard for the Democratic candidates, and hard-fought elections even in solidly Democratic districts, showed the Democrats how unhappy voters are with the current direction of the federal government. This was followed by another special election in Hawaii in May, 2010, in which a Republican won the election for a seat in Congress long held by Democrats.

More recent cases may be seen in the primary elections of the spring of 2010, in which Republicans as well as Democrats opposing the President did better than the Democratic Party expected. The Tea-Party movement also won nomination of their first-ever candidate for the Senate.

These results are important and both parties claim to be paying attention as they prepare for November 2010, when one third of U.S. Senators and all members of the House of Representatives are up for re-election. In this process, the Tea-Party movement, conservative talk radio, FOX News network and their liberal counterparts such as CNN, will continue to play important roles as liberal and conservative Americans galvanize over what to do about the health care issue and other ideas that connect to their core values and ideology.

Incumbent Democrats must convince their constituents that the President's health care plan and other domestic policies are good for them, or face defeat to an opponent with ideas the constituents like better. The unpopularity of the new health care law is proving a challenge for both parties. If the current trends hold, though, the next Congress will be less likely to succumb to pressure from the President, regardless of party affiliation.

## **5. Politics and Foreign Policy**

The last feature of American politics I would like to address is foreign policy in the American political system.

President Obama has made it his goal to change the "tone" of American foreign policy and to reach out to other world leaders shunned by his predecessors. Yet, as much as he denounced many of President George W. Bush's policies, Mr. Obama as President has not abandoned or significantly altered any of the major international security policies where there was an established international commitment. What we see instead is a case of the longstanding practice of a new American government giving priority to continuity in its foreign policy, carrying on

with major international commitments made by its predecessors despite the change of administrations.

In Iraq, for example, while making a show of bringing troops home, President Obama has maintained support for President Bush's policy of promoting Iraq's democracy and keeping the newly-elected democratic Iraqi government secure.

Similarly, while stating the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, as President, Mr. Obama has not changed any of the basic foreign policy and national security policies of successive previous Administrations on such matters as the maintenance of nuclear deterrence and a set of alliance commitments including ties with NATO and Japan. In this, despite political wrangling of the parties back home, in foreign policy America's two-party system has generally sung with one voice.

This contrasts sharply with the approach of the new Hatoyama government. One of the first measures the new Japanese government took upon assuming power was the decision to withdraw Self-Defense Force vessels that have been refueling naval ships of the United States and other countries in the Indian Ocean. These ships are part of multilateral forces that are undertaking military operations in Afghanistan. The decision by the new Japanese government was followed by a series of conflicting and contradictory statements made by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Defense Minister on the fundamentals of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. This suggests a major discontinuity in Japan's security and diplomatic posture which has not been lost on Japan's ally, the United States.

Arguably the foremost foreign policy issue for the United States is Afghanistan. While the Administration has made health care its most pressing domestic issue, military involvement in Afghanistan is clearly its most pressing international issue of concern. However, an important distinction to be made is that the President chose the health care issue as his urgent priority, while he did not have a choice regarding Afghanistan. As Mr. Obama recently stated, the military involvement in Afghanistan is not a war of choice but a war of necessity.

In essence, Mr. Obama chose to continue the Bush Administration's policy toward this war-torn country and it could possibly be said that he has taken even a harder line in respect to Afghanistan's troubled neighbor, Pakistan.

The American military operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan began in October 2001, less than a month after the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. As an armed conflict, it has been twice as long as the war between Japan and the United States.

The United States under the President George W. Bush took on the battle against the Taliban and Al Qaeda as an exercise of America's right of self-defense. This is because Al Qaeda used Afghan territory as the logistics and training base for its terrorist attacks against America. NATO member countries such as Britain and Germany joined the United States in this battle. The rationale for military action remains the same under the Obama Administration.

International press and aid institutions began pouring into Afghanistan soon after the anti-Taliban Afghan forces backed by American air strikes drove the Taliban out from the capital Kabul. Any visitor at the time would have been struck by the incredible degree of devastation one encountered in the city. Surprisingly, this devastation was largely caused by long years of the civil war and local resistance against the Soviet troops, although the vestige of non-Afghan Al Qaeda combat forces' extensive activities in Kabul also remains evident.

As of November 2009, the United States had about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan augmented by some 40,000 military personnel from more than 20 member countries of NATO and other allies. The US and other foreign troops are stationed there for the purpose of protecting the newly established democratic Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai and to maintain general security.

Despite this strategy, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were gaining ground throughout 2009. Finally, in response to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and following requests dating from the previous summer by American military leaders, in early December 2009 the President ordered the dispatch of an additional 30,000 troop "surge" to Afghanistan. In seeming contradiction but reflecting his own preferences, at the same time the President also set the date for beginning withdrawal of US troops in the summer of 2010.

There are some familiar reasons why these seemingly contradictory choices may have been taken. While President Obama stresses the continued imperative of fighting to keep Afghanistan from falling under the control of forces that support terrorism, American public opinion

shows increasing opposition to continued U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. After all, it is the blood of Americans that is being spilt there.

For a President known for his penchant for dialogue and preference for non-military means for solving international conflicts, the current situation presents a serious dilemma to say the least. He must weigh the varying factors of changing public opinion and the continuum of American policy of previous Administrations as he decides how to balance his preferences with the conditions being encountered there. Mr. Obama's decisions in the Afghan arena will further have a significant impact on the thoughts of Japan's Democratic Party leaders as they attempt to find their own foreign policy path.

### **Conclusion**

These five features of contemporary American politics will continue to drive American foreign and domestic policy-making. While touched upon only briefly, all of them provide lessons and have implications for 21<sup>st</sup> century Japan.

American and Japanese political systems and practices naturally possess similarities and differences, points of convergence and of divergence. In Japan, the situation has become significantly more interesting as indicated by the electoral majority of the DPJ indicates. Politics in Japan could possibly be entering a new era of embracing a truer two-party system with party differences based increasingly on policy and ideology.

If that is really the case, new parallels between the politics of the two countries can be expected. This suggests that the study of American politics by the interested Japanese will become more and more relevant and important to the dynamics of Japanese politics. It also suggests that political reporting in Japan will be more interesting than ever.

## Decentralization and Local Governance - Underlying Structural Issues -

Hiroshi Saito  
(齋藤 弘)

### Why Now “decentralization”?

The Japanese people like festivals. In particular, festivals have symbolized and played an important role in maintaining the “social bond” through the prayer for and the joy of harvesting, as we were all engaged in farming in ancient times, which required united power in villages. Those festivals have preserved and transmitted the life style, industries, culture, and dishes unique to the region down to the following generations. They were in fact worked out independently based on local “ideas” and “creativity.” Thus, local traditions developed and prospered. With respect to tradition, American Indians believe that important decisions should consider the impact on the next seven generations. This does not mean that they have the ability to foresee the future. What is important is the tribe’s continuation, i.e. what has been inherited from the past to the present must be passed down to future generations. In this context, American Indians have one thing in common with the Japanese; that is to say, that the first priority in life is put not on “creating” but on “preserving.”

Looking back at Japanese history after the Meiji Restoration in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, efforts were made to catch up with the modern, advanced countries by establishing a centralized government. This worked very efficiently to modernize the country by putting more emphasis on creating nation-wide standards and applying the same rules throughout the nation. In the name of “efficiency,” the central government became heavily involved in activities originally the province of local governments. This achieved the goal of “modernization,” but at the cost of leaving the local characteristics and uniqueness behind.

Now the time has come to change. “Change” here means to abandon the uniformity developed under the centralized system, with the central

government telling the local governments what to do, and instead to re-embrace the uniqueness and diversity rooted in the decentralized system, allowing each locale to pursue a way of life based on their own values and traditions. “Change” is now required, as we are facing the following structural problems in Japan in the 21<sup>st</sup> century:

1. a decrease in the population and labor force;
2. an increase in outstanding debt of both central and local governments after the era of high economic growth; and
3. accelerating international competition with emerging economies.

In order to respond to and overcome such a situation, we have to develop and exhibit our own power to the fullest extent. That is possible not under the centralized system, but only under a decentralized system, allowing us to develop new ideas and values, echoing those inherited through our long history, and thus to design the region as we wish. There is no national vitality without local vitality.

### **Structural Issues**

The centralized government system is efficient and rational for national development, putting emphasis upon equality and uniformity. However, this system robs the local government of the ability to think and act for the sake of the local people. In the current society, people’s needs, whether social or individual, economic or spiritual, differ from locale to locale. The local government therefore needs to be able to design the region freely and to carry out the policies unique to each locale to meet these needs.

However, the local government is not capable of making such policies, as the central government has developed such strong competence and control over the local government in many areas, over-shadowing the local government and limiting its ability to be independent and vital. The following are the underlying structural aspects developed under the centralized government system during the past 140 years since the Meiji Restoration:


1. Excessive national officials located in the regions: there are currently 330,000 national officials in total, of whom 210,000 are located in the regional national offices. Analysis suggests that the number of these national officials could be decreased to half if the following reviews and actions are taken:

- (a) Reclassifying all the work in the regional national offices, moving from a national standard (under which the central



government is the sole arbiter of competence) to a local standard. Work should thus be divided into that which should still remain with the central government and that which should be transferred to the local government

- (b) As a result of reconsidering what constitutes central government work, decisions should be made on whether the work should be:
- (i) abolished (including privatization)
  - (ii) transferred further to the local government
  - (iii) centered in the Ministries (head offices)





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2. Lack of symmetry between revenue and expenditure: of total revenue, the proportion of central government revenue to local government revenue is 6 to 4, whereas the proportion of total expenditure is 4 to 6. This asymmetric budgetary system comes from weakness of the local tax base, and as a result makes the local government heavily dependent on the central government. This “gap” is compensated by the following process:


- (a) The central government decides the local public finance program each fiscal year for the purposes of:
- (i) guaranteeing local revenue sources
  - (ii) gaining balance with the national budget and economy
  - (iii) setting and presenting the direction of local budgetary management each year
- (b) Then the central government decides on the size of the local allocation tax and distributes it to each local government in order to equalize the disparities in local revenue sources and to guarantee systemic management of local finances.

3. Disparity between benefits and burdens with the local revenue share of only 40 percent against local expenditure of 60 percent, as mentioned above, a lot of projects and businesses are conducted by the central government, sometimes leaving local needs behind. This creates a disparity between local benefits and burdens. For local capital expenditures, over 40 percent is for subsidized projects carried out by the local governments with their obligatory share of finance or grant-in-aid from the central government or for public works directly carried out by the central government. And the central government even requires the local governments to bear an obligatory share of expenses of such works within the limit of appropriate laws and regulations. Furthermore, from the perspective of checks and balances in a democratic system, there is a problem when the amount of expenditures decided by a regional branch manager exceeds that approved by a local government.




4. Central government deficits augment local government deficits: because of the weakness of the local tax base and the local government’s dependence on the central government under the current financial system, as described above, and because the central government deficit creates no local finance source, the local government is compelled to expand its deficit when the central government runs its budget in deficit.

**Central deficit creates Local deficit . . .**



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**As a result . . .**



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**Sustainable Financial Management**

As discussed above, it is quite clear that local governments could be forced to expand their financial deficit if the new Cabinet requires over ten trillion yen each financial year to carry out the new policies written in their manifesto. How then can we establish a local government in real terms and attain sustainable financial management? First is to establish

a simple and efficient administrative and financial system. After going through the review of the fundamental government functions and distinguishing between those that belong with the central government versus the local governments, it is essential:

1. To eliminate duplicated functions, transfer those considered as fundamentally local and possibly local, and centralize in the head offices those classified as national;
2. To abolish as a result regional offices of the central government in principle;
3. To become more cost-conscious and to make the local government simple and efficient by clarifying the relationship between benefit and burden.

Second is to establish a strong tax base for the local governments. As a result of reviewing and dividing up all governmental functions between central and local, the local government roles and responsibilities will be clarified, and thus the allocation of financing sources will be enhanced in accordance with the re-defined roles and responsibilities. Such overall renovation of the financial system should hopefully lead to the allocation of financing sources in the proportion of 5 to 5 or 4 to 6 to match the respective proportion of expenditure by the central and local governments. In addition, it is important to transfer from the central government to the local governments not only the competence and the financial sources, but also administrative officials with the appropriate technology and experience.

Third is to establish systems for local government self-decision-making and self-responsibility. As mentioned above, the local governments heavily depend upon the central government for allocating taxes and executing projects, and have little room for their own decision-making and in turn for their own responsibility. For that purpose, it is necessary to review and re-establish the financial system at least by changing the central government disbursement to general local grants and abandoning the obligatory share of public works directly carried out by the central government. Moreover, it is essential for the local governments to strengthen their ability to make ordinances and regulations to make policies and execute projects in line with their own heritage and vision.


Finally, even if the local governments become more independent from the central government and capable of standing on their own tax base, there still remains the issue of how to make the budgetary order built-in under the local government system. First, governors in local governments should show a strong commitment toward a sustainable financial system

by making a mid- and long-term financial improvement plan, including local government numerical targets. Second, governors should implement a “device” to achieve the goals of the financial improvement plan. Such a device could, for example, be targeting a balance of interest rate payments with the surplus of financial primary balance.

Last, governors should make continuous efforts to share their strong commitment toward improving the financial situation with the people living in the region, as it is often the case that such reform brings some “pain.”

To Attain Sustainable Fiscal Conditions

- Set a clear mid-term fiscal plan and run PDCA cycle
- Decrease obligatory expdrs. to more-freely design
- Balance ‘interest payment’ with ‘surplus of P.B.’



## Toward Comprehensive Area Studies in Global Perspective

Yasumasa Kuroda  
(黒田 安昌)

敷島の 大和心を 人問わば 朝日ににおう山桜花

If a person asks me what the Japanese mind is like,

it is a mountain cherry blossom barely visible under the morning sun.

~Moto-ori Norinaga~

Just as there are 100 ways to view Mt. Fuji, there are many ways to study Japanese politics. There are, however, many who attempt to eliminate or promote particular views in social science, including political science. Methodologically, there is rational choice, interpretivism, behaviorism, institutionalism, structuralism, social constructivism, idealism and realism. Data sources vary from documents, journals, records, survey research and statistical analysis, case studies, ideas and norms to model building.

There are 150 to 200 Japan politics specialists at the university level in the United States from what I can from the membership list of the Japan Political Studies Group. Some universities have more than one Japanese politics specialists, such as the University of Hawaii, but the number is relatively small in the nation as a whole.

### 1. Objective

My objective here is not to represent any other Japan specialists but myself as follows: 1) areas and approach of interest in Japanese politics, 2) sources of my learning and 3) experience and results of my teaching and research at universities in the United States from the late 1950s through 2002. My end objective of studying politics rests on my methodology of discovering new and useful knowledge to explain why politics operates the way it does.

## 2. Subject Areas

2.1 *Political socialization and recruitment* process were the first areas I became interested in political science and upon which I wrote my dissertation. It also happens that I continue my interest in them to this date. I started the collection of my data on the social backgrounds of members of the House of Representatives elected in the first 100 years of the Diet in 1958 and published a dozen articles (e.g., Kuroda 1988). I am completing my book on it now.

How do Japanese become involved in politics and how and why do some succeed in reaching positions of high power? How does one get recruited into the political system? My first systematic empirical research was developing, translating and having the questionnaire administered among elite law departments such as those at U of Tokyo, U of Kyoto, plus those who were in the Legal Training and Research Institute carried out as one of surveys carried out in Japan, Turkey and the United States in the late 1950s under Robert E. Agger.<sup>1</sup> The result was my doctoral dissertation on political socialization completed in 1961.<sup>2</sup>

2.2 How did the *Japanese approach the study of Japanese politics* and social science in general was also my early interest. I tried to learn as much as I could without being in Japan in the 1960s. This was a challenge with the advent of the computer just coming to universities. I had to do all my dissertation work with card sorters or by hand whenever it was necessary to relate one variable against another on a board in the 1950s. It resulted in the publication of one monograph (Kuroda, 1969c) and three articles (1969a, 1969b). I have since found a small but growing number of Japanese scholars with a similar interest in politics (Kuroda, 1964a).

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<sup>1</sup> He was a Yale Law School graduate who received his Ph.D. in political science. He initiated his ideas for the study of law students (Agger, 1956).

<sup>2</sup> My dissertation was on political socialization of elite law students and those who were enrolled in the Legal Training and Research Institute in Japan completed in 1961 (Kuroda, 1962). There are a number of publications based on the use of the law student data: Kuroda, 1963, 1965a, 1965d, 1967a. I received a huge hand-written data set on pre-war members of the Japanese House of Representatives from Professor George Akita of the University of Hawaii in 1966. I am grateful for his generosity and friendship which I hope to return by completing my project. The following represents published results of my political recruitment study on the Japanese House of Representatives, 1890-1990: 1972c, 1988, Kuroda and Miyagawa 1989a.

2.3 *Power structure analysis* is the third area on which I focused. My strategy was to focus on the study of local politics at the community level first for its ease of access to power in acquiring systematic as well as other empirical data. I received several grants to do a community power structure analysis in the early 1960s by combining two systematic and one humanistic methods in ascertaining power structure in a small town (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961). Its main findings were summarized in a book in English first (1974). Then it was translated by a leading sociologist and his assistant (1976) and used by the U of Tokyo and others.

My contribution can be best summarized in applying these new and controversial methods for the first time simultaneously and outside of the United States and using them to explain community level politics more systematically and comparatively than in the past. Also, I carried out a random sample survey of the voters simultaneously to ascertain the relationship between the leaders and the public. I then used these data to pursue my interest in peace studies (1966), political heroes including Kennedy (1965e), political involvement (1965c, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1968, 1972a), newspaper and politics (1965b) and psychological dimensions of community power structure for democracy (1967d). My interest goes also beyond local politics to national and international politics (e.g., Kuroda, 1971, 1972b, 1972c, 1972d, 1982a, 1982b, 1983c, 1985a, 1985c, 1985d, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2000, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, Kuroda, Fesharaki and Schultz, 1987, Kuroda, Hayashi and Suzuki, 1986, Kuroda, Fesharaki and Schultz, 1987, 1987-8, Haas, Jiwalai and Kuroda, 1996, Kuroda, Suzuki and Hayashi, 1978, Kuroda and Suzuki, 1989b, 1989c, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, Kuroda, Zhou and Yoshikawa, 1998)

2.4 I have another bias of focusing my interest in *democracy and peace*. One of the necessary if not desirable aspects of democratic governing is its transparency. I also specialized in the Middle East and particularly the Arab-Israeli peace for which our U.S. government since toward the end of the Roosevelt administration has poured more money and human resources than anywhere else in the world. I was interested in finding out how much foreign aid the U.S. actually gave to Israel. A fortuitous moment came when I was carrying on a conversation with a high federal government official. I was asking him another question of a totally different innocuous nature when he touched on U.S. foreign aid and particularly Israel. I then asked more pointed questions. He refused to reveal any specific figures or even how huge sums of funds flow to Israel. I had to ask questions that could be answered with a nod or shake of his head. I found out that a high official is sent to Israel to convince its prime



minister that what he offered was all the U.S. could afford to give this fiscal year. Normally, recipients of U.S. foreign aid hire Washington lobbyists who are often former Congressional members to work to ensure that they get a fair share of U.S. foreign aid.<sup>3</sup> I found out that the flow of funds to Israel could amount to more than double the official figure, or the \$2-3 billion annually the U.S. has been giving in recent decades. I also wanted to know how Israel manages to get their entire foreign economic assistance during the first quarter of every fiscal year and not in four installments as do other countries. I learned that an intriguing congressional maneuvering is used to do so and there is no publicity over it. And only Israel gets its foreign aid in Euros, not dollars, for the latter is falling in recently.

If we know these facts just described, one can begin to understand why President Obama is bent on bringing about peace everywhere, including the Holy Land, and why he found it impossible to convince Israel to stop its new settlement expansion projects in Arab Christian and Muslim lands in the West Bank before a peace conference could get restarted. The United States recently blocked the passage of the Goldstone Report on Gaza to the U.N. Human Rights Council.

To my surprise and awe, I was impressed by Israel's use of its resources when I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs buildings in Jerusalem. The building complex consisted of Quonset huts. I was surprised to see that a country is so powerful in its foreign policy would have its foreign ministry housed in such a simple setting. While I realize there are money scandals among officials including prime ministers in Israel, there are areas in which we can all learn from the Israelis. One such an Israeli leader whom I met in his home located on the French Hill overlooking Jerusalem among others was the late Yehoshafat Harkabi, who directed Israel military intelligence in the 1950s before becoming a professor.<sup>4</sup>

Having been to Israel and Palestine, including Gaza more than once, having lived in Jerusalem and interviewing their leaders for my book entitled *Japan in a New World Order: Contributing to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process* (1994), I learned firsthand that there are many Israelis and

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<sup>3</sup> Unlike Japan's ODA, the U.S. foreign aid program has little to do with the financial condition of the recipients.

<sup>4</sup> I must add that he also moved from military career to academic freely and well versed in Arabic as well as Islam. He moved freely from one way of thinking to another to generate new ideas and being flexible. He at one point called himself a *Machiavellian dove*.

Palestinian Christians, Jews and Muslims who desire peace with justice for all.

A young Israel soldier confiscated my macadamia nut chocolates from Hawaii, my toothpaste and the like at the Allenby Bridge in the early 1990s, for he did not know what was inside. At the end of searching my suitcase, he looked at me and asked me a question, knowing that I was going to the Peace Institute at Hebrew University: “Do you think we can have peace?”<sup>5</sup> Outside forces need to assist both Israelis and Palestinians by convincing them to accept the international consensus based on U.N. Resolution 242 the U.S. Ambassador Goldberg proposed and passed. I should, however, like to underscore the subtlety of diplomatic language used in international politics. The Ambassador makes it explicit that he purposefully avoided the words “the” and “all” in calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from “territories.”<sup>6</sup> The French version of the Resolution, in contrast to the English version, states “des territoires” that could mean “the territories” in English, but not necessarily so. The official Japanese version includes all territories.<sup>7</sup> Here we have *three different versions of the same UN resolution, an excellent example demonstrating to students the complexity involved in teaching.*

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<sup>5</sup> The young soldier must have known that I have been to Tunis, where the PLO Headquarters was located then from my passport. While I was in Amman, I met with a middle-aged, dignified looking physician who just crossed the Allenby Bridge from the West Bank to Amman. This Palestinian Christian told me that he was stripped of everything he was wearing, forced to stand naked in front of soldiers and made to wait on a wooden bench for over an hour before he was allowed to come through. Also, after I had my macadamia nut chocolates and other belongings confiscated, I asked this young soldier if there was anything I could do to save my personal belongings from being confiscated. He told me that I could take it up with Abu Nidal (father of the struggle). I said “Abu Nidal”? He was then a well-known as the most ruthless militant fighter. I was shaken. It turned out that he was a Palestinian guard at the other end of the Allenby Bridge. It was after all these things that happened before his last question.

<sup>6</sup> I first learned this from Ambassador William Buffin who was working under Ambassador Goldberg then at the United Nations. For a more detailed description of the resolution, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Nations\\_Security\\_Council\\_Resolution\\_242#Context](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_242#Context) accessed on January 9, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> I wish to thank Akira Usuki for informing the way the Japanese interpret the resolution.

2.5 I found myself interested in Japanese politics at local, national and international levels, as can be inferred from my presentation thus far and in my publications (*e.g.*, Kuroda, 1962, 1964d, 1965d, 1968, 1972a, 1974a, 1974b, 1975, 1976a, 1977, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1994b, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2008). In the pursuit of the objectives I am interested in their *empirical and operational dimensions* over normative of politics. Hence, I need methodological tools.

### 3. Methodology

3.1 Expanding our knowledge and moving us toward preferred futures legally and peacefully requires valid and reliable methodology.<sup>8</sup>

3.2 Corollary data must be empirical, collected systematically.

My data collection was based upon a sample survey or student survey including the “focused interview” method. I have used face-to-face interviewing, telephone interviewing mostly for voting studies and campaigns including random digit dialing and handing out questionnaires in classrooms and shopping malls. Whenever it was possible and affordable, a random sampling of respondents was used.

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8 I majored in sociology as an undergraduate. I moved to political science for my graduate work in the state where its economy is not based on military-industrial complex and regressive sales taxes but peace and environmental preservation thanks to such leaders as Senator Wayne Morse, a former dean of law school at the University of Hawaii. Several of us in sociology got together to form a chapter of the NAACP on the campus and invited Thurgood Marshall, who led a team of attorneys before the Supreme Court in *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka* in 1954 to come to the University to share his experience with the University community. I asked him what made it possible for him to overturn *Plessy vs. Ferguson* that existed since 1896. He answered by reviewing all existing literature in social sciences on how separate but equal education was creating inequalities of education in the nation. He assembled all the empirical evidence he could master to demonstrate the how the “Separate but Equal” doctrine contradicts with the equal opportunity principle upon which our nation was founded.

As the first and only graduate student representative to the Associated Students of University of Oregon, I introduced a bill to have the University withdraw its permits for fraternities and sororities that continued to have ethnic and or religious restrictions to exist on campus. No one opposed my proposal but it was in the end tabled. I then had to leave the University to start teaching following the end of Spring Quarter in 1960.

I learned to do survey research under the guidance of Robert E. Agger in the course of my dissertation research in the late 1950s, from scratch to the finished product or publishable papers. We used questionnaire construction incorporating items for Guttman scaling on various items used at University of Michigan Survey Research Center and elsewhere plus Semantic Differentials (Osgood1957). I also took a year-long course in sociology taught by a former UMSRC researcher and statistics in mathematics Dept. I learned that learning in class room is insufficient unless one actually gets involved in some aspects of survey research or community power studies, which I did as a research assistant for a comparative community power project (Agger, Goldrich and Swenson, 1964). Being involved in comparative research survey projects, I learned the importance of becoming familiar with politics in a number of countries to understand a particular country's politics from wider perspectives.

I started to work with the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo in 1971, initially with the study of Japanese Americans in Honolulu as an extension of the late Hayashi's research team interest in the "Japanese national character" survey he initiated in 1953. But it was not until he used his multi-dimensional scaling known as Quantification III and other methods to examine the data for their validity that he trusted my survey data.

Valid and reliable data are very difficult to produce. For example, it has been reported widely that Prime Minister Satō received his Nobel peace prize primarily for proposing and the subsequent enactment of three non-nuclear principles by the Japanese Diet in 1971. I found out in the process of studying *kokutai* politics in 1998 that the three non-nuclear principles did not originate with Satō or with the LDP but its opposition party, the JSP.

First, the Japan Socialist party proposed the three-non-nuclear-principles, not Prime Minister Satō, to whom it was credited widely. The JSP worked through its *kokutai* to have the LDP propose it to be adopted by the Diet as Japan's policy on nuclear weapons. I found this out from a retired JSP Secretary General and *kokutai* member of the Diet in my interview in the JSP office. The only problem was that the party office never sent me various documents my contacts mentioned I should receive to prove his stories.

Second, I happened to meet with Ambassador Toshikazu Kase. I asked him what brought him to Hawaii. He said he wanted to rest for a while. I

probed further. He then told me that his mission was to convince all members of Norwegian Nobel peace prize committee to award Prime Minister Satō a Nobel Prize. He also went around the world convincing key influential figures on the behalf of the Prime Minister. This interest group activity behind the scene in both cases leads me to the next case.

Another non-systematic data gathering dealt with American domestic and foreign policies that suggests the importance of interest groups in American politics and the need to further our understanding of global politics as political scientists. It also reconfirms the significance of what Bentley (1935) in 1908 pointed out and followed up by David Truman (1951) and prolific Harold D. Lasswell (*e.g.*, 1948a, 1948b, 1949, 1950a, 1950b). That is what led me to ask, as I mentioned in section 2.4, the key decision-maker in the United States regarding the actual amount of U.S. taxpayer money that flows to Israel and the way it is sent that is not reported by any media or even by any organizations or individuals critical of our Mideast policy.

3.3 To develop new valid information not available through mainstream mass media in any country, the need exists for the acquisition of non-mother tongue languages. In the process of learning to be an area specialist, one becomes aware of mother-culture constraints and acquires the habit of raising relevant questions when in contact with any key decision makers in such a manner that they may reveal what they normally would not.

3.4 To realize the first principle leads to more new questions through borrowing, restructuring old or others' ideas and cross-breeding them. These are all preferred over blind empiricism to explain what we observe.

My methodological orientation essentially comes to reinterpretation and crisscrossing between the humanistic and scientific methods of inquiry. The late Hayward Alker's *Rediscoveries and Reformulations* puts it most articulately (1996) by citing an astonishing array of literature.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> I met him first at summer welfare economics (game theory) seminar for postdoctorates given by a Nobel Laurel to be John Hersey at Princeton University in 1962. Later on I discovered that he was one of the mathematically versed political scientists who was impressed by the late Dr. Chikio Hayashi of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. Thus, when Hayashi and I completed the manuscript on Japanese culture which is an English rendition of his Japanese National Character Study he initiated in 1953, we had to look for replacing the late Dr. Karl Deutch, who had

**3.5 I cited at the outset my rediscovery and reinterpretation of a popular patriotic *waka* cited by the Imperial Japanese politico-military leaders to raise the morale of young men during World War II. In co-authoring a book on Japanese culture (Hayashi and Kuroda, 1997), I rendered my own reformulation of the way I was taught during the war in Japan to refer to Moto-ori Norinaga's once-well known patriotic poem in his generalization of what Japanese culture is all about in a nutshell. I was taught by the war-time government that Moto-ori was not only a patriot par excellence dedicated to the emperor system, but also the founder and foremost Japanologist of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. One of the lessons I learned at noon on August 15, 1945 after listening to the Emperor's voice directly for the first time was that we should never accept what authority says for granted. So it is in this frame of mind that I decided to doubt the military leaders' interpretation of Moto-ori's poem. I entertained other possible interpretations of what Moto-ori might have meant. He may have meant that while the Japanese people as a whole are alike, individual Japanese are dissimilar. I thought then that he may have meant that the Japanese self is so ambiguously defined without definitive borders between units and they are barely visible as groups. The key unit of American society is an individual but it is not clearly so in Japanese society, but rather it may be like the way the Chinese character of 人 is written, *i.e.*, supporting and being supported.**

Then, the founder of the longitudinal sample survey of the Japanese National Character and my late co-author, analyzed the last three decades of data to verify the validity of the hypothesis. The English translation of the *waka* is my own reformulation of *waka*. My rediscovery and reformulation cast an entirely different light on Moto-ori's contribution to the study of Japanese self in particular and Japanese culture in general.

We can see and appreciate a lily in a vase and the beauty it has, but we do not pick just one cherry blossom and place it in a vase to view its charm. We always see many cherry blossoms together on trees, not just one. Moreover, the *waka* says that the Japanese mind is like those cherry blossoms barely visible, implying that the Japanese self does exist but is not very visible. One cannot clearly distinguish individual Japanese

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agreed to write a preface for our joint book. Alker's name then came up for he was Deutch's student at Yale. I wrote him a letter and he agreed to write one for our Japanese culture book (Hayashi and Kuroda, 1997).

minds in that they are not as distinct from each other as minds from countries in Semitic and Western civilizations.

Then, the late Hayashi had his longitudinal sample survey data gathered from 1953 through 1993 analyzed and discovered that human relations constitutes the most salience dimension. Another component of the model of Japanese culture, “Rashomonesque Yamazakura” was derived from Kurosawa’s *Rashomon*. Hence, the way we came up with the final model was nothing but a series of trials and errors after reviewing our past data analysis results and coming up with a hunch and then test it against the same questions in the questionnaires over four decades.

3.6 *Crisscrossing Disciplines and Languages*: My own first research after my dissertation was completed was on Japanese community power structure by using scientific and humanistic methods. As a budding political scientist on Japanese politics, my plan called for understanding politics at the lowest level for I thought it was easier for me to find out who rules a community than a nation or even a prefecture.<sup>10</sup> Floyd Hunter’s power structure analysis (1953) caught my attention while I was an undergraduate in sociology that led to my study of “Reed Town.”<sup>11</sup>

As we cross borders, we see new horizons and perspectives open to us, be the borders of discipline, language or country. Translation just is not enough to allow one to fully appreciate a culture’s flavor. It may not be tangible or describable, but a greater understanding is there when one sufficiently understands its language. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis stipulates that the structure of different languages influences what we perceive and what we observe. Their position is relativistic, not deterministic though they both emphasize the important role language plays in the ways we classify and organize our experience.

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<sup>10</sup> I like many others wanted to see a democracy (as defined as a polity in which every adult has a potentially equal access to power, the ultimate power) ubiquitously practiced. There has been not enough an empirical study of power as it exists that is done systematically so that we can verify the reliability and validity of the findings.

<sup>11</sup> I wanted to someday study a Japanese local power structure using his method. The day came, when I received a Rockefeller Foundation grant and subsequently the ACLS and SSRC grant to complete one book and its translation of Japanese version, 13 articles in 12 different journals in area studies, public opinion, political science, communication, peace research and others including the *Journal of Asian Studies* to *Public Opinion Quarterly*. (1964c, 1965b, 1965c, 1965e, 1966, 1967b, 1967c, 1967d, 1968, 1971, 1972a, 1974a, 1976a, 1977).

The late Hayashi noted there are structural differences in the Japanese Americans' response patterns in Honolulu to our questionnaire when they were given a Japanese language vis-à-vis English version (Suzuki *et al.*, 1972, 33-34). Efforts were made to learn more about the role language plays in survey (*e.g.*, Kuroda, 1984, Hayashi, Suzuki, Kuroda, 1986). Suzuki and I delved further into instrument equivalency in cross-cultural surveys by deciding to contrast between a most radically different pair of languages and cultures, Arabic and Japanese. We conducted a series of surveys among university students using Arabic, English and Japanese in Amman, Cairo, Hawaii and the Mainland U.S.A.<sup>12</sup> We found that language used in survey played a more crucial role in response patterns than nationality of the respondents in the Arab countries. Arabic speakers were most decisive while Japanese speakers were most hesitant. They behaved like Hamlets wondering this or that and tried to choose a middle response category such as "it depends on..." or refused in one way or another to answer the question. English speakers are closer to Arabic than to Japanese speakers irrespective of nationalities. We also found that when one is thinking in Japanese and is asked to choose between two ends of a continuum, one tends not to choose but rather to appear as though at a loss to respond to the request to choose between two alternatives. An implication is that Arabic speakers are more likely to take extreme positions at least in form that make confrontation with others more likely in politics. The Japanese are probably in reality more likely to avoid conflicts and seek non-confrontational alternatives. What surprised me was that Americans too tend to behave like Japanese when they are thinking in Japanese. It prompted me to ask Professor Ben-Ami Shillony of Hebrew University who feels at home with Arabic, English, Hebrew, Japanese and other languages while I was at the Hebrew University if his experience of speaking Arabic, English and Japanese fit with my findings of cross-language surveys. His response was Hebrew and Arabic are being very much alike. He noted that when he goes to Japan and engages in conversation in Japanese, he unconsciously becomes mellow and more agreeable.

My latest book on Japanese politics entitled *The Core of Japanese Democracy: Latent Interparty Politics* (2005) incorporates our findings on the nature of Japanese language. This finding from the cross-language

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<sup>12</sup> I am grateful to the Toyota Foundation, whose grants in the 1980s and 1990s made our cross-language surveys possible. I also thank the late Dr. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod of then Northwestern University for his advice and assistance.



survey and other related findings from languages that led me to develop my bilayer model of latent interparty politics in the Japanese Diet. The same model can be applied to the dawn of the nascent state, if *Kojiki* has any validity.

Having outlined my biases in approaching the study of Japanese politics and demonstrated the usefulness of using a variety of ways to study Japanese politics, I wish next to propose to approach the study of Japan from not only humanities and social science perspective, but also with an engineering and natural science outlook.

**3.7 We started the Japan Study Group in the late 1960s at the University of Hawaii, where more students were taking Japanese language courses than anywhere else in the country and where the largest number of professors was engaged in teaching Japanese studies. I was the chair and the vice-chair was a geophysicist. We thought that all disciplines including natural science, health and medical science, engineering and other disciplines ought to be included in addition traditional fields of Japan studies. We felt we should study Japan not only as an Asian country with a unique culture but also with unique contributions from scientists and engineers in fields such as earthquakes, *monozukuri* and *kaizen*. We also wanted to develop a unique center for Japanese Studies different from others to promote a wider interaction of those scholars with interests in Japan. Furthermore, we could bring in more funding to the Center if we had scientists and engineers interested in working with Japanese counterparts could join the Center.**

After I responded to a Japanese government source to report the sum of the budget allocated for Japan studies at the East-West Center and the University, the University received a million dollar gift from the government. Shortly after that, conflicts rose between a few of us who sided with us to expand the Center for Japanese Studies to include scholars interested in Japan from all disciplines and a great majority who opposed our position. I decided to withdraw from the formation process a non-traditional center for Japanese studies. However, my conviction that Japan should be studied from all possible disciplinary perspectives remains firm.

#### **4. What and who influenced my focus of study?**

**4.1 *Learning from Japan's Surrender:* Being born in Tokyo several months before Japan began an imperialist campaign in 1931 against**

**its neighbors resulting in the commission of a series of inexcusably heinous crimes against not only its neighbors but also against the Japanese. It was a beautiful evening with many stars in the sky on July 7, 1937 as I heard on the radio that the Marco Polo bridge incident took place. An equally beautiful sunny Monday morning on December 7, 1941 before going to school, I learned about the Pearl Harbor attack. Having experienced air raids on the receiving end of fire-bombs as the war neared its end, I wondered in my youthful mind what might be waiting at the end of this dark tunnel. Then the news came at noon with the broadcast of the Emperor speaking directly to the people for the first time on August 15, 1945 to end the long nightmare, as it were. We had to blacken parts of our textbooks. That is when I learned to cast doubts on any authority's words no matter how legitimate it might appear to be.**

*4.2 Education in the United States:* My curiosity for learning about the United States led me leave Waseda University to complete my schooling at the University of Oregon. The University in the 1950s was not like that of the days at the turn of the century, when Yosuke Matsuoka was at the University. Oregon's economy, unlike its neighbors to the north and south, was not based on war-dependent high tech and weapons industries, thanks to Senator Wayne Morse's efforts to keep them out to base the state's economy on peaceful industries and no sales taxes. He was Dean of Law at the University of Oregon prior to launching his political career. Had he been law school Dean when Matsuoka was attending, he may not have turned against the United States.

My undergraduate degree was in sociology and I was most influenced by Dr. Joel Berriman, who taught social psychology, along with Dr. Paul S. Dull, who taught East Asian history and Japanese politics courses. An extracurricular activity that I became involved in was the formation of the University chapter of the NAACP following passage of *Brown vs. the Board of Education* on May 17, 1954. We met with Thurgood Marshall, where he answered my question on how he achieved his objectives successfully. His response reinforced the importance of empirical research and experiments in social science and the necessity of being thorough and complete to move towards a better America.

I learned to look at what Japan did, particularly since 1931 in Asia and the Pacific from a different perspective than what I had been exposed to. I also learned how to keep students interested in a subject under discussion in a huge classroom, where over 120 students sat to hear Paul S. Dull.

Finding political science an attractive discipline, I decided to further my education. It was then I was exposed to the scientific approach to the study of politics from Vincent Ostrom, who exposed me to interest group theory from Arthur F. Bentley's book in 1908 onward to Heinz Eulau in his behavioral approach to the study of politics in the 1950s. Another agent of my socialization was Robert E. Agger. He was to become chairman of my dissertation committee. Having worked for his research projects, I learned and became more interested in community power structure. My initial interest in community power structure started when I read Floyd Hunter's revolutionary book on power structure analysis in my senior year.

Area studies focus on particular geographical area or areas. In reality, however, what I see is that scholars flock to subjects for which private or public sources are willing to make funds available. Most area studies are based on social science and humanities as practiced in the United States, where area studies started at the university level following the end of World War II. The first wave of Japan specialists who flocked to colleges and universities were former service men and women who were trained in Japanese language and served in the United States military services. My first graduate advisor on Japan was a former marine with a Ph.D. in history. Paul Dull was recruited by the Marine Corps in 1940 for his ability to learn foreign languages even though he was too light in weight and too short for Marine Corps requirements. He was sent to Honolulu to study Japanese in 1940. Area studies in other words had its origin in preparation for war. Chinese and Russian studies were encouraged along with Japanese and other strategically important areas as the Cold War heated up in the late 1950s. So area studies in many ways are affected by national interest and private foundations interested in developing knowledge and promoting their values in certain areas or people of the world.

*4.3 Post Formal Schooling:* After leaving the University, two world class scholars that affected my research were the late Dr. Hayashi of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics and Dr. Johan Galtung of Norway, with whom I came into personal contact when I submitted a manuscript on Japanese attitudes toward peace in the *Journal of Peace Research* in the 1960s. Since then, he became a frequent visiting scholar at the University of Hawaii. He is the foremost scholar on peace research and peace activist I have ever personally encountered. Galtung has written a preface for my *Japan in New World Order* (1994) along with the most popular professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Dr. Ben Ami Shillony. The late Hayashi and Johan Galtung both produced well over

1,000 professional papers and books. They are both original and creative. Over 20 of Galtung's books are translated into a dozen languages and he has taught at leading universities all over the world and acts as a consultant to many countries, organizations and groups from Bhutan to huge corporations, always searching for peace through non-violent means. An international NGO, TRANSCEND is directed by Johan Galtung. They are both intellectually innovative, creative in research and their interests are wide.

4.4 Both *public and private foundations* are subject to political pressures of a country and its interest groups within and without nation state. It clearly indicates the importance of understanding the politics of an area if any area study is to improve its quality and quantity in the 21st century. I have benefited from U.S. and Japanese government sources as well as private sources for my research and conferences I organized as a team member and sometimes alone. Most of the results of these financial supports are listed in my publications of journal articles, books and monographs, *e.g.*, Kuroda (2008, 57-69).

**4.4.1 In March of 1990, I organized an international conference, "Middle East Peace: Economic and Political Opportunities for the United States, the Arab World and Japan" funded by American-Arab Affairs Council and the University of Hawaii and the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council. Speakers included Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, Frank C. Carlucci III, Ryōzō Katō, Ismat T. Kittani, George McGovern, Hisham Nazer, Adlai E. Stevenson III, Tomio Uchida and other political and diplomatic figures including a few scholars and then President Albert J. Simone of the University of Hawaii, who gave opening remarks at the conference. Just prior to the scheduled conference, I went to the President's office to receive the financial support I was promised. I was then informed that the University was in a financial pinch and had to reduce its promised donation. Local newspapers reported the forthcoming international conference several weeks in advance.**

After the conference, I learned through the grapevine in the administration that large donors to the University had written letters severely denouncing the President for co-sponsoring such an international conference as I was organizing without including a certain country. Actually there was in attendance one couple from Washington, D.C. belonging to one of that country's newspapers. There was also an irate and extremely abusing telephone call I personally received from another country who likewise felt left out. While I did not mind the commentary, I

did find the lurking forces vexing the University President disturbing, but not surprising.

4.4.2 Another incident took place in reference to a couple of international conferences supported by Sagawa-kyūbin, University of Hawaii Japan Endowment Fund and other corporate donors. The first one entitled “International Centennial Conference on the Japanese Diet.” We held the second one called “Hawaii Japan-United States Conference of Legislators, Scholars, and Journalists on Security Issues” on Maui. We had political leaders, journalists from major media such as *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *New York Times*, NHK, *Yomiuri*, and *Washington Post* and scholars. Political leaders omitting titles from names included Yōzō Ishikawa, Jyunichirō Koizumi, Mayumi Moriyama, Keijirō Murata, Noboru Takeshita, Tsuruo Yamaguchi, Jyunya Yano and from the U.S. side came Neil Abercrombie, Daniel Akaka, Richard A. Gephardt, Norman Mineta, William V. Roth, Leon Panetta, Pat Schroeder and others.

After completing the two conferences, I prepared a framed letter of appreciation signed by President Simone and delivered it personally to Yasuhiro Watanabe, President of Sagawa Kyūbin in his Tokyo office and expressed our deep appreciation for his generous financial support. Surprise came the following spring when I saw a front page article reporting the arrest of President Watanabe in the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal.

I had gained something from my earlier experience of having attempted to have the University of Hawaii award an honorary degree to Prime Minister Tanaka who was scheduled originally to come to the University to personally provide the University with the grant. I withdrew my proposal subsequently that turned out to be a wise move, as I learned that he too was arrested some years later. Being specialized in Japanese politics or for that matter perhaps in many other fields as well and attempt to carry out any project involves risks. In conclusion, the old proverb is correct; nothing ventured, nothing gained.

## **5. Teaching Japanese Politics in the United States**

Courses on Japanese politics I taught include Japanese politics at both undergraduate and graduate levels, Japan-U.S. Relations at the graduate levels and reading and conference courses on various aspects of Japanese politics at the graduate level. Also I dealt with Japanese politics in part in my comparative politics, politics, public opinion and other courses from the late 1950 through 2002.

Japanese politics course is not required course for any major at either graduate or undergraduate levels. Those who received Ph.D. under my direction have gone to various fields from teaching, research to government services such as C.I.A. I have little idea about what happens to many of my former undergraduate students enrolled in Japanese politics. When my former students organized a conference in Honolulu when I retired, they came from New York to Tokyo and gave papers and discussed a number of topics some which came out in a publication entitled, *The Impact of Globalization on Japan's Public Policy: How the Government is Reshaping Japan's Role in the World* (Itoh, ed., 2008). In the same year another book on Japanese foreign policy dedicated to me was also published by my former students (Sato and Hirata, 2008).

One of the conference participants and a contributor to this volume Itoh edited is Charles Lake III, who among the former students I have kept track of is most successful. He graduated from the University of Hawaii by majoring in political science and Asian Studies in the early 1980s. He received a Ministry of Education's scholarship to spend a couple of years at the University of Tokyo and also worked at a Japanese Diet member's office. He then went on to law school in Washington, D.C. His first position was to work under Carla Hill in the U.S. Trade Representative Office. He accompanied President Bush, who met with then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in January of 1992. His task was to open Japan's PC and supercomputer markets for the United States. He was successful while others were not successful in their negotiation with their Japanese counterparts. He was commended for a job well done by President Bush and promoted. When I asked him how he succeeded in opening up the markets, his answer was, "I did my homework, Professor Kuroda." He held several other positions in the United States before moving back to Tokyo, where he spent his early childhood. Today he is chair of Aflac Japan and Representative in Japan, President Emeritus of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, Director on the board the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, Inc. and Trustee of *Keizai Doyukai* and holds other positions. He is the only non-Japanese who serves on such capacities in the last two. The trust the Japanese have in him is derived perhaps from their conviction that he works for the mutual benefit of Japan and the United States. It is interesting to observe some similarities in Barack Obama and Charles Lake. They were both born of international marriages and schooled in Honolulu, trained to be attorneys, very successful in what they have done thus far and 47 years of age. When he negotiated the opening of the computer markets in 1992 his Japanese counterparts were well into middle age while he was in his 20s.

Each class or seminar has its own culture or atmosphere of its own, as there are differences in political orientation in universities in different parts of the United States and Canada where I taught. There were classes where students would rarely question me, no matter how outrageous an argument I might present. There was one University where I was asked at times annoying and embarrassing questions when I was inconsistent in my presentation, for example. However, I was pleasantly surprised when I finished my last class in the first quarter. The students gave me a standing ovation. Such is a moment when one feels that a scholar's life is worth pursuing.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

I focused on how Japanese politics actually moves over how it operates by the authority and main stream media in my teaching in the United States over 40 years. That meant to empirically ascertain what experts tell us is what politicians actually do through multi-method strategies, including both systematic and non-systematic methods. Sometimes politicians would compose poems to express what they do or feel that they are not expected to make explicit, as for example what Junzō Iwasaki, HC did (1994). And they are some political figures who would be honest enough to say, "I cannot tell you what we do in this committee because we do things we are not supposed to do." That was Minister Jyunichirō's Koizumi response to my question in 1998 about the *kokutai* committee. He certainly was a *henjin* from the first time I met him in 1990. Others such as Noboru Takeshita were usually more open. To extract answers they would rather not give out requires a researcher to know something about that matter already, yet ask questions that lead politicians to assume that the researcher knows nothing about the matter under discussion. Elite interviewing is quite different from interviewing random samples of the voters in any country.

When I compare the teaching Japanese politics and American politics with that of teaching the Middle East politics, I found it much easier to teach Japanese or American politics than the Middle East politics, at least in the United States. Perhaps I can say what I want to about Japanese politics more than I can about Middle East politics. It is a safer subject to teach in the United States.

Kenzaburo Ōe's in his recent column in the *Asahi* ( Oct. 20, 2009, 12) had an article I cite to end my presentation. He makes reference to reinterpretation and rediscovery of Ninomiya Sontoku by Tetsuo Najita and the need the late Masao Miyoshi felt for Japan to reformulate a peace

constitution. Miyoshi thought Koizumi's regime is threatening the peace constitution by going along with militant neo-conservative programs carried out by the Bush administration.<sup>13</sup> Being in nature in Honolulu and listening to Najita near the home where he was born, Ōe realized the validity of Najita's reformulated view of Sontoku. It is that if you want to gain knowledge, read nature. Nature is a language. To know its grammar is to be cultured, which leads a person to act correctly. It is interesting to note that the Nobel laureate was too mechanical in his reformulation of Sontoku. Sontoku was often depicted in pictures seen in prewar schools as reading books while carrying firewood on his back in order to teach the importance of diligence. His status was omnipresent wherever public schools are located in pre-war Japan. Ōe's earlier reformulation was that Sontoku was so poor that he did not even own any books!

Ōe's article implies that there is a need for us to understand Japanese politics in the context of politicians' time and space and their ways of perceiving their environment. In this regard, those who must study American politics in Japan and Japanese politics in the United States face unprecedented challenges today. As globalization moves on and multi-polarization of the world becomes a reality, area study requires greater effort to be *au courant*.

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<sup>13</sup> I too felt likewise about the danger of neo-conservatism in 2003 to the world and wrote an article in an area studies journal [地域研究] in Japan. (2004b).



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## Comparison Study between American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies of American Politics: An Indonesian Perspective

Dedy Permadi

This paper will focus on the comparison between American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies of American Politics especially from Indonesian perspective. It means the elaboration will talk about how Indonesian academicians and Indonesian academics curricula have arranged and elaborated these two academic areas. It is a very important topic because in Indonesia and many other countries, American Studies of Japanese Politics and Japanese Studies of American Politics are the main topics of studies, especially on International Relations Studies.

In Indonesia, Japanese politics is one of the most important topics on American studies; moreover, American politics is one of the most important topics on Japanese Studies. Therefore, it will be an important topic if we make an analysis on how American studies were elaborated and how it sees Japanese politics, and on the other hand, how Japanese studies were elaborated and how it sees American politics. From this analysis, we can explore the differences and similarities of both studies.

This comparison depends on many factors like the dynamics of Japan-America relation, the agent who have developed the American studies and Japanese studies in Indonesia and also Indonesia's national interest to Japan and America. In fact, there was a close relationship among Indonesia, America and Japan. So, it is a complicated analysis that could result in a specific and special perspective from Indonesia.

### **The Curriculum in Indonesia**

In Indonesia, the study on Japan and the study on the United States of America are generally categorized into two sections, the study in the socio-cultural field and the study in the political field only. Generally, universities teach subjects on Japan and the United States of America

mainly in the International Relations Science. In Universitas Gadjah Mada for example, the study on Japan is being taught in several subjects such as Japanese Politics and Government, Japanese Foreign Politics, Japan and International Economy, and also Japanese Society System. Meanwhile the study on the United States of America is given through the subjects the United States Politics and Government, and the American Foreign Policy (based on the curriculum of the *International Relations Department* of Universitas Gadjah Mada in 2001, applied until now). In other universities, the subjects on Japan and the United States of America are not being taught specifically. For instance University of Indonesia only discusses these topics in the United States' Global Politics and East Asia's Development Political Economy (Based on the curriculum of the *International Relations Department* of University of Indonesia in 2006, applied until now).

However, it has to be understood that the inclusion of Japanese and the American politics in a high education curriculum is not a definite parameter of the development of this study within a country. In reality, the discussion on Japanese and the American political issues is still an interesting topic in various discussions and publications in Indonesia.

The interesting part in the development of the study on Japan and the United States in Indonesia is that the substance between the two that are strongly related. In the study on Japan, the American politics is a highly important topic and vice versa.

In the study on the United States of America in Indonesia, Japan's politics has a strategic position especially on the subject on the United States of America's Foreign Politics. In this subject, it is shown that Japan is one of important countries for the United States of America both historically or concerning contemporary issues. However, Japan is not the most dominating country in discussions on the study on the United States of America. There are still countries beyond Japan that become dominant topics such as China, European Union or the Middle East.

Meanwhile in the study on Japan in Indonesia, the American politics also obtains an important position especially in the subjects of Japan and International Economy and Japanese Foreign Politics. If given attention to, there are so many topics on the American politics in those subjects. Seen from this fact, from the aspect of curriculum, it can be said that the discussion on the American politics in Japanese studies tends to be more dominant compared to the discussion on Japanese politics in the studies on the United States of America.



### **Substance of the Study**

The comparison of Japanese and the American study from the perspective of the curriculum that has been previously discussed is certainly not powerful enough to prove that there is a strong relationship between the two studies. Therefore, the comparison between the two should also be seen from the substance of the subjects being taught in the classroom. There are at least three main substances in the Japanese and the American studies in Indonesia which show interconnection between the two.

**First (Period I).** Japan and the United States of America have a unique relationship, especially historically. It should be remembered that the United States of America is the country that forces Japan to open itself towards the outside world. On 31 March 1854, the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and the “Black Ship” of the United States’ Navy has forced Japan to open itself to the Western World through Kanagawa Agreement (Arnold, 2007). Furthermore, these two countries were also involved as main actors in the World War II. In 1937, the Japanese invasion to Manchuria has led the Second Sino-Japan War (1937 – 1945) which has caused an oil embargo towards Japan by the United States of America on 7 December 1941(Worth, 1995); Japan attacked the United States’ Naval base in Pearl Harbor, and stated a war against the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Netherland. The attack on Pearl Harbor has led the United States of America into World War II. After a long military campaign in the Pacific, Japan has lost the territories it had during the beginning of the war. The United States performed strategic bombing towards Tokyo, Osaka, and other major cities. After the United States of America dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan finally surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Forces on 15 August 1945 (the Victory Day against Japan) (World of Education, 2004).

This historic review is automatically an important part of the Japanese study on the United States’ politics and in the American study on Japanese politics in Indonesia. From the perspective of the Japanese study, the United States of America is a major threat in defense and security. Also, if seen from the perspective of the American study, Japan is also the main threat for the United States of America during that time. Therefore, seen from the historical aspect, Japanese study on the American politics and the American study on Japanese politics is dominated by the perception of threat.

**Second (Period II)**, Japanese study on the American politics and the American study on Japanese politics is also interesting since in its development these two countries have a very close relationship, even a joint defense agreement pact. In 1947, Japan enforced a new Japanese Constitution. Based on this Constitution, Japan was set as a country which embraces pacifism and the practice of liberal democracy (Coleman, 2007). The United States' occupation towards Japan officially ended in 1952 with the signing of the San Francisco Agreement. However, the United States' troops remained in their important bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa. The United Nations also officially accepted Japan as its member in 1956. This fact showed that the two countries also possess political intimacy.

Important developments in the two countries' relationship truly influence the substance of studies on Japan and the United States of America. Perception of threat which dominated the previous discussion no longer remained as the main topic of discussion. On the contrary, the two studies are strongly related not due to the perception of threat that they share, but the perception of mutual trust that the two countries have for each other.

**Third (Period III)**, in the contemporary era, Japan and the United States are the world's largest economic powers. After the Second World War, Japan experienced rapid economic growth with the average growth of its Gross Domestic Product reaching 10% per year for four decades. As an economically developed country, Japan has the second largest Gross Domestic Product after the United States, and is included in the top three for its purchasing parity (IMF, 2009). In foreign trade, Japan ranks number 4 as the world's largest exporter and number 6 as the world's largest importer. As a developed country, the citizens of Japan have a high living standard (the 8<sup>th</sup> highest in the Human Development Index) and its live expectancy rate is the highest in the world according to the United Nations' estimation (United Nations, 2006). In technology, Japan is highly developed in telecommunications, machinery, and robotics.

Japan's economic power that is growing stronger has made it one of the main focuses of discussion in American studies in Indonesia. It is undeniable that the United States of America is getting more concerned about this development. In reality, Japan is one of the United States' heaviest competitors in production, distribution, and even consumption sectors. The flood of Japanese products in the United States is one of the strong indicators of this economic competition. Therefore, it is not a surprise that studies on Japanese politics these days is the main concern of those studying the United States.

The United States' concern is not only applicable in the economic sector. American studies on Japan also focus on the analysis of the development of Japanese politics. This is because the development of Japanese politics is possible to have a huge impact towards the United States. For example in verse 9 of the amendment and the issue on the United States' military base in Japan. These two issues are important for the United States considering the survival of the United States' control towards Japan is determined by those issues.

Meanwhile, Japanese studies on American politics also remained an important study considering the political intimacy between the two that continues until this moment. Political changes happening in the United States would certainly bring an impact on the United States' foreign policy towards Japan. The transition of Bush's administration to Obama's, for example, has been a crucial issue in Japanese studies.

Of all the points mentioned, it can be known that in reality Japan and the United States of America possess a close historical, political, and economical relationship. The three aspects that have been previously mentioned are the focuses of American and Japanese studies in Indonesia. Therefore, seen through Indonesian perspective, Japanese political study in America and American political study are dominated by discussion on the two countries' dynamic relationship pattern from time to time.

### **Japanese Studies is More Interesting: Diplomacy and Soft Power**

The next question which has to answer is why the Japanese Studies more interested both in United States and in Indonesia? There are so many reasons to answer this question. But, the most important thing is the diplomacy of Japan. This paper also has an argument that Japan uses diplomacy effectively by all of resources of diplomacy in this Country, in International Relations Studies, called multi-track diplomacy.

There are various definitions of diplomacy; the following are some of them. First, diplomacy is the organized relation between countries<sup>1</sup>. Second, diplomacy can be understood as the means of communication between two or more countries through representatives to reach the goal of foreign politics. Third, diplomacy is the art of communication using propagandistic ways to reach the goal of foreign politics. Fourth, diplomacy is defined as the communication between two people or more either through mediator or not in one negotiation to reach the goal of foreign politics. Last, Ivo D. Duchacek defines diplomacy as the

practice of foreign politics of a country through negotiating with other countries. From those definitions, we can draw a red line that diplomacy is the art or the means of communication in the relation among countries which is organized to reach the goal of a country's foreign politics.

Diplomacy has its elements and functions <sup>1</sup>. The elements of diplomacy are more on the essential matters in diplomacy, while the functions of diplomacy are the goals to reach in diplomacy. The elements of diplomacy comprise: sending representatives to certain forums, countries, or regime; propagandizing; negotiating; observe and report; listening post; and reaching the goals of foreign politics. Some of the functions of diplomacy are to make up certain relation which was formerly fairly bad (or even bad) to prevent wars, create cooperation to establish opinions, and implement the foreign politics of a country.

Vienna Convention about diplomatic relation (1961) divides the leaders of diplomatic mission into three groups. Each of the first two groups consists of the ambassadors and ministers. Those two diplomatic mission leaders are accredited/ recognized officially by the head of the host state. Meanwhile, the third group is the charges d'affaires that are accredited by the minister of foreign affair of the host state<sup>1</sup>. The relation can be carried out when both countries have been involved in an agreement.

H.J. Morgenthau proposes a concept of diplomacy that he considers as the ideal diplomacy. He argues that diplomacy should be the main consideration in all problems. Every goal of foreign politics should be based on the national interest supported with enough "power". Besides, diplomacy should give priority to other nation's point of view. All nations should be interested in compromising about problems which are not vital with other countries. Gun force is also a means of foreign policy, but it is not the main means. Lastly, government is the leader of public opinion, not the slave of public opinion <sup>1</sup>.

Based on that concept, we know that actually Japan has so many instruments to achieve their goals by diplomacy, included to make the Japanese Studies become a favourite study around the world. This descriptions bellow could show us the various tracks of diplomacy, named multi-track diplomacy. What is multi-track diplomacy?

*...Multi-Track diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process (Based on the understanding that Multi-Track Diplomacy is the "way to view" this writing assumes this term as a "perspective". Actually, this concept first emerged to see the process that was running in US*

*as “a whole elephant”. However, in its development, this perspective can be used universally). That term refers to a conceptual framework we design to reflect the variety of activities that contribute to international peacemaking and peace building (Diamond, 1996).*

Some extremely complex methods are known in the efforts to maintain and create world peace, one of which is through multi-track diplomacy. In this method, the actions to maintain the world peace focus on positive peace that is the long-term-peace creating positive impacts in a long time (permanent).

In international level, the impacts can be the continuous economic development, social justice, political participation, etc. In the realm of positive peace, it is understood that the causes of conflicts and wars are poverty and colonization. Meanwhile peacemaking itself can be understood as the whole activities comprising peacekeeping, peace building, peace studies, peace education, and conflict resolution.

There is a conception in multi-track diplomacy saying that a country's success in diplomacy is determined by not only the diplomacy done by government actors but also the actors outside the government that can be empowered to support the diplomacy in that elite level. In other words, diplomacy is not only done by governmental institutions but also all segments in society. Therefore, foreign affair ministries create partnership with every components in society both domestic and foreign components to succeed foreign politics.

*... According to Louise Diamond and John Mc Donald (1994) categorize the levels in diplomacy into 9 levels / track, which are: Track One: Government, Track Two: Nongovernment/Professional, Track Three: Business, Track Four: Private Citizen, Track Five: Research, Training, and Education, Track Six: Activism, Track Seven: Religion, Track Eight: Funding, Track Nine: Communications and Media.*

Actually this concept is in line with the categorization in analyzing India's foreign politics made by Richard L. Park based on policy making process point of view. He categorizes the actors who can play in foreign policy as governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies 8. The difference between those two categorizations is that Diamond is more detailed (compared to park) in categorizing non-governmental agencies into 8 diplomacy tracks.

*Track One: Government.* The official track of government is understood as a form of conventional diplomacy, which is diplomacy with country-nation as its main actor. It is formal and bureaucratic. Conventional elements and system are applied here, like diplomat, Japan embassy, Japan consular, etc around the world. *Track two: Non-government/ Professional.* Non-governmental/professional track has actors who play personally (non-institutional) and without compensation although it is still done in the corridor of academician and professional. We know that the academicians and professional in Japan is very active to promote cooperation among the actors around the world. *Track three: Business.* Behind its orientation to get profit, Japanese business also plays role in maintaining international relation and creating the short cut for the smoothness of international communication. The basic assumption of the relation between business and peace is that basically business is very beneficial for all parties internationally. Japan business is an integral part of political and social order, besides if people run their business with social and environmental awareness, business can encourage positive changes in transnational system, for example the establishment of business diplomacy education program. The last is that business will not run successfully without peace.


*Track Four: Private Citizen.* The fourth track points out the role of grass root society in creating the world peace. The role of Japan citizen here can be *exchange programs, private voluntary organizations, advocacy, professional groups, etc.* *Track Five: Research, Training, and Education.* The fifth track is through the research, education, and training program to transfer the issues related with issues of conflict and peace. The assumption of this track is that through education, research, and training, it is hoped that people can be more aware and do real actions to get involved in international phenomenon.

*Track Six: Activism.* This track means the advocacy to change views and policies through political actions. The political actions are meant to give input so that the political process can result in precise policies. *Track Seven: Religion.* The seventh track is through the religious teaching. It is hoped that the religious values will make people's morality grow to maintain the peace. Confucianism and Maoism are very important in the progress of Japanese culture. It is also very interesting for the foreigner.

*Track Eight: Funding.* The eighth track is funding: peacemaking through providing resources, that is to provide financial support for various activities of the reconciliation institutions. Fund, such as ODA (Official Development Assistance), suppliers also automatically get involved in

determining the priorities/ agenda that will be brought to institutional efforts in creating peace. Japan ODA is the biggest ODA for Indonesia and many other countries; it is the important thing that could show the contribution of Japan aid in another country. The last track, *Track Nine: Communications and Media* is the involvement of media to communicate issues about peace, conflict resolution, and international politics and relation. The media being discussed here can be both printed and electronic media. Japan also has so many media to introduce Japanese Culture to another country, in fact, it is could be very popular media in Indonesia (and another country, I think). The next analysis could show more facts about this track.

The nine tracks are described by Diamond in the picture below:



### ***The Nine Tracks of Multi-Track Diplomacy*** (Diamond, 1996)

In the concept of multi-track diplomacy, there are 12 principals that should be held by every actor as follow:

1. *Relationship-Building strong interpersonal and intergroup relations throughout the fabric of society.*
2. *Long-term commitment-Making an ongoing commitment to people and to processes that may take years to come to fruition.*
3. *Cultural synergy-Respecting the cultural wisdom of all the parties and welcoming the creative interaction of different cultural ways.*
4. *Partnership-Modelling collaborative process by partnering with local parties and with other institutions and coalitions.*

5. *Multiple technologies-Utilizing a variety of technologies, as appropriate, and creating new methods, as needed, to meet the unique needs of each situation.*
6. *Facilitation-Assisting parties in taking responsibility for their dreams and destiny.*
7. *Empowerment-Helping people become empowered agents of change and transformation within their societies.*
8. *Action research-Learning from all that we do and sharing that learning with others.*
9. *Invitation-Entering the system where there is an invitation and an open door.*
10. *Trust-Building relationships of mutual trust and caring within the system.*
11. *Engagement-Acknowledging that once we enter a system we become a unique part of it an engaged, caring, and accountable partner.*
12. *Transformation-Catalyzing changes at the deepest level of beliefs, assumptions, and values, as well as behaviours and structures (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2004).*

In my opinion, Japanese studies in several parts of the world are strongly influenced by the diplomacy undertaken by the Japanese government and all of stakeholders in Japan. Japan successfully used all of track in diplomacy.

In Indonesia, for example, although Indonesia has had a bad experience with Japan, but for the present time there are almost no people of Indonesia who hate Japan. Even the fact that they encountered was a growing influence of Japanese culture and education in the life of Indonesian society. Japan became one of the interests of the most popular area studies, especially among teenagers and academicians. This condition also occurs at the college level where the study of Japan is increasingly in demand. Even the percentage of lecturers / researchers who are studying in Japan is very large, ranging from 30 to 50 percent.

While some segments of the youth in Indonesia are also very fond of the Japanese lifestyle. This is shown by so much public interest to Japanese cultures such as Japanese movies, Japanese comics, Japanese-style clothing, Japanese, and so on.

If we look at into historical perspective, Japanese culture includes the interaction between native Jomon cultures strong with influences from abroad that followed. At first, many Chinese and Korean influence, starting with the development of Yayoi culture around 300 BC.



Combined Greek traditions and Indian culture, art and religious affect Japan since the 6th century AD, with the introduction of Mahayana sect of Buddhism. Since the 16th century, prominent European influence, followed by the United States influence that dominated Japan after World War II.

Japan helped develop the original culture and unique, in the arts (ikebana, origami, ukiyo-e), crafts (sculpture, pottery, gift (bunraku puppets, traditional dance, kabuki, noh, rakugo), and traditions (Japanese game, Onsen, sento, tea ceremony, Japanese garden), and Japanese food.

Now, Japan is one of the exporters of the biggest pop culture. Anime, manga, fashion, film, literature, video games, and Japanese music received rave reviews all over the world, especially in Asian countries. Japanese youths find creative trends and styles. In fact, those trends affect the whole world. Youth market is very bright with a test to the user items of new electronic, in which style and function is determined by Japanese users, before being considered for release to the world.

Recently the first Japanese export another valuable commodity culture: sportsman. Popularity of Japanese baseball players in the United States to raise awareness of Western citizens is against everything about Japan.

Japanese people usually like to eat their traditional foods. Most of the TV show in the evening is devoted to the discovery and earnings quality traditional food. Japanese Food print name around the world with sushi, which is usually made from various kinds of raw fish combined with rice and wasabi. Sushi has a lot of fans around the world. Japanese food relies on the transitional seasons, with cold noodles and served sashimi in the summer, while hot ramen in the winter.

Above facts can be a good reason why the people of Indonesia have a positive perception of Japan. This phenomenon in international relations glasses can be described as soft power.

Before having deeper understanding about soft power, the basic concept of “power” and the position of soft power among the other types of power need to be known first. Usually power is related with the ability to impose self-desire over other’s desire. In politics and military fields, this concept is recognized as the power to coerce or hard power. In the other pole, there is what is called as soft power, or the power to persuade, that usually occur in the worlds of ideas, values, education, culture, religion, music, and literature.

To bridge those two poles of power, there is a “gap” that is called as smart power, the space between “hard power” and “soft power”. Being smart in using power is the strategy to offer “software” supported with the potentials of the usage of “hard power” through “smart power”. It is common to do with money, trade, or financial benefit, even position as the retainers. Every country has soft power, hard power, and smart power.

“Soft” is the all power of culture, literature, teaching, and belief offered as life values that can be enjoyed by other nations. “Hard” is the physical power of military, police, attorney and court, and authority that is legalized as the tools for law enforcement. “Smart” is the power of economic, finance, trade, and natural resources potentials (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2004).

*... Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives (Nye Jr., 2004).*

From the definition above, the development of Soft Power concept can be found in the book *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics* written by Joseph S. Nye Jr. as follows: Most people conceive hard power as military and economic. This power is often used to press other parties. Yet, sometimes a party cannot rely on this power to achieve its goal. This method is what often called as second face of power. A country can achieve its goal in international sphere because there are other countries that follow this country. The important thing in this case is to prepare an agenda and the efforts to raise the sympathy or interest of other countries, not only by military force or economic sanction. The method to make other parties follow the desire of a party without pressing them is called as soft power.

The important point in soft power is the ability to form other parties' perception, for example how a political leader is able to raise sympathy from her/his members without considering tribes, religions, etc. However, soft power is different from influence because the concept of influence may be related with hard power. It is because a country can improve its influence toward other countries by using military or economic force. The concept of soft power is more than merely persuasive or argumentative ability. In a more simple expression, soft power can be called as attractive

power.

However, the concepts of hard power and soft power can be considered as related each other because in both concept, there is the ability to influence other parties' actions to achieve certain goals. The difference lies on the level of power used. Hard power uses command power, such as pressure, sanction, and threat while soft power uses co-optive like values, cultures, and policies.

In the realm of international politics, soft power is very close to the term "world opinion", which a country should create by raising attention and sympathy from other countries. This concept had ever been applied by world leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt, and Kennedy. The example of the creating of soft power in international politics is through the sending of reconciliation army or through financial aid. Besides, it also can be done through the institution formation like when U.K. applied the gold standard or when U.S. initiated the formation of IMF, WTO, and UN.

The source of soft power itself can be categorized into three forms, which are culture, political values, and foreign policy. Culture contributes specific characteristics in a group of society. It can be divided into two, which are high culture such as literature, art, and education that are addressed to certain people and popular culture that focuses on mass. The example of soft power usage can be seen from U.S.' actions, so that it can be the most successful country to spread its culture throughout the world, *e.g.* McD and Hollywood artists' culture.

## **Conclusion**


A conclusion that can be taken from this essay is that in Indonesia, Japanese and American studies have a very close connection. This connection is shown by the curriculum applied in Indonesian universities and the substances taught in the subjects. Related to Japanese studies on American politics and American studies on Japanese politics in Indonesia, both of them have several similarities, among them is that these studies are the main concern in International Relations studies. Both of them have also received major attention in discussions and publications in Indonesia. However, even though both of them are interesting subjects to study, there has not been any specific study on both of them. These two studies are merely sub-themes of larger themes taught in the universities.

Moreover, if seen substantially, Japanese studies on American politics and

American studies on Japanese politics are highly influenced by the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries. These dynamics can be divided into three major periods with different characteristics. The characteristics in the first period was dominated by perception of threat towards security and defense of the two countries, the second period was dominated by mutual trust through joint defense pact, and the third period was again dominated by perception of threat. However, the perception of threat in the third period was not related to defense and security, but more to the perception of threat in terms of economic rivalry.

Meanwhile the basic difference between the two is the portion of discussion in the lectures. Even though both of them are interesting subjects of discussion, if seen from the aspect of curriculum, it can be said that in Indonesia, the discussion on the American politics in Japanese studies tends to be more dominant (having a bigger portion) compared to the discussion on Japanese politics in American studies. Therefore, Japanese studies in Indonesia talks more about the American politics, but the American studies in Indonesia talks less about Japanese politics. This is not a surprise since in the perspective of developing countries such as Indonesia; the position of the United States in international politics is still very strategic.

Japanese Studies is very popular in the world, especially Indonesia, due to the success of diplomacy that Japan had been built. Diplomacy is run well through the various instruments and actors, such as government, private sector, employers / business, media, funding, and so on. Through all the instruments and actors, the image of Japan in the international world is very good, so many people who admire the Japanese state. This phenomenon is known as soft power. Therefore, the success of Japanese studies in various parts of the world cannot be removed from the success of Japanese soft power.



The dynamics of the relationship between Japan and the United States of America highly influences the substances of Japanese and American studies in Indonesia

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## Japan Studies in the United States – Past and Present Perspectives

C. Kenneth Quinones

### 1. Introduction

The study of Japan in the United States is a mature area of academic endeavor with a lengthy history that dates from the 1930s. Over three hundred and thirty American institutions of higher learning, both colleges and universities, host programs of study about Japan. But study of Japan alone is viewed as too narrowly specialized, at least prior to enrolment in a Ph.D. program. Only a very small number of institutions offer the Bachelor of Arts degree in “Japan Studies.” Virtually all undergraduate programs have integrated the study of Japan into their broader curriculum as an integral element of “Asian” or “East Asian” studies degree programs.

These programs accent a geographically broad interdisciplinary approach to learning about Japan that includes the study of at least the Japanese language. The programs are often augmented with study in Japan for one or two semesters. Most institutions that encourage study in Japan belong to one of a few consortia that emphasize Japanese language study either in Kyoto or Tokyo.

The leading professional association for academics and students engaged in the study of Japan is the University of Michigan based Association for Asian Studies (AAS) which has more than 6,000 members around the world. It promotes the interdisciplinary study of all areas of Asia.

The academic work of these colleges and university programs, and the AAS is enhanced by the activities of large and financially well endowed foundations and institutions. Some of these organizations, which are both government and privately funded, specialize in promoting Japan studies at all levels of American society. Consequently the American public is relatively well versed about Japan.

## 2. Genesis of Japan Studies

The needs of missionaries gave rise to the formal study and teaching about East Asia, including Japan, during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century but the needs of the United States government during World War II in the Pacific fostered East Asian studies as it is known today in the United States. Edwin O. Reischauer is widely recognized as the father of Japan studies in the United States. Actually this son of an American missionary who grew up in Japan to become an accomplished scholar, Harvard University Professor of Japanese History and US Ambassador to Japan owes much to his mentors who came from Europe, East Asia and the United States.

When Reischauer commenced his academic career in Japan studies at Oberlin College in the late 1920s, only Harvard, Columbia University and the University of California at Berkeley offered a few courses about Chinese and Japanese history. His first interest was China, not Japan. From Oberlin, Reischauer followed his older brother to Harvard in 1931. (Note: The older brother pioneered the study of Japan at Harvard, but died from injuries suffered during the Japanese bombing of Shanghai in 1937.)

At Harvard Reischauer was compelled to begin his study of East Asia by taking Chinese language courses. It was not until Serge Elisseeff, possibly the leading European scholar in the field of Japanese studies, arrived at Harvard University that Reischauer had a mentor. Elisseeff, the grandson of a Russian merchant, broke with his family's mercantile tradition and went to Japan in 1908 where he enrolled at Tokyo Imperial University. Eventually he returned to Russia but fled after the revolution to France where he established himself as a professor of Sinology studies at the Sorbonne.

In 1933, as Reischauer recalled in his 1986 autobiography *My Life Between Japan and America*, Professor Elisseeff invited Reischauer to pursue a five year program of study abroad aimed at gaining a Ph.D. in Far Eastern Languages, at the time the only degree program Harvard offered in East Asian Studies. The program called for two years in Paris and three years in Japan, Korea and China. In Europe Reischauer concentrated on learning French and studying classical Chinese.

In accordance with his first academic love of ancient China and Buddhism, Reischauer selected as his Ph.D. thesis the translation into English of the 9<sup>th</sup> Century Japanese Buddhist monk Ennin's diary. (Ennin, after extensive travel and study of Buddhism in China and Korea



returned to Japan where he is credited with the establishment of *Motsuji* Temple in 850. Located near the more famous *Chusonji* Temple of Iwate prefecture, *Motsuji* is famous for its *Jodo*-style garden where the famous Japanese film director Kurosawa staged one of his highly regarded scenes.) Twenty years later Reischauer's translation was published in two volumes as *The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law*, and *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China*. Reischauer won his Ph.D. in history and promptly began teaching Chinese at Harvard University.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 profoundly benefited the study of Japan in the United States. Immediately there was an urgent need for Americans with knowledge of Japan, particularly the Japanese language. Reischauer, being one of the few professors in the United States then with extensive knowledge of Japan, was quickly drawn into government service to help orchestrate the expansion of Japan studies. First he was called upon to organize a Japanese language program at Harvard University for US military officers. After one year the program was moved to the University of Colorado and combined with a similar program established earlier at the University of California at Berkeley. (Note: The Japanese language program was placed in Colorado because the Japanese-American instructors were barred from living within 200 miles of the U.S. Pacific coast.)

Reischauer moved to Washington, DC to assist with US government efforts to break Japan's diplomatic and military codes. There he helped organized at Arlington Hall school (which eventually became headquarters for the US Army's code breaking branch called the Army Security Agency) the training of crypto-analysts in the breaking of codes. He concentrated on this work until war's end. Many of his students later became leading scholars in the study of Japan across the United States. His wartime experience ended with service in the Department of State advising about the post-war occupation of Japan. But growing distrust of so-called "area specialists" among American politicians late in the war compelled the State Department to replace "Japan specialists" with China specialists to formulate and implement plans for the occupation of Japan.

In 1945 Reischauer returned to Harvard University to resume his academic career. One consequence of his war time experience was his writing and publication of *Japan Past and Present*. This relatively short and highly readable book was destined to become the standard textbook for the introductory study of Japanese history in the United States. A revised and enlarged version was published in 1970 under the title, *Japan*

*Past and Present: The Story of a Nation.*

Another major contribution to the study of Japan and East Asia was the birth of “rice paddies,” the basic introductory course in East Asian history offered at Harvard University. This was the brain child of Reischauer’s mentor John King Fairbank, an historian with little formal training in East Asian studies. Fairbank’s early focus had been Europe’s expansion into East Asia, particularly China. Fortunately for future students of East Asian studies in the United States, both scholars opposed treating Asian studies as an area of academic specialization. Instead, they agreed to merge the study of Japan and China into a single area called East Asian studies. Their “rice paddies” course was designed to excite undergraduate interest in the study of East Asia.

Subsequently they established two degree programs at Harvard University that eventually became the standard for East Asian studies programs at other American institutions of higher education. The M.A. program acquired the name East Asian regional studies. The two year program required the study of Chinese and Japanese plus the interdisciplinary study of both China and Japan. Candidates for a Ph.D. in East Asian studies were required to pursue an additional five year program in Chinese, Japanese, either a European language or a third East Asian language, plus a variety of courses in three distinct academic areas. This program led to a Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages. Variations were allowed if a Ph.D. candidate was able to organize a committee of three professors to oversee their program of study.

Reischauer was able to escape relatively unharmed from the McCarthyism “Red Scare” of the 1950s, but many early scholars of East Asian studies were falsely accused of disloyalty to the United States. Among them was John Service, a Foreign Service officer who studied with Reischauer at Oberlin College and became an expert on China. Senator Joseph McCarthy (Republican, Wisconsin) groundlessly labeled Service “pro-communist.” Disgraced, Service was forced to resign his commission and retire to an obscure life in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Many American academics and US government officials disassociated themselves from professors of East Asian studies out of a conviction that knowledge of China, Japan, Korea, etc. somehow diluted one’s loyalty to the United States. Others in the US government and academia assumed that the Marxist orientation of many of Japan’s scholars in Asian studies had tainted the views of America’s East Asian “experts” with Marxist and communist perspectives. This bias infected academia’s relations with the US government well into the 1980s.

It also barred many of America's "Asia experts" from qualifying for security clearances needed to work in the US government. Until after the Vietnam War, Americans with parents or spouses born in an Asian nation, regardless of whether they were US citizens, were barred from obtaining a security clearance. At the same time, Americans whose parents were spouses or were born in Europe or Australia did not face a similar barrier to government service. The rule was suspended for nearly three decades until President George Bush restored it following the 9/11 New York terrorism incident.

President John Kennedy sought to bridge the gap between academia and government by appointing several prominent scholars to high ranking positions in his administration. Presidential appointees were excused from the rule that required both parents and/or spouse be born in the United States. Reischauer was selected to serve as U.S. ambassador to Japan. But after Kennedy's assassination many of the scholars the president had appointed to government office returned to academia. Reischauer persisted but eventually left government because of opposition to the Vietnam War.

Ultimately American higher education benefited from the exodus of academics out of government. Scholars in East Asian studies with experience in both government and teaching acquired positions in the growing number of M.A. and Ph.D. programs established in the 1960s. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations funded many of the new academic positions in East Asian studies and the expansion of library collections about East Asia. Simultaneously the US Congress established the National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship program late in the Eisenhower Administration. This made it possible for an increasing number of American students to pursue the study of Asian languages at the M.A. and Ph.D. levels.

These developments fostered a new direction for Asian studies after the Vietnam War. As explained in subsequent sections of this paper, enhancement of the general public's understanding of Asia and East Asia began in earnest after 1965. Programs and materials for the study of Asia and East Asia at the pre-college level, sparked partially by a thirst about Vietnam during the war, also rapidly multiplied. What had begun in the 1930s as the pursuit of knowledge considered exotic and of marginal significance had a half century later merged with the main stream of education across the United States. Edwin Reischauer, his mentors and early colleagues are largely responsible for this

accomplishment.

### **3. American Higher Education and Japan Studies**

Originally in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, scholars in Europe and North America tended to marginalize the study of Asia as being exotic and of little academic significance. This perception was largely a consequence of Europe's 19<sup>th</sup> Century imperialistic perception of the world. Scholars looked at Asia from their home universities in Europe and declared everything east of Europe to be "oriental" and thus inferior to the "occident," i.e. Europe. Looking east from their universities in Great Britain, France and Germany, they further divided the world into the "near East" and the "Far East." In the United States, this perception was reflected in the assignment of "Oriental" or "Far East Studies" to the American Oriental Society.

Early American scholars of East Asia under the leadership of Hugh Borton, an early student of Japanese history based at Columbia University, broke with tradition as Europe's imperial order collapsed during World War II. Borton early in 1941 established the Far Eastern Association and with it *The Far Eastern Quarterly* which eventually became the leading academic journal in the area of Asian studies.

When Edwin Reischauer was elected president of this association in 1955, he changed the name to the Association for Asian Studies and the journal became the *Journal of Asian Studies*. Today the AAS, as it is usually called, is recognized internationally as the leading professional organization in the field of Asian studies. Key members of the AAS soon standardized the names for Asia's different regions. In the process, they disassociated the names for Asia's regions from Europe's earlier versions. Instead, the "Far East" and "Orient" became "East Asia" which was further divided into "Northeast and Southeast Asia." South Asia was assigned to the nations east of Pakistan and divided into "South Asia" (India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan) and "Southeast Asia" (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, etc.). Today the AAS is further organized into regional councils that include the Council on Northeast Asia. Within this council committees are organized according to national specialization.

#### ***Integration into the Liberal Arts Curriculum***

The intent of these changes was three fold. First, professors of Asian studies sought to integrate the study of Asia into the main stream liberal

arts curriculum. Toward this end they disassociated the nations of Asia from their colonial past. Secondly, they sought to counter conventional wisdom that claimed the study of Asia was of marginal significance relative to Europe focused subjects. Finally these scholars endeavored to establish that the study of Asia would not lead to excessive specialization relative to liberal arts' goal of promoting a broad comprehension of the human experience. By the 1970s America's students of Asia had largely succeeded in overcoming the parochial inclinations of their European oriented colleagues and their Euro-centered academic disciplines.

***“Japan Studies” verse “East Asian Studies”***

Consistent with these efforts, most colleges and universities in the United States have opted to integrate single nation studies into broader degree programs. Thus “Japan studies” as an academic degree program has virtually disappeared in the United States as evident in Chart I below.

**Chart 1. “Japan Studies” verse  
“Asian or East Asian Studies”**  
(Source: Association for Asian Studies)

Asian Studies Programs	137	41.9%
East Asian Studies Programs	78	23.9%
South Asian Studies Programs	18	5.5%
Southeast Asian Studies Programs	8	5.0%
Asian-American Studies Programs	10	3.0%
Korean Studies Programs	31	9.3%
<b>Japan Studies Programs</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>8.9%</b>
China Studies Programs	17	5.0%
Totals	327	100.0%

According to the Association for Asian Studies, only 29 or 8.9% of 327 institutions of higher learning in the United States host “Japan Studies” programs as an entity separate from other academic programs. This percentage is consistent with the general pattern for Akita International University’s partner institutions. But in the majority of the cases represented in Chart I, the “Japan Studies” programs concentrate on the study of the Japanese language and are not an interdisciplinary degree program. For the most part, “Japan studies” has been integrated into the liberal arts curriculum as an integral part of a degree program in Asian or East Asian studies. Actually only one university and four colleges in the United States now host “Japan Studies” B.A. degree programs (see Chart

III below).

Instead of studying only about Japan, most undergraduate and graduate students alike are required to concentrate on the study of Asia or East Asia, much as Reischauer was required in the 1930s. Consistent with the AAS designations, Asia encompasses the entire Asian continent from India east to Japan, and from China and Korea south to Indonesia. Excluded are the nations of the Middle East or “Western Asia” that encompass the Arab/Islamic cultural region (Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, etc.). The term “East Asia” is more narrowly focused and is sub-divided into Northeast and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia includes: China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Mongolia. The region from the Philippines south to Indonesia, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar are placed in Southeast Asia.

### *Interdisciplinary Degree Programs without Specialization*

Undergraduate and Master degree students are required to study a geographically broader region rather than a single nation, as well as develop an interdisciplinary perspective of their chosen region. In short, they learn to place their selected nation within a broad cultural and interdisciplinary context. The only area of permitted specialization is in the study of a single Asian language at the B.A. and M.A. levels.

Candidates for the Ph.D. are also barred from concentrating on a single nation. They must establish competency in three languages (usually Chinese and Japanese plus one European language) and an interdisciplinary knowledge of three areas of study. For my Ph.D. degree at Harvard University, I was required to study modern Chinese, classical Chinese, modern Japanese and modern Korean as well as medieval and early modern Chinese history, medieval and modern Japanese history, and Korean history. Prior to this study, I had also studied at the undergraduate level French, political science and American history.

Charts II and III below document that Asian and East Asian Studies are fully integrated into the liberal arts curriculum of US higher education. All but three states (South and North Dakota, Wyoming which all have relatively small populations) have no institutions of higher with programs in either Asian or East Asian studies. The states with the largest populations (California and New York) host more than twelve institutions each with Asian/East Asian Studies programs.

**Chart II. Geographical Distribution of All  
“Asian/East Asian Studies” Programs**

(Source: Association for Asian Studies)

States with none (North & South Dakota, Wyoming)	3
States with 1 or 2 institutions	23
States with 3 or 4 institutions	9
States with 5 or 6 institutions	9
States with 7 to 11 institutions	3
(Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois)	
States with more than 12 institutions	3

The majority of Asian/East Asian studies programs are at universities (see Chart III below). But 58 colleges now host B.A. degrees in these fields of study and the number continues to increase. “Japan Studies” degree programs, however, remain the exception and have not increased for some time.

**Chart III. Universities and Colleges with  
“Asian/East Asian Studies” Programs**

(Source: Association for Asian Studies)

Universities	145*
Colleges	58
Colleges with Japan Studies	4**

- \* Includes four “think tanks” based in Washington, D.C.  
The University of Washington is the only university to offer a B.A. in “Japan Studies.”
- \*\* College of Charleston, Gustavas Adophus College, Middleburg College and Wellesley College

***Study Abroad in Japan***

Most Asian and East Asian studies programs do not require that undergraduates study abroad, but it is encouraged if financially possible for the student. Graduate students, particularly in Ph.D. programs, are generally required to live in East Asia for at least one, preferably two semesters prior to completing their degree.

The primary purpose for going abroad is to pursue language study in a student’s nation of primary interest. To facilitate this, several leading universities and colleges that host Asian/East Asian Studies programs

belong to a consortium of institutions that encourage study abroad. The Associated Kyoto Program hosted by Doshisha University in Kyoto is the largest such consortium. It hosts students from 38 nations, including 34 US colleges and universities. Each semester (September-March or April-September) 65 students from American institutions are admitted to the two part academic program (*Nichibun* program). Students usually spend two academic semesters in intensive Japanese language study (*Bekka* Program) held in the morning and take liberal arts courses in the afternoon.

A second highly regarded exchange program is the Kyoto Consortium for Japanese Studies organized by Columbia University in association with the Universities of Michigan and Virginia. This program provides an “intensive, two semester academic program primarily for undergraduates who wish to do advanced work in Japanese language and Japanese studies.” Consortium members include: Boston University, Brown University, the University of Chicago, Columbia University/Barnard College, Cornell University, Emory University, Harvard University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, Stanford University, Washington University in St. Louis and Yale University.

A third consortium is the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies sponsored by Stanford University. Established in 1963, it is based in Yokohama, Japan. The program provides ten months training in advanced Japanese for a select number of undergraduate, graduate and post-graduate students. Most of its students aspire to careers in academia, business and government. Some 1,600 persons have completed the program since its initiation.

#### **4. Public Diplomacy and “Japan Studies”**

The study of Japan in the United States also benefits from the work and financial support of several government and private organizations. They fund library acquisition programs, graduate and post-doctorate research fellowships for study in Japan, and the endowment of tenured academic positions at selected universities. Other similar organizations fund public education programs and elementary and high school teacher programs that encourage teaching about and travel to Japan. The more prominent of these organizations are: The Japan Foundation, Japan Society, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, and the United States-Japan Foundation. The Asia Society, a privately funded institution, sponsors a wide variety of programs for the general public about all areas of Asia, including Japan.



Additional financial support for faculty exchange and research programs is available from the US government sponsored Fulbright Program and the Japanese government's Japan Foundation and JET program. Also the US Congress partially funds the Mansfield Center which assists US government officials wishing to study in Japan. The U.S. Department of State partially funds and assists in sponsoring public speeches and discussions about a wide range of foreign policy topics that encompass US-Japan relations.

Finally there are key privately funded "think tanks" in New York and Washington, DC that host scholars and government officials from both nations to study bilateral US-Japan foreign, security and trade policies, politics and related issues. These include the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Brookings Institute, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Sasagawa Foundation.

### ***The Japan Foundation***

The most financially well endowed organization that promotes the study of Japan in the United States is the Japan Foundation. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages the organization and funds it with the proceeds from Japanese passport fees. The foundation's activities are global in scope. Within the United States, the foundation invests several million dollars annually to promote "Japan studies" by funding research fellowships (graduate and post-doctoral), grants for staff and library expansion, conferences, Japanese language study, and sponsors art exhibitions and performances. In 2007, the foundation awarded some \$3.8 million to 36 individuals and 321 institutions in the United States to promote "better understanding of Japanese culture, arts, language and society and to promotions of Japanese cultural relations" between Japan and the United States.

### ***Japan Society of New York***

The Japan Society is a private United States based organization with its headquarters in New York and a branch office in San Francisco. It receives financial support from the Japan Foundation, the City of New York and the Freeman Foundation. In addition to hosting lectures on Japanese topics by prominent experts, the Society sponsors art exhibitions and performances of Japanese performing arts and films. Its New York office organizes educational programs for students from pre-school to

high school plus adult education programs. One of its most respected programs sponsors workshops and three week tours of Japan for elementary and high school students each summer. The Society also sponsors a Corporate Program that hosts public and invitation-only programs for the international business and foreign policy community to discuss bilateral US-Japan issues. The program annually hosts events that attract more than 2,500 business executives.

### ***Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation***

This foundation was established by former U.S. Senator and scholar of Japan studies Mike Mansfield and his wife in 1984 to promote better understanding and cooperation between the United States and Japan. The foundation is funded by proceeds from the senator's endowment, the Japan Foundation and US Congress. The Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program allows a small number of US federal employees to develop a detailed knowledge of how the Japanese government works. Awardees reside for two years in Japan where they observe up close their Japanese counterparts in business, government and other professions, and form professional relationships. Since the fellowship program began in 1994, 91 American officials from 22 federal government agencies have studied in Japan. The foundation also sponsors a series of "Capital Hill Area Policy Dialogues" that bring together members of the US Congress and their staff with experts to discuss issues of mutual importance to the United States and Japan.

### ***United States – Japan Foundation***

This foundation shares the same goals as its larger cousins, the Japan Foundation and the Japan Society, specifically the promotion of "stronger ties between Americans and Japanese by supporting projects that foster mutual knowledge and education, deepen understanding, create effective channels of communication, and address common concerns in an increasingly interdependent world." Also like its cousin institutions, the foundation's offices are in New York and Tokyo, and it too receives funding from the Japan Foundation and the US Congress. It distinguishes itself by sponsoring programs for pre-college level educators, i.e. elementary, middle and high school teachers. These programs promote the integration of "Japan studies" into pre-college curricula and Japanese language study at the pre-college level. Other programs concentrate on facilitating closer and smoother bilateral trade relations between the United States and Japan.

## 5. American Perceptions of Japan

The study of Japan in the United States has virtually erased from the American people's minds the negative imagines of Japan fostered by legacies of racism and World War II. This is best illustrated by the annual survey that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has conducted since 1960. The survey polls two groups of Americans, one the "general public" and the other "opinion leaders." The 2009 survey polled 1,500 US citizens over the age of 18 who live in the United States and another 253 professional persons working in government, business, academia, the mass media, religion and labor unions. According to the "2009 U.S. Image of Japan Study," the majority of Americans rate Japan as a country with:

Great traditions and culture	96%
Strong economy and high technology	88%
Beautiful nature	85%
Peaceful country	84%

Equally important is the American general public's perception that Japan is a:

Dependable ally	80%
US-Japan Cooperation is excellent or good	73%
Japan is U.S. most important partner	46%

## 6. Conclusion

The efforts of American educators, obviously ably assisted by their Japanese counterparts, to integrate the study of Japan into the liberal arts curriculum of United State's institutions of higher education have been highly successful. From its humble start as an academic enterprise considered of marginal educational importance, the study of Japan has flourished in the United States. This accomplishment most likely would not have been possible had American educators maintained "Japan Studies" as a separate pursuit. Fortunately for "Japan Studies," the American public and Japan, the study of Japan was integrated into the broader liberal arts curriculum at many universities and colleges across the United States. This has enabled Americans in all professions to acquire at least an appreciation for Japan's accomplishments and to understand the benefits of the increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Japan since 1945. Also, because Japan Studies in the United States has not been conducted in isolation, American educators and students are able to perceive Japan and its significance in a global

context.

Nor have the public diplomacy programs by public education organizations such as the Japan Foundation gone unnoticed. A direct consequence of them is that the American public, professionals in government and business, and pre-college educators have a keen appreciation and understanding of Japan, US-Japan relations and Japan's global role. Similarly Americans have an accurate image of Japan, its people, and their accomplishments. Although "Japan Studies" has almost disappeared from US higher education, the study of Japan is no longer considered "exotic." On the contrary, it is now a significant and integral element of liberal arts education in the United States.

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## The State of Japanese Political Studies in the United States: From Mega-Universities to Liberal Arts Colleges

Ronald J. Hrebentar

*Abstract: The “Golden Age” of Japan Studies in the United States has passed. Various forces, economic and intellectual, have operated to reduce the impact of Japanese Studies. Within the broad field of Japan Studies, political science has been in decline with History and Cultural Studies becoming more popular in recent years. While the study of Japanese politics can be found in large state universities and elite private universities, it is absent in many of the country’s institutions of higher education. If a student seeks to study of Japanese politics at the graduate level, it must be done at one of the twenty or so elite state or private universities with the resources necessary for MA and PhD study.*

### **Introduction to the Study of Japanese Politics in the United States**

There is good news and bad news to report regarding the current state of Japanese studies and Japanese political studies in American colleges and universities. Clearly, the “Golden Age” of Japanese studies in the United States has ended and now it must now compete with a number of new programs and academic perspectives that threaten to dilute the significance of Japan and its academic study.

The once powerful Japan Foundation and its various programs were the models for nations seeking effective and influential input into the education of future political, economic and social leaders as well as a foundation for protecting Japan’s political and economic interests. Today, in relative terms due to rising levels of competition, the Japan Foundation is less significant in the United States and throughout the world.

Additionally, Japanese studies must compete with a growing trend toward broad based programs of academic studies that come with such popular names such as “globalization,” “international studies,” or “Asian



studies.” More and more American college and university students are avoiding the more traditional majors such as comparative politics within political science or international political economy within economics and choosing the more amorphous new majors like international studies. The implications for Japanese studies are significant because the new majors are broad in their perspectives, but shallow in their detail and depth. Majors in Asian studies will have a much lower level of information and knowledge on Japan since their class load will be spread over the entire continent or at least, from South Asia to Northeast Asia.

The rise of a new educational paradigm, Cultural Studies, has also served to reduce the importance of Japanese political studies. By adopting a wide range of largely European intellectual perspectives largely housed in colleges of humanities, the social sciences in general, and political science in specific, has been eclipsed in Japan Studies programs across the nation.

Furthermore, the world economic recession has forced cutbacks in various academic programs that have and will profoundly impact Japan studies in a negative way. The recession of 2008-2010 in the United States cut endowments of foundations and universities that have served as funding sources for supporting academic programs and the recession also severely cut governmental budgets that partially fund the community colleges and state universities that form the core of higher education in the United States. As political science, economics and history programs lose “hard money” that funds professor’s salaries and replace them with “part-time” and adjunct faculty, who usually lack the educational experience, research focus and publication records needed to support a specialized undergraduate or graduate program in Japan studies.

The decline of Japan in relative economic terms and the rise of China have changed the political game in Washington, D.C. to such a degree that it is now very difficult to find much of a Japanese presence there, but Chinese money and programs are everywhere. With the decline of Japanese interests and concerns in Washington and in the United States in general, Japanese funding of cultural, economic and political programs has suffered a relative decline and it is felt throughout the nation and even in academic programs. Now, when political science or economics programs are considering a new faculty appointment, the case for allocating a professorship to Japanese politics, economics or history is much weaker than it was in the 1980s.

Finally, the rise of other East Asian nations over the past several decades

has produced formidable competitors for the Japan Foundation in the political, cultural and academic arenas throughout the United States. An emergent and aggressive China has created the Confucian Institute that has pumped millions of dollars into American colleges and universities. Japan's closest geographical Asian rival now has a very aggressive and well-funded Korea Foundation that mirrors many of the strategies and tactics of the Japan Foundation, but seems to be better funded.

### **Japanese Studies in American Colleges and Universities**

When Japanese studies were launched by an influx of Japanese funding in the 1950s and 1960s, a critical decision was made to concentrate the establishment of Japanese studies programs at elite universities that mirrored the pattern of Japanese elite universities in Tokyo and Kyoto. Millions of dollars of funding went to the "usual suspects" of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Stanford, University of California-Berkeley and Los Angeles, Hawaii, Michigan, Washington, Southern California and Wisconsin. Prestigious centers were established and most, if not the vast majority of new Ph.D.s in Japanese studies were trained in a handful of these elite universities. Additional funding poured into the establishment or enhancement of great libraries devoted to Japanese studies at such universities such as the Universities of California-Berkeley, Michigan, Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Princeton, Stanford, UCLA, and Washington.

Today, almost every major college and university has an undergraduate program in Asian studies or East Asian Studies. At the mega-state universities and elite private universities such programs have many parts to it offering courses from its many different departments and colleges from law to language to architecture. Many even offer a concentration leading to a B.A. degree in Japanese studies. Others has merged Japanese studies into a degree concentration on East Asia. Smaller liberal arts and state colleges may offer a course or two on Japan within some broadly defined major such as international studies or perhaps a traditional department such as political science or history. The current state of Japanese studies is a broad continuum of educational experiences ranging from the meg-state universities like the University of California offering many Japanese classes in often narrow subject areas to the many small state colleges and small liberal arts colleges that offer one or maybe two courses on Japan.

To illustrate the vast difference between the curriculum offered in a mega-university and that offered in a much small college or regional state

university, allow me to present several examples of each. In summary, the larger state and elite private universities offer fine programs in Japan Studies, the smaller state universities and private colleges tend to offer Japanese studies only within broader introductory courses.

The Japan Foundation has been tracking the state of Japan Studies in the United States. Its 2007 study of American Japanese studies programs noted that after examining a massive amount of data, its major findings are “clear and compelling:”

- The number of Japan specialists has declined from its 1995 high.
- There is a steady supply of new Japan specialists entering the field to replace retiring specialists.
- The current pool of Japan specialists is heavily academic, with stronger language skills and active researchers and teachers.
- Libraries with large Japanese collections have expanded in recent decades.
- Japanese studies programs at academic institutions have become stronger, broader and deeper over the past decade---even as their number has decreased. These programs offer higher levels of Japanese language training as well as more specialized courses for professional and advanced academic study.
- A slightly wider-range of universities are now regularly graduating new Ph.D.s in Japan related fields. All of these institutions are research I academic institutions.
- There will be continued difficulties in placing new Ph.D.s in academic positions with the structural changes now ongoing in higher education and the great increases in untenured track part time faculty.
- Institutions with marginal Japanese studies programs may be more endangered in the current era. In the past decades marginal programs have been likely to fail and outside financial support is not likely to be available in significant amounts.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion of the Japan Foundation is also very clear in its overall positive findings with some vague warnings:

Thus at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Japanese Studies appears to be in quite good condition to face the future. That future is not as rosy and expansive as it appeared to be in the early 1990s, but the infrastructure of Japanese Studies in the United States has now dug deep roots and should be able to weather some storms without serious damage. These developments of the past decade

have occurred in the context of a *paradigm shift in Japan studies* in the United States that has had uneven effects on Japanese Studies programs...<sup>2</sup>

The beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century will probably witness some retrenchment of the boundaries of Japan studies in the United States for economic, political and academic reasons. Clearly, there is much less interest in Japan in 2009 than there was in 1989 and that reduction of interest has been translated into a reduction of funding from both sides of the Pacific as the disinterested Japanese and the distracted Americans re-order their funding priorities to match the new world and its various types of concerns and demands.

What is this “paradigm shift” that the Japan Foundation states has had a strong impact on Japan Studies? Japan studies have bounced around three different paradigms. The oldest paradigm is the *Economic Competition Paradigm* that reflected the economic trends and academic responses of the 1980s and early 1990s; the *Language and Areas Studies Paradigm* was often found in the social sciences and emphasized politics and economics; and the third and now dominant paradigm is the *Cultural Studies Paradigm* that is largely housed in the colleges of humanities and heavy with language and associated cultural studies, religion and literature. These paradigm “wars” are significant because whichever paradigm is adopted by an institution will have a profound effect on faculty hiring and departmental/college/program resources allocations. The rise of the Cultural Studies Paradigm means future declining roles for specialized Ph.D.s conducting traditional research on Japan in political science, economics and other related social sciences.<sup>3</sup> The Cultural Studies Paradigm has some very serious problems associated with it. By its very nature it is program based and not housed in traditional academic departments. Therefore it will have severe legitimacy problems in the elite graduate program universities where graduate education is almost completely discipline based and thus Cultural Studies based Japanese Studies programs graduates will have even greater difficulty finding jobs in a distressed job market. Housed in the humanities, such programs will also lack the traditional methodological skills needed to be discipline successful in contemporary academia. This is another case of the “survival of the fittest” in Japanese studies. The largest and most powerful Japanese studies programs located at the elite universities

“are so extensive that they have managed to accommodate all three of the dominant paradigms by layering them, rather than shifting entirely from one to another. They were able to maintain their

original investment in the Language and Area Studies paradigm through Japanese studies degree programs at the undergraduate and MA level....They have met the challenges of the Economic Competition Paradigm by adding professional and technical programs....and they have also developed new course offerings and degree programs...that fall within the Cultural Studies Paradigm.<sup>4</sup>

### **So where should an American student who wants a good education in Japanese studies go?**

The answer to the above question requires an examination of the range of opportunities available to students in the American system of higher education. At the end of October 2009, a report was issued that noted that a high water mark had been reached in terms of the percentage of young Americans then enrolled in higher education. For the first time, 40% of the 18-29 year olds were enrolled in higher education, but it also noted that much of the growth to reach that percentage had occurred at the community college level. Many American students have been choosing the community colleges for their first two years of higher education because it is cheaper, often much cheaper than the state and private colleges and universities. That may be true, but as the old saying goes, “you get what you pay for.” The chances of getting any courses that directly deal with Japanese studies and especially Japanese politics are almost zero. What a student will find at this level are introductory level courses in international relations and comparative politics that may have a week or so on Japan in the latter course. Of course, most students attending the bigger state universities will also not be exposed to Japan specific courses during their first two years.

But when the four-year B.A. degree experience is considered, one must note that there is an enormous range of opportunities for Japanese politics study and broader Japan Studies. Whether or not a student is given a quality education in Japanese studies is largely related to the type of higher education institution he or she attends and the resources it has decided to invest in Japan Studies. As previously mentioned, one will not receive any significant education in Japanese studies at the community college level where most of American students choose to begin (and often end) their post-secondary educations. Where these community college graduates and newly graduated high school students select for their next institution is critical. Smaller state colleges and most small liberal arts colleges have almost no faculty for the teaching of Japanese studies and Japanese politics in specific. These schools have a very small political science department with five or six political scientists and sometimes

even fewer. The University of Alaska at Juneau, for example, has a couple of political scientists housed in a social sciences department with sociologists, economists and psychologists. And the University of Alaska-Southeast (Juneau) is a four-year B.A. granting institution. In the state of Utah, for example, there are 9 state universities and colleges, but a course in Japanese politics is found at only the University of Utah. The Utah State University, the state's second most prestigious state university, has 61 courses in its political science department, but not one on Japan---China, yes; Russia, Yes; Japan, no. Utah Valley State University, with nearly 30,000 students, has no course on Japan and the closest is a course on International Relations of East Asia.

Major private universities such as the great private, elite universities such as the Ivy League schools, Chicago, Stanford, USC, and others are sites where one will always find a fine education in Japanese studies and in Japanese politics. Many of the "big names" in political science that specialize in Japanese politics are professors at Harvard, Yale, Chicago and Columbia. These schools are the core of the original twelve American universities selected by the Japanese government for massive subsidies to build and maintain elite Japanese studies programs. Columbia University, for example, offers courses in Chinese Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy and one course in Japanese Politics. Of course, the big drawbacks of the elite private universities are two: they are very difficult to enter because of the student demand and small sized student bodies and they are very, very expensive.

The other major alternative for students seeking to study Japanese politics lies in the flagship state universities such as the University of California system, the Universities of Texas and Michigan. There a student will find a wide range of undergraduate courses that focus on Japan or relate to Japan. The student will also find a collection of professors who are major publishers of articles, book chapters and books on Japan.

Japan Studies is particularly weak in the social sciences. If we exclude history, a quarter of American higher education institutions do not even offer one course in the social sciences that includes the study of Japan. Another quarter offer social science content in only one course. On the other hand, only 15 institutions offer social science courses on Japan in four or more disciplines.<sup>5</sup> Many multinational courses that contain some Japan content are found in such courses as Asian or East Asian art history, history, religion or civilization. History or literature account for over 40% of the enrollments in courses exclusively on Japan. The top five course areas (excluding political science) account for nearly 75% of the

enrollment.<sup>6</sup> The number of Japan specialists in 2005 was 1,284. There were 184 Japan Studies programs and 565 doctoral students. All of these figures represent declines from 1995, but are higher numbers than in 1989.<sup>7</sup>

With the decline of interest in Japan and Japan studies since the 1980s, there has been a reduction in the number of programs that can be called “marginal.” On the other hand, the older and strong programs have become institutionalized with endowments, government grants and other types of long-term financial support that aids both faculty and graduate students. The elite of these established programs now have more than 50 faculty members associated with it and also research institutes and additional specialized programs offered under its administration.<sup>8</sup>

Where does one find the most Japan Studies specialists? The answer to that question is in the biggest states that have the largest institutions of higher education: California, New York, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan.<sup>9</sup> In terms of colleges, humanities alone accounts for 45% of all Japan specialists. Clearly, the college of social sciences in Japan Studies is suffering a “slow, steady decline.”<sup>10</sup>

Where are the formal Japanese Studies programs found in American higher education? They are most heavily concentrated at the largest academic institutions---those with enrollments over 20,000 students. Conversely, Japanese Studies are least likely to be available in schools with less than 1,000 students. This should not be a surprise since Japan Studies originally started in the United States in the biggest and most elite universities<sup>11</sup>. Japanese Studies has “some presence” at about half of academic institutions with undergraduate enrollments of over 15,000, and a quarter of those with 10,000 to 14,999 students. In sum, Japanese Studies, in general is found in less than 15% of all academic institutions, but is available to more students because of the high enrollments where it is found.<sup>12</sup>

### **Studying Japanese Politics at the Graduate Level in the USA**

Selecting either the elite private universities with long standing Japan Studies programs or the great state flagship universities is even more important for study at the graduate level. No, not just important, absolutely crucial! For a masters or a doctorate degree in Japanese politics to a significant value in the research or academic marketplace of the United States, a student needs an advanced degree from one of the universities known for its Japanese and Asian Studies. Given the dismal

current general job market and the very limited number of research and academic positions that open each year, anyone with less than an elite degree is severely handicapped in their job searches.

Among contemporary graduate students studying Japanese topics, history has emerged as the 2005 leader in the number and percentage of doctoral students by a wide margin. History was ranked second to literature in 1989 and to political science in 1995. Political science, once ranked as number one in 1995 with the most graduate students, is in 2005 ranked in fourth place.<sup>13</sup> The core of doctoral production in Japanese Studies can be found in about twenty of America's most prestigious universities. The top twelve universities that dominated PhD production in the 1970s still found in the top 20 producers of PhDs in 2005.

Within Japanese Studies specialists found in Political Science, there have been significant changes in terms of the types of specializations held by current faculty teaching in the program. The top three specializations of the 1980s (foreign policy/trade policy/international relations; political institutions; and political thought/culture and ideology) have all dropped substantially, while there have been increases in political parties and electoral politics, women and politics, and political violence and terrorism.<sup>14</sup> The movement to the Cultural Studies Paradigm has had a profound impact on Political Science and other traditional disciplines. History has seen an explosion of courses that on that deal with World War Two and the post-war era. It has also added new courses that deal with gender issues and Japan, the samurai, film and terrorism.<sup>15</sup>

### **Japan Political Studies in the United States: A Preliminary Summary**

In summary, there are about 100 colleges and universities in the United States with some kind of Japan Studies program. This is out of over 3600 colleges and universities in the United States. Of those 100 institutions, fewer than half have programs that are broad based enough offer a solid foundation for further graduate level study and in reality, there are fewer than 20 institutions that offer both a great undergraduate and an excellent graduate education in Japanese politics.

### **Additional problems that will impact on the American Study of Japanese Politics**

In a 2009 book, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S. Japanese Relations*, by Japan scholar Dr. Kent Calder, the state of current Japanese studies in the United States is assessed within the broad frame of an analysis of all



types of relations between the United States and Japan. Professor Calder is an eminent political scientist who in earlier years served as a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo before entering the academic world at an elite Ivy League university known for its emphasis on Asian studies in general and Japanese studies in specific.<sup>16</sup>

Professor Kent E. Calder is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, SAIS. Previously, he served as professor at Princeton University for twenty years, the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University, where he served as the first Executive Director of the Harvard University Program on U.S.-Japan Relations. Dr. Calder was also the former special advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, former special advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and is currently a member of the editorial board of *Asian Security*. I give you this background to demonstrate the depth of knowledge that Professor Calder brings to this current assessment of U.S. Japanese Studies.

Professor Calder notes that the Golden Age of Japanese studies in the U.S. began in the early 1950s and gradually ended in the 1990s. The early boom was largely funded by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and in its middle years by the Japan Foundation, but these funding agencies and their leaders have disappeared or declined in terms of their relative significance in funding the Japanese sector of Asian studies in the United States.

Other measures of interest in Japan in the cultural areas indicate a sharp decline in Japan studies. Even the once powerful Japan Societies have fallen on hard times since the 1990s. Membership in the most successful big city Japan Societies such as in New York and Washington, DC has fallen and the regional or rural Japan Societies have folded in recent decades or have been significantly reduced in activities. Other organizations that have kept Japan studies alive in the United States have also lost important ground in recent years. The Shimoda Conferences, once a major source of international dialogue has largely disappeared and the U.S. Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program is a shadow of its once significant self and has been bypassed by newer programs started by China and Korea. Between 2000-2005, only 39 legislators visited Japan, but 113, 79, and 68 have visited China, India and Taiwan, respectively. While the ‘sister cities’ program is still viable with over 400 U.S.-Japan sister cities, Chinese cities with American exchanges is growing much faster with over 300 as of 2008. The future in sister cities in terms of the

trend line is in China and Korea.

The famous academic Japanese scholars of the “golden age” have largely retired or died. Names such as Scalapino and Reischauer have left the scene and others like Donald Hellman are on the verge of retirement. While some younger scholars have established promising careers, few have the “star” quality needed to raise Japan studies back to its once lofty position in American universities. More and more, the colleges and universities are seeking out broad based Asian scholars to teach in Asian Studies programs or International Studies programs and bypassing the very narrow and specific country scholars—the true Japan scholars.

Calder argues that the reason Japan Studies and Japanese influence has declined in the United States is that Japanese American economic and political conflict has been largely eliminated in the 1990s and Japan has been replaced by China as the primary East Asian nation of interest for the United States in both governmental and academic attention. If one examined the world of think tanks in Washington, DC in the 1980s and now in 2009, the presence of Japanese scholars, Japanese programs and lobbyists working for Japanese interests has greatly declined. Researchers and lobbyists who once worked for Tokyo are now employed by Beijing. The rise of the New China Lobby in the United States has also been accompanied by the Confucian Institute as the Chinese cultural component of its rise as a new world power.

This rise of Chinese influence, political, economic, social and academic has also been accompanied by a lesser, but still significant, rise in Korean influence in American universities and colleges. Not only have China (Confucian Institute) and Korea (Korea Foundation) raised the stakes in the academic game of influence, but this has been matched by fundamental demographic changes in the Asian populations living in the United States. Chinese-American and Korean-American populations have been growing explosively in recent years...there are now twelve times as many Chinese-Americans as Japanese-Americans in San Francisco. It used to be a 3.6 to 1 ratio in 1980. From such population surges comes student constituency demands for languages and other courses that have surged Chinese studies and Korean studies ahead of Japanese studies in many colleges and universities.

A significant part of American Japanese studies used to be fueled by the large number of Japanese students coming to the United States to study in American colleges and universities. That number has declined over the past decade with the number of such students declining from the mid-

40,000s in the 1990s to about 40,000 by 2003-04. Meanwhile the number of Chinese, Korean and Indian students coming to America to study has increased significantly over that same time period.

The number of U.S. college students taking Japanese language courses has increased slightly in the 2003-06 period, but the number of primary and secondary school American students studying Japanese fell by nearly 34 percent. By 2005, the number of teachers of Japanese fell by 31 percent to about 800 in the U.S. Mandarin Chinese has replaced Japanese in many urban schools as it is also replacing Cantonese Chinese because of the rise of Mandarin speaking immigrants coming to the U.S. Among graduate students studying Asian subjects, there are clearly fewer choosing to study Japanese subjects. Calder notes a growing number of Korea specialists being educated in the nation's elite graduate schools:

This shift is especially pronounced in Washington, D.C.. At the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, for example, there are only half as many students in Japan studies courses, and one third fewer courses, as there were in 1997, while a vigorous new Korea program has emerged. A similar pattern seems to prevail at other major schools in the area, including George Washington, Georgetown and American University. Conversely, far fewer Japanese than Korean, relatively to overall leadership population, have studied in the United States. And all too few Americans have studied in or traveled to Japan.<sup>17</sup>

Calder summarizes the significance of these trends:

“Falling prey to Japanese inattention and American indifference, the infrastructural base of U.S. Japan relations in Washington has thus quietly yet dangerously eroded. Resident Japan specialists have disappeared from the staffs of the Brookings Institution, and many other research centers, while such long-standing pillars of the Japanese presence in Washington such as the Japan Economic Institute have closed their doors. In the capital's universities, as in major academic institutions throughout the United States, both the number of Japan courses and the proportion of students studying Japan and the Japanese language, relative to the shares studying other major Asian languages has been steadily declining. The most significant variable in terms of the relative influence of Japan studies in the United States seems to be the existence of a political or economic period of crisis and it is strongly correlated to the growth of academic interest in Japan. Given the small portion of the

American population that is of Japanese background, the domestic student demand cannot support significant academic programs.. Japanese and Japanese Americans outnumbered the Chinese living in America until 1980. Now there are three times as many Chinese than Japanese living in the United States. In summary, if the Japanese government does not adequately fund the academic study of Japan and support the easy access to Japanese culture, economics and politics about Japan will continue to decline relative to its major Asian rivals to the detriment of long-term Japanese interests.”<sup>18</sup>

### **Conclusions:**

In summary, Japanese Studies in the United States for a wide variety of reasons noted in this paper, is stressed in an ever more competitive academic marketplace. Unless the Japanese government and its primary academic agencies such as the Japan Foundation, make a serious and long term commitment to maintain and expand Japan Studies, and especially Japan political studies, in the coming years, they will continue to lose ground to the Chinese and Korean academic programs in the United States and the study of Japanese politics and government will continue to be a minor subject in the vast majority of American institutions of higher education.

Japan, still the world’s second (or third) largest economy has to invest in maintaining or enhancing its position in American higher education priorities. It must:

1. Invest in the training of Japan researchers and graduate students in the social sciences and especially politics.
2. Invest in supporting faculty positions in institutions outside of the traditional, elite Japan centers
3. Establish the equivalent of Confucian Institutes. This means going beyond the Japan Foundation and its programs. It also means new financial support for research and programs on Japan.
4. It must view Chinese and Korean educational and cultural initiatives as significant competition for influence with the United States.

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*The Japan Foundation is the authoritative source of information and analysis on the state of Japan studies in the United States and Canada. It has commissioned and published periodic studies that have chronicled the rise and fall of Japan studies. This paper is largely based on this series of Japan Foundation reports, my experiences in American academe and as associate director of Asian studies at the University of Utah. I have referenced all the direct quotes I have taken from the various Japan Foundation reports dating back to the 1980s, but the other data presented in this paper on the state of Japan Studies in the United also comes from these Japan Foundation reports, but I have not referenced each and every one of them to save the reader from “terminal reference death.” However, I do want to clearly establish the great contribution the Japan Foundation’s periodic research on the state of Japanese studies in the United States has played in the writing of this paper.*

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<sup>1</sup> Japan Foundation. *Japanese Studies in the United States and Canada: Continuities and Opportunities*. Japanese Studies Series XXVI (Tokyo: The Japan Foundation. 2007). 184-85.

<sup>2</sup> Japan Foundation. 2007, 185.

<sup>3</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 186.

<sup>4</sup> Japan Foundation, 2007, 186.

<sup>5</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 135.

<sup>6</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 131-132.

<sup>7</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 12.

<sup>8</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 14.

<sup>9</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 28.

<sup>10</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 26.

<sup>11</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 106.

<sup>12</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 107.

<sup>13</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 37.

<sup>14</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 46.

<sup>15</sup> Japan Foundation 2007, 135.

<sup>16</sup> Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Pacific (New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009).

<sup>17</sup> Calder. 17-18.

<sup>18</sup> Calder, 18-19.

# **PART II**





富田人形 – Tonda Puppets  
A Winter's Tale: Building Tradition in Japanese  
Puppet Theatre

Darren J. Ashmore


*“It is not that we are actively anti-intellectual, opposed to the local authorities or are against professional puppet theatre. However, all the members of the group hold to the convictions that were taught to us when the theatre was originally revived in the 1950s. Everything we have now has come at a price and we have had to be willing to accept some very painful changes in order to stay in operation. However, we also know that our existence is just as important to our sponsors and that we are not entirely powerless. This is not a story of oppression and imposition, but one of negotiation and compromise”<sup>1</sup>*

Abe Hidehiko. Director, Tonda Traditional Puppets.



Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002

The Head Store at the Tonda Theatre



### Guise and Disguise

In my previous article in the AIU Global Review we considered how, when the perceived ownership<sup>2</sup> of a particular social reality is beyond all doubt, groups negotiate with each other for rights of access to particular social significations, and to the ends to which they put such associations.

In this case however, we focus on a revived property for which issues of actual ownership had been so obfuscated by the time of its revival in the 1950s that those who entered into the process of reconstruction at that time, did so free of the sort of constraints that bound up Nishinomiya's sponsors. Essentially what is being examined here is the process of negotiation of social reality itself, and whether such a process is different when none of its participants possess a mandate from the other participants for total control the process of re-signification.

However, much as with the previous article, we begin this investigation with a short narrative which describes something of the day-to-day operation of the modern revived theatre, its performance style and its staff's general attitudes to their art's place within their home.<sup>3</sup>



**New Tonda Meeting Hall**

Built in 1991, the New Tonda Hall, which serves as puppet store, theatre and village meeting place, is actually almost the last place one would expect to find a well respected traditional Japanese *ningyō jōruri* troupe. Looking more like a farmhouse than a theatre,<sup>4</sup> it stands amid windswept fields at the edge of the small hamlet of North Tonda and on most days of the week the building appears to serve little more purpose than to give shelter to the occasional game of croquette, the village horticultural circle or calligraphy classes. However, at certain times of the year, this façade completely drops away from the hall and it becomes an almost perfectly realized effigy of what the modern Japanese public have come to expect from a ‘traditional’ theatrical establishment. Sometimes playing to school parties, at other times for prefectural gatherings and, increasingly, US university students, perhaps the most important of these occasions is the annual Japan Rail West Lake Biwa Heritage Day, during which the theatre not only gives a grand performance of a scene from the theatre’s signature play (“*Keisei-no-Awa-no-Naruto*” [The Courtesan/Beauty from Naruto in Awa]) but also opens its ‘stage doors’ to the paying public and allows individuals a chance to see the beating heart of the Tonda Puppets.

Working with Japan Rail West and the city of Nagahama as a way of promoting the popularity of the city’s month-long festival of *bonbai*,<sup>5</sup> the Heritage Day links together over thirty important cultural sites within the north-eastern Biwa-ko region, from Omihachiman in the centre of Shiga

prefecture to the village of Kawate in the far north, and vigorously promotes them as a unified expression of Shiga culture. This is done through tourists travelling into the region on one of the JR Biwa-ko line trains from Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto or Himeji with specially priced excursion tickets, which allow free entry into any of the cultural sites advertised on the large map of north Shiga which is purchased with the day's train pass. Moreover, at each of the stations on the route up from Omihachiman to Nagahama any patrons of the Heritage day scheme will find a small fleet of JR busses which carry guests to and from the various participating sites.

For the Tonda players, the day begins early in the morning with the director, Abe Hidehiko, and his wife Sueko, arriving at the venue with a few of the more active members of the troupe to decorate the normally drab looking 'farmhouse' exterior. This is a very important step in the day's proceedings both on a practical and symbolic level for the troupers. In practical terms, according to Abe Sueko, this stems from the fact that, when the hall was built, a decision was taken by the whole Tonda community not to design it in the form of a traditional theatre, complete with a bell-tower and vibrantly painted exterior walls, but in the fashion of the many old farmhouses which stood alongside it in the village proper.<sup>6</sup> As a result, performance days call for the total redecoration of the theatre, masking the plain exterior with paintings and lining the approach roads with colourful banners. On a more symbolic level however, according to the director of the theatre, the process of decoration serves to adjust the perceptions of both the troupers and the people who live round the theatre and allows them to enter into the spirit of the performance more fully.

Once the banners, placards and tower are in place and the site has been transformed externally, a similar but far more delicate process takes place inside the theatre and again, this has much to do with the dual role that the building has within the community of North Tonda. Curtains, which hide the kitchen, the bathrooms and the small apartments of the caretaker, are stretched around the front of house. Panels, covered with traditional Edo period prints, are brought out to conceal the television, video recorder, Midi system and bookshelves which serve the clubs and societies which meet in the hall. Finally, the stage front<sup>7</sup> is put into place at the front of the *tatami* room where the patrons will seat themselves on cushions, and a series of lights hauled into place in the roof before the set is dressed for the grand performance.

When complete, the stage is divided into three main areas. Firstly, a foreground, raised a foot from the floor and screened so that any puppet appears, from the perspective of the audience, to be walking on an artificial ground-level whilst actually being held at waist height by the performers. Second, there stands a mid-ground level which is built to the same height as the foreground, but is partitioned in order that small, forced perspective building props can be set to encourage the audience's feelings of distance. Finally a horizon level is added, raised about five feet from the floor, upon which very small scale back-scenes can be affixed. On this day, with the play being the meeting scene from "*Keisei-no-Awa-no-Naruto*", the stage is laid out to represent the home and gateway of a low ranking samurai's residence belonging to Jurobe, the story's protagonist, along with a small section of roadway. With the front wall of the building resting on the very stage edge and taking up almost the whole of the performance area, the impression this set creates is one of great intimacy, which is very important for the heart-rending nature of the scene itself.

At this point one of the puppets which are to be used in the evening's performance, Otsuru,<sup>8</sup> the daughter of Oyumi and Jurobe, is brought out from storage and placed, along with a pair of *omoidzukai*'s [senior puppeteer] slit-like foot-ware,<sup>9</sup> the narrator's book stand<sup>10</sup> and the accompanist's *shamisen*,<sup>11</sup> at the front of the house. Just as with performances at the National Bunraku Theatre this is partly an advertising gimmick and partly a way of showcasing the skills of the craftsmen who made the puppets.

This latter reason is why, along with the puppets, the theatre displays the photograph of the master puppet maker Oe Minnosuke (1907-1999), who generously supported the small theatre's puppet restoration programme and whose work is generally comparable with the best creations of the great Tengu-hisa I (1855-1943).

The closeness between the modern Tonda Puppets and the various Uemura dynasty theatres of Osaka (Bunrakuken-za, Bunraku-za, Asahi-za and National Bunraku Theatre) becomes plain for all to see, at least on a superficial level, once the clapper man appears to tap out the opening of the show. The first of the puppeteers, led by Abe Sueko in the three man *sangyo* [Three Way/Style] system which has become synonymous with the professional Osaka theatres,<sup>12</sup> are already on stage as the curtain slides back.

Handling the puppet of Oyumi the trio stand in the middle of the house, adjusting what, to the audience, appears to be a fire-grate. Mrs. Abe, wearing a pair of stilt shoes, is stood a good ten inches higher than her subordinate *hidaridzukai* [left hand puppeteer] and *ashidzukai* [foot puppeteer]. This is a critically important feature of the technique, for it is only by holding the puppet at waist height, with elbow bent against her body, that Mrs. Abe can support the five kilogram weight of the Oyumi *ningyō* for the whole of the performance.

This is certainly no mean feat, especially when one remembers that neither Mrs. Abe's right arm, nor either of her assistants actually provides any support to the puppet's weight. Moreover, when taken together with the fact that an *omoidzukai* must also articulate the head of their puppet with their left hand, manipulate the right arm and coordinate the movements of two other people, one begins to gain an insight into the level of skill required of even an amateur folk puppeteer.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, to all intents and purposes the Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre appears to have become a small, though well appointed, manifestation of the National Puppet Theatre of Osaka, abandoning its folk roots in revival to take advantage of the protective care of the nation's foremost exponents of the puppet arts. However, according to the current director of the troupe, Abe Hidehiko, this could not be further from the truth and only occurs to people, "academic researchers in the main",<sup>14</sup> who are so obsessed with the visual form of the theatre that they forget what folk arts are fundamentally about, "creating and confirming specific social realities which appeal to people on a level so basic that anyone can appreciate them".<sup>15</sup>

Thus, as Mr. Abe hints, the Tonda Traditional Puppets exist in something of a disguised form which, though flimsy in some ways, appears able to fool most people who come across it. To some this is a classical art, to others a folk fantasy revival and to yet others a grand example of Shiga prefecture's own cultural revival.<sup>16</sup> However, to understand this process of obfuscation and signification negotiation, which directly reflects the heart of this work, it is important that we understand how the Tonda theatre has come to the condition it is currently in.

### **Winter, 1835: Snow-Binding Kaki Puppeteers**

According to master Matsushita Morikazu of the Tokushima Puppet theatre, early in the January of sixth year of Tempo (1835), after a three day run of performances of Ebisu dances and *ningyō jōruri* plays at the

Kitano shrine in Kyoto, a touring troupe of Shikoku based Gennojo company puppeteers called the Yoshida-za<sup>17</sup> from the town of Tokushima in the Awa fief of the Hachisuka clan,<sup>18</sup> set out up the East coast of Lake Biwa on a New Year tour of the Omi region, which is known today as Shiga Prefecture.<sup>19</sup> The troupe is said to have travelled up the Omi Merchant's road towards the port of Otsu and gave a performance at the Hie shrine near to that city, before taking sail up the lake with the intent of stopping off at each major port town. After successful stops in towns such as Omihachiman, Aizuchi, Kawase and Hikone, the troupe is believed to have arrived in Toyotomi Hideyoshi's old fortress town of Nagahama very late in the month, possibly as late as the January 28. Here the records from Awaji and Tokushima fall silent however, giving no more reference to the troupe's activities in the Biwa-ko region, forcing the scholar to rely exclusively on the records of the Tonda Traditional Theatre.<sup>20</sup>

According to Tonda legend, it was in Nagahama that the puppet group encountered the headman of the nearby farming community of North Tonda, who extended an invitation to the puppeteers to perform at their local shrine. Though the weather was threatening snow, the company agreed and travelled the four miles to Tonda with their host. It would seem that shortly after arriving in the village the weather did indeed break, blanketing the whole North Biwa region, from Hikone to Kawate, in snow which drifted so badly that all track-ways and many houses were completely covered.

The puppeteers are said to have taken immediate shelter in the Tonda shrine, assuming that the snow would break up relatively quickly, but when the storm had not abated by the first evening, they were forced to seek shelter in the houses of the village. Initially this does not seem to have caused any problems for any of the parties involved. The troupe had earned a great deal of money on its tour and it was felt that they could easily afford to lodge with the villagers until the snow stopped.

However, as February turned into March, with no sign of abatement in the blizzards, the locals began to debate what they would have to do when, as happened in early March, the troupe's money ran out. Not wishing to throw the puppeteers out into the stormy weather, perhaps mindful of the fact that most families had been rather overcharging their unexpected guests, the village elders decided to offer the following deal to the company. They would keep them as long as the weather held up travel, and, to speed the puppeteer's departure, even loan them enough money to return home with, but in return they would leave some of their

puppets and other equipment as collateral to be redeemed in one year. Once the Tokushima players had departed Tonda in mid March, the puppets and stock were carefully put into storage at the headman's house in preparation for the return of the group the following winter to reclaim them.

However, as Abe Hidehiko informs us, it was over five years before another puppet group passed through North Biwa and this one, hailing from the Nishinomiya region, claimed to have little knowledge of Gennojo puppet troupes from Awa or Tokushima, save that such tropes no longer toured the North end of Biwa-ko.<sup>21</sup>

It has long been a matter of conjecture among the Kansai folk puppet art revival community as to exactly why Gennojo would stop touring in the North of Omi *han*. Touring was what defined Awa puppet arts and set them apart during an age in which the more traditional activities of old *kaki* puppeteers had elsewhere given way to theatres such as the Takemoto-za: a slender, but important, reminder of the original purpose of puppeteers as itinerant ritual specialists. Moreover, Biwa-ko was counted as the single most profitable annual tour route that the Gennojo company had control over in the nineteenth century. Why then should such a wealthy and influential artistic group feel it necessary to sacrifice their interests in such a lucrative region?

Some, such as Abe Hidehiko, see a purely monetary motive in that it was easier to ignore the issue of the debt, which would mean never returning to the region involved, and cut their losses than to enter into negotiation with the Tonda people to buy back the stock.<sup>22</sup> However, this really does not make any sense in that the value of what had been given up, both in puppets, which were worth several times the value of the money owed, and in loss of revenue from the annual tours, far outweighed the small debt itself. This view is, being most commonly encountered in the Tonda region itself, probably derived from local feelings of resentment and not based in any objective reality.

Other observers however, such as Niimi Kanji, choose to see the affair as possibly reflecting the censure of the master of the failed Yoshida-za tour by the leadership of his group.<sup>23</sup> We know from their own sources that the Gennojo Company was not unwilling to censure members who failed their masters in any way through the withholding of performance privileges. Indeed, in the case of the 1835 incident, the troupe leader certainly had put a number of valuable puppets in the hands of unlettered peasants, allowed them to take (admittedly in return for the wherewithal



to survive) his not inconsiderable profits for the tour and even been the agents of the Yoshida-za's rescue.

For myself, while I certainly see some degree of shamefulness at the heart of this momentous decision, the matter seems to be connected more to a form of institutional embarrassment than to any specific person or family. Specifically it is my contention that, while the Hikita would certainly have been ashamed of what happened at Tonda in 1835, it seems more likely that their real concern would have been focussed on the relationships between puppeteer and patron which were irrevocably changed by this short, but serious, forced interaction. The central mystique of the Awa tradition of puppeteering, right up to the Meiji period, was always the role of the itinerant puppeteer as the auspicious stranger who existed as an external, incomprehensible force which helped satisfy certain ritual activities which traditionally could not be carried out by untrained locals.<sup>24</sup> Central to this signification of authority is the way in which the 'stranger' swiftly comes to and goes from a community without fully interacting with it on any serious level, especially important to a society which had, as Omori Tetsuro reminds us, increasingly begun to look at ritual contamination as an unimportant issue when compared to social taints.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, when the Awa party was forced to live in close proximity with their Tonda hosts for an extended period, the sort of professional and ritual prohibitions which made performances so appealingly mysterious must have quickly fallen apart, to reveal the *kaki* from god-haunted Tokushima as no more or less than normal people, devoid of any of the power with which their eager audiences invested them. These puppeteers could not return to the Tonda region because they would never again be viewed in the same light by the locals. Indeed, no Gennojo puppeteer who respected his work could go there without some doubt creeping into his mind about the way in which their work would be interpreted, as the Tonda residents had been party to Gennojo troupers being reduced to begging. This then is, I propose, why the Awa puppeteers defaulted on such a small loan, abandoned many irreplaceable puppets and sacrificed a great deal of potential income from the relatively wealthy Nagahama area of Omi. The 1835 incident had exposed the all too human frailties of the *kaki* puppeteer as a profession to (albeit limited) public attention and (if only locally) destroyed the signification which all parties used to negotiate the social meaning of such ritual activity.

By 1840 it was clear to the inhabitants of North Tonda that they had little hope of regaining the money they had loaned to the Awa players and a

debate apparently began in the village as to what to do with the puppets they now owned. Some seem to have favoured selling the stock wholesale to one of the small puppet theatres of Otsu or Kyoto, citing that the whole collection, even if sold at a pittance, was likely to generate much more than what was owing to the village. However, even before the villagers addressed the issue of how to locate such a theatre, the potential sale apparently became bogged down in a bitter argument as to where any excess money received would go. It would seem that those families which had actually loaned money to the village to see the Awa puppeteers off felt that they should keep most of the excess to take account of the delay involved in recovering their funds. Moreover, those families who had hosted the puppeteers even after their money had run out, also appear to have made claim to the potential windfall, citing that they had lost much food to the puppeteers and that this fact needed recognizing in specie. As neither side would apparently back down from their position, the acrimony seems to have caused some people to openly suggest that the puppets be destroyed before they caused a feud within the community.<sup>26</sup> This deadlock only seems to have been broken when it was suggested that the community actually keep the puppets and, in the absence of other *kaki* to carry out the New Year observances, learn to manipulate them and become *kaki* puppeteers in their own right. According to the modern troupe, this notion was met with a great deal of enthusiasm and a small group of performers was recruited, both from among the families who had loaned the Gennojo players money and from among those who had boarded them.<sup>27</sup>

For about a decade thereafter Tonda's little amateur company fulfilled the performance duties of the travelling *kaki* who no longer came to North Tonda. They manipulated Ebisu at New Year in order to stave off disease and bring in good weather for the year ahead. They danced with Sanbaso and Okina and Senzai at planting and harvest times to guarantee a good crop for the village. However, it is said that the company's players also adapted these ritual *ningyō* to take part in local ceremonies which had never featured puppets before, such as the local ritual in which any new brides to the village were welcomed by a parade of the villagers.<sup>28</sup>

It is interesting to note however, that when the Tonda villagers finally formed their small theatre they did so seemingly without fear of the Special Status traditions which they were technically infringing. It is my contention that, the decision of the locals to take up this career was greatly influenced by the time which many of the villagers had spent in close proximity to the original owners of the puppets, looking behind the

Special Status mask and discovering that no ancient contamination therein resided.

By the 1850s, the company had expanded their repertoire to include complex *jōruri* pieces and was, according to Aoi Hajime, regularly performing at many special occasions such as Nagahama's famed annual Shizan Festival.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, through the foresight of the Abe family, who essentially controlled the group by this time, the Tonda Puppets had been more formally educated in the puppet arts, in that on the rare occasion that an itinerant puppet troupe passed through the region they were engaged to further instruct the Tonda players in their craft. Indeed, because of this, the troupe went as far as attracting the attention of Yoshida Kingo IV (1813-1884), one of the puppet masters with the touring arm of the Osaka Bunrakuken-za.

Though originally offering his services to the troupe to help educate Tonda's puppeteers in *sangyo* three man puppeteering techniques, master Kingo took an avid interest in the troupe as a whole and went as far as negotiating their first tour of the Lake Biwa region in 1853.<sup>30</sup> The Tonda Puppets remained an immensely popular attraction on the annual festival circuit in North Biwa-ko region, thanks to Yoshida Kingo's influence, until well into the Meiji period, with audiences being so supportive of them that many shrines were willing to defy Office of Religious Affairs' prohibitions on puppet arts in shrines in order to have them perform at important festivals.<sup>31</sup>

However, by the turn of the century, support began to noticeably fade as people moved out of the increasingly poor agricultural regions like North Tonda in search of work in the growing cities of Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto, seeking a lifestyle which, by definition, tended to reject all the trappings of the former, failed, feudal age. In 1902 the Tonda puppets were officially disbanded as a performing group, as the performers were forced to deal with the increasingly harsh realities of rural life in the modern age, and the company's puppets were returned to storage around the village, where as Abe Hidehiko informs us a sad fate befell some of them. As agricultural revenues dropped increasingly steeply in decade from 1905 to 1915, a few of the families who had been entrusted with puppets actually illicitly sold a few examples to collectors in the cities.

Puppets which had once been a symbol of the unity of the community, were quietly disposed of by people who had, admits Mr. Abe, been forced by circumstance to think exclusively of their own existence and saw the precious *ningyō* as a way to preserve themselves against the

insecurities of the age.<sup>32</sup> The saddest fact of this quiet disposal however, was that each family which engaged in it seems to have done so in the firm belief that they were the only ones to commit such acts and that, as Abe Sueko tells us, “the community could bear the loss of one or two of the dolls, as long as the majority were safely kept”.<sup>33</sup> However, the reality of the situation eventually came to light in the late 1930s and the Abe family was able to apply enough pressure to the community to prevent the sale of any more of the remaining forty nine<sup>34</sup> puppets.

Even so, the loss of twelve late eighteenth and early nineteenth century *ningyō* was a bitter blow to Abe Hidemichi, the aging father of the current director, who had always despised the practical necessity which kept the village's puppets locked up in neglect, and faithfully believed that once the social climate had improved<sup>35</sup> it would be possible to bring them out again, even if only to a museum, university or other public collection. Indeed, so disillusioned did he become at the actions of his friends in the village, both their duplicity and the very real necessity which had driven the guilty parties to such action, that he simply locked up the remaining puppets and was, as his son tells us “content to see them slowly rot away to nothing, sure in a misguided belief that the world had forgotten about the Tonda Puppets in the build-up to what would become a [second] world war”.<sup>36</sup>

However, once a group has been party to the creation of such a powerful, and widespread, social signification, there is little chance that it can easily put their involvement with it aside. Therefore, how much more impossible might it be for one man, acting alone, to successfully bury so important a feature of regional social reality? The Tonda Puppets might have started life as a small scale personal response to an unusual situation on the part of the inhabitants of the farming community of North Tonda, but by the time the company wound down, they had acquired a signification which stretched far beyond the ability of a single person, family or village to control. However, this was only fully realized by the inhabitants of Tonda in 1956, when the prefecture, in the shape of its governing body, turned to this small puppet theatre as the figurehead of a very politicised revival of the fortunes of the region as a whole.

### **Shiga: Regional History as Political Revival**

It must be remembered that, by the end of the Second World War, the fortunes of what was by then called Shiga Prefecture<sup>37</sup> had fallen almost as low as they could go and the land was in a state far removed from its original position as the most important political region in the whole

country. During the civil war period (c.1470-1600) it had witnessed the rise and fall of many feudal families whose castles had once nestled on lakeside pinnacles to guard its fishing rights as well as the all important Omi road which ran from Nagoya, past Lake Biwa to Kyoto.

Moreover, when the civil wars ended, Tokugawa Ieyasu was left with something of a stark choice as to where to site his new capital city. Placing it at his old fortress at Edo made more military sense, in that his real power base was in the Kanto, although for several years he also considered the Biwa-ko trade city of Omihachiman. Situated on the main trunk road from Nagoya, with access to the lake and, if only symbolically, important as one of the most important seats of his old enemy, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the city would have made a politically sound capital for Tokugawa rule.

However, the Tokugawa leadership eventually chose the safer option of the Kanto and, with that decision, the fortunes of the Omi region slowly began to fade as Tokugawa vassal families set about systematically denuding the lakeside cities of wealth to help fuel the increasingly parasitic Edo government.

As Hatanaka Masaharu reminds us, the inhabitants of the region never forgot what Omi had been, and could potentially be, if given the chance. It was not until after the Second World War, at which time the Japanese government began to hand over more and more authority to local administrative groups that the people of old Omi began to think about restoring the significations of the agricultural, mercantile and cultural power which certain members of the post-war prefectural government perceived as having once been theirs.<sup>38</sup>

Chief architect of this process of regional revival was no less a person than the first post-war governor of the region and former Ministry of Education official Mori Shutaro, who had been raised among the sleepy little towns of Biwa-ko's eastern shore before being sent to school in Osaka and university in Tokyo. A man of considerable intellect, Mori seems to have realized early on in his governorship that the central administration had little interest in promoting his prefecture to the country as a seat of culture, learning or tourism and his fears were confirmed when the 1950 Cultural Properties Protection Law was eventually published.<sup>39</sup> Not a single one of the properties, people or sites which the prefecture had submitted for consideration to the government had been accepted for the *minzoku shiryō* [folk material] designation

despite many having the requisite backing of the prefectural academic and political communities.

Officially, this was because each of the properties selected were seen as little more than expropriated examples of properties which had roots in other prefectures. However, quiet inquiries through old ministerial friends revealed that the central authorities simply did not view Shiga as a cultural centre, despite its complex history, and preferred to funnel the available money to the Kyoto and Osaka regions which were perceived as the natural places to which tourism would gravitate.<sup>40</sup>

Apparently crestfallen by the way in which his prefecture had seemingly been written off as little more than an agricultural hub, Governor Mori retreated from all public comment on the issue of the cultural revival of Shiga until the Spring of 1953. At this time, according to Morita Yoshio, he was invited to attend the Tokyo Convention of Folk Dance and Song of that year and appears to have been completely radicalised by the opening address given by Honda Yasuji, a man who would go on to champion the cause of common rights of signification over common culture.

In this lecture Honda made it very clear to the assembly that he was not at the venue to laud the work of the native academy or the government in their handling of the preservation and revival of regional cultural properties. Rather he openly lambasted the establishment for their apparent lack of interest in folk culture, save as an interesting historical adjunct to the great narratives which supported the, so called, classical arts of the mighty Edo cities.<sup>41</sup> However, what seems to have drawn Governor Mori's attention most of all was an impassioned plea by Honda for artists, creators and sympathetic sponsors to re-claim their own culture and independently undertake its revival as a reminder to all cultural elites, himself included, that they did not completely control the rights of access to the notion of the common cultural identity.<sup>42</sup> Within a month of this event, the Shiga prefectural government had begun organizing examinations of its own historical records, searching out every scrap of information on local festivals, crafts, songs, dances, theatre and all geographically specific activities which could, potentially, be used to promote the prefecture.

By the winter of 1954, a list of nearly a thousand<sup>43</sup> individual examples of regional culture had been identified as being worthy of further investigation by the prefecture and moves were made to recruit people who could undertake the task of isolating a smaller number of properties

which could be successfully exploited. This initial survey took just over one year, reduced the prefecture's list to just under one hundred viable properties, ones which were still active or had only recently failed, and first brought the Tonda Traditional puppets to the notice of Governor Mori, who seems to have been very taken with the group from the outset.<sup>44</sup>

Indeed, when, in March of 1956, he finally went public with his plans, which had been kept a closely guarded secret till the last moment, it was essentially to the 'retired' Tonda Puppets that he made his announcement in the Asahi News (Osaka edition) of April the nineteenth.

“In this prefecture we still possess very many culturally important properties, such as Tonda's Puppet Theatre, the Sakuragawa boatmen's songs, Omihachiman's *taiko* drummers, Moriyama's loincloth festival etc. However, according to the national government we possess nothing which is worth the effort of preserving. So be it. If the nation will not take regard of this prefecture's history and its people's culture, then we shall do this ourselves. [...] I take this opportunity to announce that, in June this year, the prefectural government will open an office dedicated to the preservation of local cultural properties, to be funded and administered entirely by the prefecture. [...] To this end, it has been determined that the sum of ten million yen will be made available annually to support such revivals and we invite all groups who wish to take part to approach their government representative<sup>45</sup> as soon as possible”<sup>46</sup>

Shortly after this address, the prefecture appointed a body of fourteen specialists<sup>47</sup> to closely vet a list of sixty selected groups in order to determine both whether they could be effectively revived and, if so, how much funding would be required to do so. This seems to have been important because of the fact that, despite Mr. Mori's potent rhetoric and the seemingly immense sums of money made available for the program, the prefecture felt it could not support more than thirty properties.<sup>48</sup> Each group on the inspection committee's list was visited, inspected in minute detail and compared at length with similar groups to be found in other prefectures, which stemmed from the, admittedly vague, directive laid down by Mr. Mori's office that supported properties should be able to demonstrate features unique to Shiga. Thus, in all the categories with which the group worked (intangible cultural assets, important landmarks, architecture, arts and industry) Professor Aoki's team debated how the applications would be reduced to only twenty four properties which met with the approval of the prefectural board.<sup>49</sup> However, when the issue of

the Tonda Puppets was raised with the governor's office the concerns of the committee were apparently quickly dismissed.<sup>50</sup>

“[Professor Aoki] told me that the governor had not only pre-selected the [Tonda] puppet theatre for inclusion in the programme but had insisted on a designation which would leave no-one in any doubt as to how the prefecture viewed its ‘most valuable asset’, to use the governor’s words. He wanted us called a *mukei bunkazai* [intangible cultural property], where in all reality we should have been within arts and crafts section as it was the puppets which were valuable and not the few rusty performers we had left.”<sup>51</sup>

This opinion was apparently mirrored by some on the prefecture’s governing council, who seem to have felt that the Tonda Puppets did not really qualify as a truly prefectural cultural property because everything which the theatre was directly derived from the Tokushima and Osaka schools of *ningyō jōruri*, possessing nothing which could be called unique to the region. This was taken further when, in the June of 1956, Mr. Mori announced that the Tonda Puppets would be headlining an event on the ninth October 1956 to publicize the prefecture’s cultural revival policy. Indeed, when it was further announced that Bunraku Theatre masters, Takemoto Kikuwaka and Takemoto Hisato would be attending the evening to add their support for the designation of the Tonda Puppets as a Shiga Prefecture *mukei bunkazai*, even some members of the Governor Mori’s personal staff began to question their master’s reasoning in making what seemed to be a totally alien property the flagship of regional cultural revival.<sup>52</sup>

However, to a few among the inspection committee, especially Tsujita Taiichi (the group’s legal adviser), the decision to co-opt the Tonda Theatre as the symbol of the revival of the fortunes of Shiga and its ‘native culture’ appears to have been a logical one. For the prefecture’s plan to stimulate the fortunes of the region to succeed, the programme needed a single, easily recognizable and effortlessly understood signification of cultural revival which could act as a draw to anyone in Japan who might encounter it. It had to be something which could not only create the requisite perception of Shiga-as-history within the minds of the target demographic, but also something which, when presented to a person from without the region in a capsule form such as a photograph or advertisement, could elicit a strong enough inquisitive response. Essentially whatever symbol was chosen to represent Shiga to Japan, it had to be something which was both known to the public as signifying cultural or historical redevelopment while, at the same time being



original enough to create a strong desire to find out more in the minds of those who encountered the prefecture's revival programme.

“This is why we were chosen to represent the prefecture in this way and were dragged out of retirement. Not because we were ‘worthy’ of the honour, but because we fitted into a process of expanding historical awareness which had made the Bunraku puppet theatre in Osaka a very attractive and immediately recognizable tourist prospect”<sup>53</sup>

As Tsuruzawa Enjiro informs us, by 1955 the Bunraku Theatre had begun to witness a remarkable rise in the popularity of its performances, with audience figures actually approaching the impressive houses of the 1930s,<sup>54</sup> something which its most famous master, Yoshida Bungoro, had thought impossible during the post-war slump.<sup>55</sup> This appears to have been due partly to the fact that the central government had granted the theatre tax-exempt status in 1954, which removed the heavy ten percent ticket duty which all theatres were required to impose at that time and made performances more profitable for the company. However, it must also be acknowledged that the 1955 promotion of three members of the troupe to the status of *mukei bunkazai*, the first puppet art performers to be awarded this signal honour, had a not inconsiderable effect on attendances as well.

However, what had the greatest impact on the theatre was the national television exposure which the Bunraku troupe received on NHK during the 1950s. Over the course of six years from 1954 to 1960, the theatre was featured in fifteen different national broadcasts ranging from screenings of important performances, through interviews with hitherto reclusive masters of the art and documentary programmes which discussed the historical development of Japanese puppet arts as a whole, taking the Bunraku Theatre as the ultimate form of those arts.<sup>56</sup>

This then is part of the genius of Governor Mori's plan. He saw, in the Tonda Puppets, a group which had an unimaginably broad potential for public appeal both within and without the prefectural boundary when linked up to the popularity of puppet arts in general. He was able to take what to others would have been crippling burdens and turn them into positive public draws through clever manipulation of the Tonda popular signification. Moreover, he was able to enhance this further by quietly hitching the group's redevelopment to the Bunraku Theatre, essentially selectively playing up the connections to Yoshida Bungo IV to the media.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, when in June 1957, Shiga prefecture officially acquired its first *mukeyi bunkazai*<sup>58</sup> it came as no surprise to Governor Mori that interest in the troupe, both inside and outside the prefecture grew. However, what stands out in the governor's overall plan for the revival of the culture of his prefecture was the degree to which he understood the role that outside agencies would have to play in the restoration of Shiga's own cultural properties and his awareness of the risks involved. Perhaps, whether through following Honda Yasuji, or through having worked within the culture system at a national level, Governor Mori really does appear to have possessed an understanding of the way in which all negotiations between groups affects not only how those parties interact with each other, but how they ultimately come to look at themselves.

### **The Blank Page: The New Tonda Puppets**

Despite being the base of a once popular regional folk theatre, the post-war Tonda village itself was in no position to even begin thinking about putting its puppet stock, company records and the few remaining masters<sup>59</sup> onto a performance footing when the notion of revival was first mooted to them. The puppets themselves had no official provenance, the connection with Yoshida Kingo IV could likewise not be proven, and the many performance dates at places such as Nagahama could not even be certified, as the shrines in question possessed no records of such events, beyond the fading memories of some of the older priests.

Thus, in many ways, the Tonda puppets had almost faded away for lack of the sort of concrete evidence which would be required to make a revival possible, and rendered all talk of rather grand stories of Awa puppeteers, snowstorms or Bunrakuken-za assistance meaningless for all but the people who lived in North Tonda itself. Moreover, despite the enthusiasm of Governor Mori, without some dedicated outside assistance it was highly unlikely that the sort of evidence required to support or disprove the Tonda claims would be forthcoming, which fact alone threatened to stymie the planned revival at the first hurdle.

Of course this is not to say that such data did not exist, only that it proved impossible to collect them without the assistance of external agents, who then had an opportunity to join the revival process at a more intimate level than if the Tonda players had been able to begin the process for themselves.

In a mere fifty years, the group had completely lost touch with its heritage, its history and its right to control anything which was based on

that lost legacy, when brought to light through the work of others. All that was left to Tonda was a signification, partly factual, partly fabricated, but certainly locally supported, of uniqueness which had become so important to the community that the villagers would as Abe Hidehiko reminds us do almost anything to see that signification 'restored' to the social position of authority which all in the community perceived it should occupy. In short, the Tonda Puppets had been reduced to an, albeit powerful, form of nostalgic desire which could be manipulated by any who had the social authority, the professional skill and the intellectual ability to take possession of this fading signification in order to create something valuable from it.

We have seen above how Governor Mori was more than willing to provide the social authority for the revival, in his bid to regain some regional pride for the prefecture he called home. Moreover, we have seen how far he was willing to go in order to secure intellectual validation for this endeavour in browbeating enough local academics to support his ideals. However, what still remains unclear is why such a respected body as the Osaka Bunraku community, the most important agent in the Tonda revitalization, and the only one which could bring real cultural validation to the process, would actively participate in such a seemingly insignificant revival in the first place. This is a tricky question to answer in that, from informants such as Kiritake Monjuro,<sup>60</sup> Miyake Shutaro<sup>61</sup> and Oda Sakunosuke,<sup>62</sup> we already know that in the 1940s and early 1950s, key members of the Bunraku-za staff had gone on record several times to criticize the notion of the revival of Japanese puppet theatre.

In the main, this seems to have been connected with the potential loss of funding which large scale officially supported revival might have had on the Bunraku-za at a time when its future was still far from secure. However, it is not unfair to suggest, as does Oda Sakunosuke, that part of the theatre staff's concerns sprang from the fact that an official revival of one of the large scale ancient traditions such as Awaji and Tokushima might also bode very badly for the artistic dominance<sup>63</sup> of the Bunraku-za.<sup>64</sup> Thus, before we can, in the closing section of this case study, debate the actual process of negotiation itself and what its terms mean for the modern Tonda theatre, it becomes essential to carefully analyse the motivations of the Bunraku players involved in the move to support this amateur revival.

This is necessary because, when speaking of relatively large groups such as the Bunraku community, it is all too easy to inappropriately transform the personal motivations of powerful individuals working within those

groups into seemingly corporate ones. To do this would be a failure as it might imply that the Bunraku-za actually 'came to the table' as a unified body, free from any internal conflict concerning the issues at hand. Of course, this is very far from the truth and so it is important to be able to isolate exactly who supported moves to assist, or oppose, the Tonda Puppet Theatre's revival. In doing so we gain a greater understanding not only of how these external elite agents viewed Tonda specifically, but also the larger issues of gaining control of the right to signify common culture in general.

As we have already seen above, as early as 1956, when the first post-war public performance of the Tonda Puppet Theatre took place at the Shiga Hall, the Bunraku community of Osaka appeared to be in support of the revival. Indeed, that well regarded masters such as Takemoto Kikuwaka and Takemoto Hisato were not only given permission by the patriarchs of the Bunraku-za to attend the performance, but allowed to express personal support for the programme in conversations with the press, can be seen as a real triumph for Governor Mori's powers of persuasion.

However, right up to the day before the pair were to set out for Shiga, the directors of the larger theatre was still deeply divided as to whether or not the *bunraku* tradition should actually be seen to be supporting the sort of folk art revival which had been anathema to their body for so long.

Some masters, led by the enigmatic Toyotake Yamashiro-no-shojo spoke openly in opposition to the proposal, citing that closing ranks with a half ruined folk imitation of professional *bunraku* would offer little to the grand theatre but public ridicule; and possibly even invite unfavourable comparisons between the Bunraku-za and this small Tonda troupe.<sup>65</sup>

However, when master Yamashiro-no-shojo made these comments, such fears of public rejection of *bunraku* were not thought of as being overly panicky or irrational. The troupe had just recovered from a very serious post-war slump in attendance in the late 1940s and was in the process of re-inventing itself, with the help the central government, which had added the theatre to its list of important cultural properties in 1955, and a foreign artistic community which was becoming increasingly fascinated by Japanese elite cultural properties. As Tsuruzawa Enjiro of the National Bunraku Theatre tells us:

“It had taken over a century for Bunraku to divest itself of all the rural or folksy aspects of its performance techniques, which had only been made possible by the way in which the [Meiji period] restoration government

effectively promoted the Osaka Bunraku Theatre of Uemura Bunrakuken III, and this theatre alone, to be Japan's elite puppet art source. This process had involved a very great degree of historical revisionism however, in that it became necessary to avoid speaking of the work that the company had done in touring, or how its 'star performers' were often recruited on such regional outings, or in small rural theatres which we helped in order to strip out exceptional talent. Tonda was, to some, an embarrassment because its very existence made a mockery of the revised history and overshadowed the elite status the theatre had achieved."<sup>66</sup>

However, to a good many other Bunraku masters, championed by Yoshida Bungoro himself, the opportunities presented by the revival of the Tonda Puppet Troupe far outweighed the potential negative press which accepting such a low-status folk company might generate for the Osaka theatre in the short term. His argument seems to have run along the lines that in the post-war era, with more and more academics crawling, with or without the leave of the theatre, all over the history of Bunraku, it was going to be impossible for the troupe to effectively conceal the more sordid aspects of their history from the world for very long.

Indeed, to continue to do so risked damaging the traditions of the theatre more through being thought of by the outside world as recalcitrant and blinkered holdovers from a time of unacceptable historical revisionism: the Meiji restoration Bunraku-za having been a direct product of that socio-politically confused age. Again master Tsuruzawa Enjiro can offer some intriguing thoughts on the subject:

“Masters Bungoro and Tsunadayu are said to have both agreed in private that to maintain the theatre's façade of detached indifference to the realities of progress which were unfolding around them, to deny Bunraku's part in the revision of Meiji social history if you will, was only going to lead the art into another decline, fearing that an increasingly well informed population would come to view the company as being completely anachronistic and unworthy of special attention. It was brought home to them when Donald Keene first visited the theatre in 1945 and was, though the perfect gentleman, seen as being overly inquisitive about the development of Bunraku's folk art antecedents outside of the confines of the city of Osaka.”<sup>67</sup>

Moreover, there existed another, far more important, reason which seems to explain why master Bungoro was especially keen to be involved with the revival of the Tonda puppets, connected to the role which several of the famed masters of his branch of the theatre had played in creating this rural theatre as a miniature version of the Bunrakuken-za in the 1850s.

The Bunrakuken-za had connections with many shrines, temples and small playhouses throughout the Kansai region in the nineteenth century. These were places where touring Bunrakuken-za players could perform, practice or rest. However, the relationship between Tonda and Yoshida Kingo IV appears to have been unique in the history of the art.

This puppet master, who remains largely an unknown quantity outside the Bunraku circles even today, had used his position within the touring arm of the Bunrakuken-za to build up a small personal theatre in the wilds and used it to hone the skills of his own pupils, in return for providing the amateur Tonda troupers with a good education. That this Tonda troupe not only survived the death of its sponsor, but went on to flourish into the twentieth century as a fragment of old Bunrakuken-za performance methodology seems to have appealed to master Bungoro, who, according to Miyamoto Yukio saw in its revival a chance to, not only reclaim something which he felt was a part of the direct past of the Bunraku-za, but also a way of deflecting potential claims of historical revisionism within the *bunraku* community.<sup>68</sup>

However, one has to ask the question why, if master's Bungoro and Tsunadayu so supported the Shiga government proposal that the Bunraku Theatre assist in the revival of the Tonda Puppets, did they not attend the October 9 Tonda Performance at the Shiga Hall? According to Tsuruzawa Enjiro, this seems to be due to the fact that to have done so at such an early stage would have effectively committed the Bunraku-za to the whole process both without the backing of the Osaka company, which was still in debate about the matter, and without the approval of the government, to which the Bunraku-za reported.<sup>69</sup>

As much as masters Bungoro and Tsunadayu might have respected the work of Yoshida Kingo IV, or believed that it was better to embrace certain aspects of the amateur folk puppet art revival community, they were still constrained by their duty to the Bunraku-za and a desire not to bring the theatre into disrepute through ill considered action. Thus, by sending two of their junior puppeteers to the Shiga performance, they sent clear, but restrained, messages to both sides of the debate that a speedy resolution was required.

To Shiga, the message was one of guarded approval for the work that was being carried out in the prefecture as, though the guests were not the people hoped for by Governor Mori, they were still respected members of the Bunraku-za and their words might, barring official denouncement

from the Bunraku-za, be reasonably reported in the press as coming from that august body.

However, to the Bunraku-za, the act, whilst stating very clearly where the old master's sympathies lay, gave the board and the government a way out should the official line go against support for Shiga, in that the theatre could more easily write off the attendance of Kikuwaka and Hisato as a purely personal visit by two junior performers. In this respect, Tonda can be seen as representing the perfect expression of Bunraku's acceptance of the changed state of the artistic world and its master's recognition of the fact that they no longer possessed the right to determine the historical accuracy of any particular aspect of Japanese puppet arts. By sacrificing some of the immediate prestige of the tradition, the, now renamed Bunraku-za (the Asahi-za) gained credibility with the nation at large which increasingly began to see this Osaka theatre as a national centre for puppet arts.

### Conclusions

In the words of Abe Hidehiko: "The [Tonda] villagers had the puppets and the precedent, but could not do anything with the little they had because so few people had been able to record the activities of the Tonda Puppets in their heyday. [...] The local government had the resources to rebuild the venue and the authority to carry out any work which was proposed, but they were halted by the fact that anything they did would automatically carry the tag of 'bias' and be worthless without some form of intellectual support from people in the art world. The [Asahi-za] could not simply jump in and claim the Tonda group without the support of Shiga's local government, and the Tonda players; especially as both the swiftly reviving Awaji puppet theatre and the Tokushima Puppet Association might have made equally reliable counter claims.<sup>70</sup> Not a single one of the individuals or groups involved here could, by themselves, claim to control the revival, because none of them had the power to create the necessary reality without the help of the others."<sup>71</sup>

As Abe Hidehiko quite rightly points out, in the 1960s this was a situation in which all participants had come to understand the limited, but vital, role that each of the others played in the ongoing success of the revival of the Tonda Traditional Puppets and the degree to which each would have to compromise any feelings which they might harbour about sole control the right to signify this group. As a result, the next three decades, which were largely given over to research into the specifics of the original troupe and the ways in which the revived Tonda Puppet

Theatre could be made to serve its three masters, were characterized by a slow, but steady, growth as each party filtered aid into the project.

Academically, the work of well respected scholars such as Eita Kokichi,<sup>72</sup> Hayashia Mitsuo<sup>73</sup> and Prof. Martin Holman<sup>74</sup> served to bring the theatre further into the minds of the folk culture revival community, even if, occasionally, their work was met with some ridicule. Moreover, according to Abe Sueko, the way in which the Shiga authorities and the *bunraku* community were able to work easily together on issues such as restoring the puppet stock, acknowledging the issue of the Awa foundation story and so on, helped convince the central government to extend further resources to the Tonda group which included the building of its first modern theatre in 1967,<sup>75</sup> with Eita Kokichi leading the project for the government. Indeed, as she reminds us, once the Tokyo government had, through the Asahi-za, become reconciled with the nature of the Tonda revival, it began opening up avenues of expansion to which the community would never had access otherwise, promoting the theatre to foreign academics, allowing the group to perform at the National Theatre in Tokyo, approving Tonda's first overseas tour to Australia and even funding the construction of the New Tonda Hall, in 1991, as a community space, not just a theatre, to reflect the way that the village of North Tonda as a whole helps maintain its puppet art heritage.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, are we to believe that the success of the revival of the Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre in the 1950s-60s was founded exclusively on the desire of a small number of individuals to further their own particular causes, devoid of any sense of artistic, social or cultural sensitivity? Are we to accept that masters Yoshida Bungoro and Takemoto Tsunadayu of the Asahi-za looked only to the intellectual and moral gains which would accrue to the Bunraku Association in being seen to support such a delicate and unique fragment of Bunraku history and cared nothing for the Tonda Theatre itself?

Or indeed, what are we to make of the flamboyant Governor Mori: a self-serving political animal with no love for the Tonda puppets beyond their ability to win him prestige in the polity and confirm him as a symbol of cultural rectitude in the minds of the Shiga population? Moreover, what should we say about the people of North Tonda themselves, whose general silence and willing acceptance of the situation as it stands only seems to encourage these other external parties: should we say that they are sacrificing their village's artistic heritage by working in this way?



As we have seen, the motivations and desires which each of these signifiers brought to the revival of the Tonda Puppets is far too complex to simply write them off as manipulators of the culture of the common man, who only entered into the process of negotiation because it was the best way that they would be able to enforce their opinions in such a fashion as to make them appear reasonable and valid. Such a view is, at best, an oversimplification of the pragmatics of how groups assign rights of signification between agents of control and, at worst, almost verging on a blind belief in the inviolability of the common man.

However, to deny the power of such a situation, in which the very state of reality is regularly redefined by group consensus, to affect the way in which a person, or group, might act should not be disregarded as going against the better natures of the individuals involved. None of us are immune to the desire to defend our own positions above all other considerations and when presented with such a poorly defined and easily manipulated source of self validation, it would be wrong to look down upon the groups involved and condemn them for playing up to their fellow conspirators and re-creating the Tonda Puppets as a reflection of their immediate concerns.

While Governor Mori might, on the available evidence, be viewed as the classical manipulative politician with eyes only for the prestige of his office, it is also clear that he had a deep and abiding love for all the properties he helped revive in the early years of his monumental programme. Having been fatally blocked by the central government in his desire to have Shiga's cultural heritage recognized, one has to ask what other road was open to him, as a concerned individual, than the one he took to regional action? Possibly he did abuse the relatively independent power-base which prefectural Japanese governors enjoyed in the early post-war years, but one cannot really hold that against a man who had so assiduously attempted to work within the system and had been, in his eyes very unfairly, utterly rejected by the one group of which he had highest expectations: the government.

The same can be said of masters Bungoro and Tsunadayu of the Asahi-za. Certainly their views on the revival of the Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre can be seen as helping to bolster the reputation of an institution which was facing increasingly searching questions about its own credibility as a reliable 'source' of Japanese traditional culture, especially considering the very revisionist path which the theatre took, perhaps unwittingly, in the Meiji period. However, it cannot be denied that these men had to face very serious ridicule at the hands of their peers and were

willing to take great professional risks in order to convince the conservatives in the Bunraku Association that Tonda was worth saving on more grounds than its historical importance to the Bunraku tradition. While it might appear to the casual observer that the people of North Tonda have been little more than passive partners in this revival process, satisfied with skimming off such prestige and profit as their partners let fall to them, to make such a crass assumption would be to overlook the power which these bodies wield in the modern day theatre.

First, it can be said that altruism and personal gain seem to strike a balance within the revival of the Tonda Traditional Puppets, with each participant in the process of re-signifying this regional *ningyō shibai* theatre willing to work closely with all other parties in order to create something which has as much value to the group as to each member individually. Yet, this cannot be seen as being an unexpected outcome for, as we have discussed in several places already, the negotiation of specific realities through ongoing interaction is what defines all levels of human social behaviour. However, of all the case studies involved in this text, the Tonda Puppets themselves still stand out as being perhaps the most important from the perspective of the primary hypothesis of this work: that, while it is possible for those with enough support to claim a degree of control of the right to signify a specific cultural reality (especially in revival), the fact is that no-one can truly claim ownership of such a reality. All rights, privileges and controls in such circumstances derive from a mandate of support from others and cannot simply be claimed because of the way that it is impossible to destroy the significations of a specific reality within each participant.

Second, the Tonda revival has taken place largely without any single body expressing a desire to gain executive control of the process of redevelopment. The Village of North Tonda had absolutely no connection with the puppet art community prior to its sudden creation as a puppet theatre in the mid nineteenth century. It possessed no religious centres or practitioners who were known for such activity, and who might have passed the rights to signify those arts to local families through lineal descent. Neither has the region ever been known for great secular puppeteering families in general who could have passed on the knowledge of the art to the revival generation.<sup>77</sup> This is the 'empty book' of which Director Abe speaks so eloquently when discussing the artificial nature of his theatre's modern revival.

Finally, it can be seen that the revival of the Tonda Traditional Puppets represents the clearest example of the general arguments being made in

this thesis. Tonda's revival never had, nor has, a cultural 'overlord' who controls access to the right to signify the theatre for its participants, patrons or audience. Rather it has, from the experiences of its founding revivers in the 1950s, developed something of a critical consensus in which any of the participants can take part in all aspects of the revival, whether or not they might be perceived as being suitable for such positions.

## References

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<sup>1</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 18 1998.

<sup>2</sup> As we have discussed before, whether actual ownership of such ephemeral properties is possible or not, possession of the rights to signify such social assets is certainly possible.

<sup>3</sup> The observations for this description were taken on the January 10 2002 at the Tonda Traditional Puppet Hall, between the hours of five am and nine pm.

<sup>4</sup> Image T-001 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Abe Sueko, June 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Bonbai (盆梅展) A form of Bonsai art which uses Apricot trees as the base for its art.

<sup>6</sup> Abe Sueko: Omoizukai puppeteer, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Image T-002 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Image T-003 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Image T-004 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 14 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Image T-005 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Image T-006 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, June 12 2001.

<sup>12</sup> Although the style was probably created by masters of the early Tokugawa period Edo troupe the Magoshiro-za, it became closely associated with the Osaka region after the great Meireki fire of 1644, after which the capital lost most of its theatres to the Kansai region.

<sup>13</sup> Image T-007 on CD-ROM. Photograph by Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 14 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>15</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Commonly held, according to Matsushita Morikazu, to have been from one of the touring arms of the great Hikita family run Gennojo troupe which, as will be seen in the Saibata case study, dominated puppet art in the Awa region during the Edo period. Matsushita Morikazu: Director, Tokushima Puppet Theatre Archive. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, December 19 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Awa was a feudal domain which encompassed both the Eastern side of the island of Tokushima and the neighbouring isle of Awaji.

<sup>19</sup> Matsushita Morikazu: Director, Tokushima Puppet Theatre Archive. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, December 19 2001.

<sup>20</sup> Hirasaki, Shimebuchi. (1985). *Tonda Ningyō Kobore Hanashi* (富田人形こぼれ話) [A Flowing Narrative of the Tonda Puppets]. Osaka: Asahi Shinbunsha.

<sup>21</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 21 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 21 1998.

<sup>23</sup> Niimi, Kanji. (1974). *Awaji no Ningyō Shibai* (淡路の人形芝居) [Awaji Puppet Arts]. Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten. (pp 77-79).

<sup>24</sup> Agar, Michael H. (1980). *The Professional Stranger: an Informal Introduction to Ethnography*. New York; London: Academic Press.

<sup>25</sup> Omori, Tetsuro. (1989). *Buraku Mondai Yuron* (文楽問題優論) [The Problem With Bunraku]. Osaka: Kaiho Shuppnasha. (page 41).

<sup>26</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>27</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>28</sup> Traditionally when a girl from outside North Tonda married into a family, the *gonguji* of the Tonda shrine would meet her at her parent's house in company with the women of North Tonda and take her in procession to her wedding. When the puppet of Sanbaso was added to his ritual, it was to prepare the way for the wedding party and, as such, he danced the route from bride's former home to the Tonda shrine.

<sup>29</sup> Aoi Hajime: Senior priest, Nagahama Shizan Temple, Nagahama. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, April 15 2001.

<sup>30</sup> Tsuruzawa Enjiro: Master of the *shamisen*, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, May 11 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Aoi Hajime: Senior priest, Nagahama Shizan Temple, Nagahama. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, April 15 2001.

<sup>32</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Abe Sueko: Head Seamstress, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 21 1998.

<sup>34</sup> *The Forty nine puppets of Tonda and their Makers.*

<i>Signature or stamp location</i>	<i>Maker</i>
1: Shoulder plate	吉田宇蔵 (Yoshida Uzo)
2: Shoulder plate	嘉永三 (Yoshi Eizo)
3: Arm	桐竹紋十郎 (Kiritake Monjuro)
4: Head	吉田金吾 (Yoshida Kingo)
5: Arm	金吾 (Kingo),

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	but probably Yoshida Kingo
6: Arm	桐竹門藏 (Kiritake Monzo)
7: Arm	Unknown – stamped 念 (desire)
8: Arm	Unknown – stamped 國 (nation)
9: Arm	Unknown – stamped 龜 (turtle)
10: Arm	Unknown – stamped 国 (nation)
11: Head	吉田文五 (Yoshida Bungo)
12: Head	吉田文五 (Yoshida Bungo)
13: Head	吉田文五 (Yoshida Bungo)
14: Head	文吾 (Bungo), but probably Yoshida Bungo
15: Head	文吾 (Bungo), but probably Yoshida Bungo
16: Head	文吾 (Bungo), but probably Yoshida Bungo
17: Head	吉田文吾 (Yoshida Bungo)
18: Head	Unknown – signed 五十七鳴洲 (57 Meisho)
19: Head	大江幸 (Oe Yoshi)
20: No stamp	Unknown
21: No stamp	Unknown
22: No stamp	Unknown
23: No stamp	Unknown
24: Head	桐竹門十良 (Kiritake Monjuryo)
25: Head	安政 (Yasumasa)
26: Eye mechanism	桐竹門十良 (Kiritake Monjuryo)
27: Neck stem	Unknown – stamped ••
28: Head	Unknown – stamped ⊖
29: Neck stem	吉田中連 (Yoshida Chushin)
30: Arm	Unknown – stamped 新 (new)
31: Arm	Unknown – stamped 文 (art)
32: Arm	Unknown – stamped 一 (first/one)
33: Shoulder plate	吉田小辰 (Yoshida Kotatsu)
34: Shoulder plate	吉田一平 (Yoshida Ippei)
35: Shoulder plate	吉田正歌 (Yoshida Shoka)
36: Shoulder plate	吉田市造 (Yoshida Ichizo)
37: Body former	文吾 (Bungo), but probably Yoshida Bungo
38: Body former	豊松国三郎 (Toyomatsu Kunisaburo)
39: Neck Stem	吉田文吾 (Yoshida Bungo)

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40: Neck stem	吉田新 (Yoshida Shin)
41: Neck Stem	吉田新 (Yoshida Shin)
42: Neck Stem	吉田好三 (Yoshida Kozo)
43: Body former	吉田亀楽 (Yoshida Kingaku)
44: Body former	吉田金吾 (Yoshida Kingo)
45: Body former	吉金, but probably 吉田金吾 (Yoshida Kingo)
46: Head	吉田金吾 (Yoshida Kingo)
47: Head	吉田新吉 (Yoshida Shinkichi)
48: Shoulder plate	天狗久 (Tengu-hisa)
49: Shoulder plate	松竹株式会社

(Matsutake Stock Company)

<sup>35</sup> With money coming back into the region, mainly in the shape of rising agricultural incomes, and authoritarian attitudes to traditional 'folk' practices softening in the wake of increasing academic interest.

<sup>36</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>37</sup> In 1872 the Japanese government issued the *haihan-chiken* [abolition of *han* and institution of prefectures] edict under which all former feudal domains were collapsed into largely autonomous regions of political control.

<sup>38</sup> Hatanaka, Masaharu., et al (1997). *Shiga-ken no Rekishi* (滋賀県の歴史) [The History of Shiga Prefecture]. Osaka: Kaiho Shuppansha. (pp 30-32).

<sup>39</sup> Morita Yoshio: Deputy Director of Archives, Omihachiman City Government. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 11 1998.

<sup>40</sup> Morita Yoshio: Deputy Director of Archives, Omihachiman City Government. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 11 1998.

<sup>41</sup> Tsuruzawa Tomoji: *Juyo-bunkazai* Master of Music, Awaji Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, 27<sup>th</sup> October 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Morita Yoshio: Deputy Director of Archives, Omihachiman City Government. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 11 1998.

<sup>43</sup> Though few in the local government believed that more than a fraction of these would be in any state to consider reviving, the number was intentionally floated through the local media as something of a rebuttal of the government's (unofficial) stance on Shiga as being a cultural vacuum.

<sup>44</sup> Hirasaki, Shimebuchi. (1985). *Tonda Ningyō Kobore Hanashi* (富田人形こぼれ話) [A Flowing Narrative of the Tonda Puppets]. Osaka: Asahi Shinbunsha. (page 46).

<sup>45</sup> Yet another example of Governor Mori's attempts to make his work seem more inclusive than it actually was, in that, by this stage, the Shiga government had assembled a list of groups to be investigated.

<sup>46</sup> Ito, Saburo. (1956). "Mezurashii 'Tonda Ningyō' no Shien" (珍しい「富田人形」の試演) [A Test Performance by the 'Tonda Puppets']. In, *Chunichi*

*Shinbun* (中日新聞) [Mid-week News]. Osaka: Chunichi Shinbunsha. (page 8).

<sup>47</sup> Shiga Prefectural Cultural Assessment Committee (1956); folklorists, architects and historians with specialist knowledge of old Omi-han . Professor Aoki Yoshizo. Director, Shiga Historical Research Centre (chairman of the committee).

Arai Yasue. *Gonguji*, Fukuta Temple (vice-chairman and religious adviser to the committee).

Egahise Koji. Lecturer in folklore, Shiga Prefectural University (secretary of the committee).

Kageyama Haruki. Director, Kyoto Musuem.

Omaki Saneshige. Lecturer in Japanese architectural and landscape history, Shiga Prefectural University.

Shibata Makoto. Lecturer in History and folklore, Kyoto University.

Tazawa Katsu. Independent expert on fine arts, crafts and architecture.

Tahara Gonbei. Director, Yokaichi Historical Research Society.

Tsujita Taiichi. Historical researcher, Shiga prefectural government (legal adviser to the committee).

Nakasai Yoshiyuki. Lanscape architect, Shiga Rural History Society.

Nakamura Rinnichi. Director, Nagahama City Cultural Research Centre.

Yamada Shigeichi. Independent expert on historical medical practice and ritual activity.

Wakada Genzaemon. Mayor of Hino Town, Biwa region and independent expert on regional folk arts.

<sup>48</sup> Hirasaki, Shimebuchi. (1985). *Tonda Ningyō Kobore Hanashi* (富田人形こぼれ話) [A Flowing Narrative of the Tonda Puppets]. Osaka: Asahi Shinbunsha. (page 48).

<sup>49</sup> Proposed Shiga Prefecture Protected Properties Listing as of April 1956. *Intangible Cultural Assets*.

Tonda Traditional Puppets.

*Important Landmarks*.

The Kochi Wind Funnels.

The Fukuta Temple Gardens.

The Daikichi Temple Sand Garden.

*Sites of Architectural Importance*.

The Nenjo Temple Worship Hall.

The Ishisuwa Shrine Central Hall.

The Onjo Temple Pagoda.

The Onjo Temple Belfry.

The Otsuki Grand Shrine Central Hall.

The Hakuzan Shrine Front Hall.

The Aburahi Shrine Front Hall.

The Namura Shrine Festival Wagon Storage Hall.



The Gomiya (AKA Ebisu Miya) Shrine Central Hall.

*Arts and Industries of the region.*

The printed silks of the Omi district.

The Thirty Six Great Poems: calligraphy from temples and shrines in the prefecture.

The carved wooden Buddha of the Hachiman Shrine.

The Copper (clay cast) Amitabha of Otsu.

The carved wooden Amitabha of Zeze.

The carved wooden Bhaisajyaguru of Ishiyama.

A pair of cared wooden *sumotori* [wrestlers] at Aizuchi.

A civil war period Loyalist (Toyotomi) despatch box discovered at Aizuchi.

The writing tools correspondence of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, maintained at Nagahama.

The grave mound decorations at Yamazu Shrine.

<sup>50</sup> Hirasaki, Shimebuchi. (1985). *Tonda Ningyō Kobore Hanashi* (富田人形こぼれ話) [A Flowing Narrative of the Tonda Puppets]. Osaka: Asahi Shinbunsha. (page 51).

<sup>51</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>52</sup> Morita Yoshio: Deputy Director of Archives, Omihachiman City Government. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, August 22 1998.

<sup>53</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Tsuruzawa Enjiro: Master of the shamisen, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, May 11 2001.

<sup>55</sup> Miyake, Shutaro. (1948). “Bunraku ha Shinu-no-ka?” (文楽は死ぬのか) [Will Bunraku Die?]. In, *Jiron* (持論) [One's Cherished Opinion]. Tokyo: Jidiaisha. (page 31).

<sup>56</sup> Not surprising, given NHK's remit on cultural issues.

<sup>57</sup> Unlike places such as Awaji, or Northeast Tokushima, Tonda's history of puppet manipulation was totally implanted and did not stretch beyond the few families which lived in North Tonda. Thus one of the most potent methods for transmitting the concepts and ideals of revival, family connections or regional identity, were fundamentally missing as most people, even if they respected the puppets as being important to the prefecture, had difficulty in seeing where the group fitted into their own lives. This is why Bunraku support was essential.

<sup>58</sup> A term chosen specifically to fly in the face of the government's own definition for the most respected of protected cultural properties.

<sup>59</sup> Ueno Chotaro, Takemoto Yoshidayu (real name Kawasaki Tashichi), Maeda Yoshi, Mabuchi Isamu, and Ibuki Jinzo.

<sup>60</sup> Kiritake, Monjuro., and Tsurusawa Seijiro (1944). *Bunraku no Ningyū to Shamisen* (文楽の人形と三味線) [The Puppet and Shamisen of Bunraku]. Nagoya: Bunraku Kenkyukai.

<sup>61</sup> Miyake, Shutaro. (1948). “Bunraku ha Shinu-no-ka?” (文楽は死ぬのか) [Will Bunraku Die?]. In, *Jiron* (持論) [One's Cherished Opinion]. Tokyo: Jidiaisha.

<sup>62</sup> Oda, Sakunosuke. (1946). *Bunraku no Hito* (文楽の人) [The People of Bunraku]. Tokyo: Hakuosha.

<sup>63</sup> In that, in a society which has a firm belief in the laws of temporal precedence, the younger puppet theatre might lose its cultural position as the premiere venue for such art in the nation. This was especially true after 1958, when the remnants of the Awaji *ningyō shibai* tradition were invited to tour Russia by the curator of the Moscow Museum. On their return it was decided by the government that their arts, which had been completely ignored to that date, should be protected and, according to Miyamoto Yukio, the Bunraku Theatre's board greatly feared that they would not only lose funding to a revival of this ancient tradition, but also lose some of the younger staff who seem to have found the prospect of working within the ‘roots’ of the art appealing. Miyamoto Yukio: Archivist, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, December 9 2001.

<sup>64</sup> Oda, Sakunosuke. (1946). *Bunraku no Hito* (文楽の人) [The People of Bunraku]. Tokyo: Hakuosha. (pp 33-34).

<sup>65</sup> Takemoto, Komon. (1982). *Bunraku no subete* (文楽のすべて) [All Bunraku]. Tokyo: Takeoka. (page 56).

<sup>66</sup> Tsuruzawa Enjiro: Master of the shamisen, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, May 11 2001.

<sup>67</sup> Tsuruzawa Enjiro: Master of the shamisen, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, May 11 2001.

<sup>68</sup> Miyamoto Yukio: Archivist, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, 9<sup>th</sup> December 2001.

<sup>69</sup> Tsuruzawa Enjiro: Master of the shamisen, National Bunraku Theatre, Osaka. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, May 11 2001.

<sup>70</sup> Both these groups share many thematic links with Tonda and both could have made a play for inclusion within the revival of the Tonda Puppet Theatre, which was a thing that the masters of the Asahi-za seem to have wanted to avoid at all costs.

<sup>71</sup> Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>72</sup> 永田 衡吉. As a member of the national *bunkazai* programme, he was ideally placed to help the Tonda players because, even though he could not actually promote the group within the *bunkazai* community he was able to use his weight with various ministries to negotiate a series of grants which made it possible for members of the theatre to travel to Tokushima and

research their troupe's links to that island. He was the man who uncovered most of the Awa texts which record the Awa side of the disastrous 1835 Gennojo tour. He was the one who conclusively established the provenance of all forty nine puppets which the Tonda players possessed; not only demonstrating that a good many were once the property of the Gennojo company, but also showing that others had been made for, or by, members of the first Bunrakuken-za in the middle of the nineteenth century. He was also the first figure from the central government to accept the Tonda Theatre as a valuable folk art group in its own right, pressing for funding to be made available to the group on those grounds. He argued that what made an art such as Tonda's a true folk property was neither in the visual impact it had, nor in the plays it put on. Rather, he suggested that it was the process of interaction which took place between performers and local residents which defined modern folk art status, looking for things such as educational content, local involvement, familial transmission, contemporary material etc. Indeed, he condemned folklorists who dismissed cultural properties which did not have earth between their toes (meaning that they appeared in the guise of old fashioned rural traditions, simple, undeveloped and fitting elite perceptions of folk culture).

<sup>73</sup> 林屋三郎. A well respected writer and lecturer with the Ritsumeikan University, professor Hayashia led a party of twelve students to Tonda village as part of his research for a work on the underdeveloped aspects of folklore studies, Special Status, common and women's arts. Inspired by the 1963 field trip of Kondo Yoshiko's *kabuki* group (from Kyoto Women's College), he knew that he could find in this one theatre a group which represented all his academic interests in one, in that the troupe was founded by Special Status artists, operated on the fringes of even modern Japanese society and allowed women to practice their skills freely in performance. Though he was considered, at the time, a radical supporter of Honda Yasuji, being laughed out of the 1964 Ritsumeikan Convocation as a result of his attempt to present his findings from Tonda, his work (though not very well known) is now considered to be some of the best on plebeian access to the folk identity (and the care which must be taken by the scholar when studying it).

<sup>74</sup> Lecturer at Doshisha University from 1990 to 1997, Professor Martin Holman is the man who brought the Tonda Puppets to the attention of the world at large in the early 1990s by introducing the puppet group to his students (not a few of whom went on to perform with the group on special occasions). A strong supporter of the rebuilding of the group's theatre in 1991, he also helped secure the troupe's first overseas tour of Australia in 1994. Moreover, since his return to America in 1997, he has proved to be a very capable voice for the Tonda group in the United States, organizing

several successful tours of the States and working on several projects to further raise awareness of *ningyō shibai* in general among his colleagues.

<sup>75</sup> The costs of just over one million yen were met by the Tokyo government, in concert with a few industrial sponsors who were friendly with Eita Kokichi, the Shiga authorities becoming responsible for the building once finished.

<sup>76</sup> Abe Sueko: Omoidzukai puppeteer, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

<sup>77</sup> The families which became involved with the original theatre still maintain a certain pride in their achievements, but are still very aware that they are not from traditional puppeteering families and, according to Abe Hidehiko, have never felt quite able to dictate the terms of the local revival in quite the same way that puppeteering families on Awaji, Sado Island or Tokushima have been able to. Abe Hidehiko: Director, Tonda Traditional Puppet Theatre. Interview with Darren-Jon Ashmore, January 10 2002.

## “Japanese English”: A Descriptive Grammar of the Nominal Phrase of Educated Written English in Japan

Kolawole Waziri Olagboyega

### 1.0 Introduction

Arguments rejecting the pedagogic notion of “Standard English” or “correctness”, and suggesting that all forms of English are equal, have resulted in the proliferation of terms such as “Indian English”, “Singapore English”, “Filipino English”, “Nigerian English” etc., which are claimed to be on precisely the same equal footing with “American English”, “British English”, “Australian English” (Greenberg 1971; Kirk-Greene 1971; Grieve 1964; Kachru 1986a; Coleman 1987, 13).

The term “Japanese English” has also gained currency amongst many linguists, anthropologists, sociologists, cognitive scientists and ordinary people both inside and outside of Japan (Sonoda 1975, Morita, 1978, Fukao 1979, Kashima 1981, Pereira 1983, Suenobu 1990, Constance 1992, Takeshita 1993, Larsen 1993, Iwasaki 1994, Morrow 1995, Hayashi et al 1995, Bolton 2003, Stanlaw 1987b, 1988, 1992c, 1992d, 1996b, 2004, Kachru 2005, D’Angelo 2005 and Honna 1995, 2008). However, some scholars remain cautious about the stability of this variety of English language and have sometimes used somewhat disparaging remarks to describe the use of English in Japan. While it is a ‘problem’ for Ishino (1977), it is a ‘puzzle’ to Yokoi (1973). In Hirai’s (1978) views, English in Japan is a ‘barrier’ to communication while Kawasaki (1981) feels it is something ‘fashionable’. Kirkup (1971) and Morris (1970) expressed the view that it is some kind of ‘pollution’.

Some other scholars have been more positive (Honna 1995, Stanlaw 2004, D’Angelo 2005). For instance, in his study of the formal features of “Japanese English”, Honna (1995) has gone one step further to describe it as a ‘language within a language’.

However, the most comprehensive study on the subject of “Japanese English” was conducted by Stanlaw (2004). In his seminal study done from ‘an anthropological linguistic perspective’, Stanlaw describes

“Japanese English” as ‘a created-in-Japan variety for use by Japanese in Japan regardless of how they may appear to native English speakers’. In other words, the Japanese do not aspire to approximate the native norm. He claims that in the larger context of ‘world Englishes’, “Japanese English” is so entrenched that English has become ‘... a Japanese language’. This is an extreme position which few scholars share with Stanlaw. And, this is not my position.

The tendency among researchers on the subject of English in Japan has largely been to provide glossaries of coinages and other lexical modifications, and the listing of isolated examples of divergence, and present them as “the features” of “Japanese English” (cf. Stanlaw 2004,). Caught helplessly in this controversy especially in a country such as Japan, where English language is chiefly acquired through formal education, is the classroom teacher, who needs to know what form of English to teach, and which reference books to use.

The focus exclusively on isolated examples of divergence (cf. Miura 1998), in the final analysis, does not provide the classroom teacher in Japan with a full knowledge of what needs to be highlighted in the classroom; nor the theoretical or descriptive linguist with what to be observed and analyzed.

This study does not select isolated examples of forms to corroborate or falsify any theoretical position or construct, which has been the general trend of research in the field. Instead, it seeks to provide a descriptive grammar of aspects of educated written English in Japan, on which those concerned with teaching English in Japan particularly at junior high, high school and university can draw; it seeks to demonstrate that across the range of forms which are regularly identified as “errors” in the English written by educated Japanese, there are some environments which regularly reflect “Standard English practice” and others where “divergent forms” are manifested with some degrees of frequency. The discrimination between the different types of environment gives some idea of the possible reasons for this variation and how to set about correcting it in the classroom.

## **2.0 Scope, Data and Methodology**

As an attempt to conflate the existing pedagogical concept of “Standard English” and the emerging theoretical notion of “standard non-native varieties of English” (Milroy and Milroy 1987; Quirk 1989), this study looks at the stability of the claimed “characteristic” forms of “Japanese

English" and shows the statistical likelihood of their occurrence in particular syntactic and semantic environments.

This approach is both pedagogically and theoretically interesting inasmuch as it identifies the divergent forms. The classroom teacher, for example, may know what to “correct” and the textbook (cf. Tregidgo 1962) what to highlight. The theoretical linguist who argues for the existence of non-native standard varieties of English (cf. Todd and Hancock 1986; Williams 1987) has also got ready evidence on which to draw; evidence that can also validate the concept of “fossilization” (cf. Selinker 1972), which seeks to account for the adult non-native speaker’s grammatical variability.

The corpus consists of material that appears in the four Japanese national English-language newspapers, *Asahi Evening News*, *Japan Times*, *Mainichi Daily News*, and *The Daily Yomiuri* which comprises the editorials, articles, advertisements, letters to the editor, etc.; government publications, such as those of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT); articles published in English by Japanese University professors and the writing of university students in Japan. Statistical information is given in the text itself. Because we are interested in the language produced by a people or group of speakers rather than the individual variability within the group, the data-base is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal.

The newspapers have been selected for this study for several reasons. Published daily (Monday to Sunday), they are the most widely circulated national English-language newspapers in Japan read by the whole public, whose proficiency in English ranges from the lowest to the highest (native-like). The newspapers constitute what might be called the Japanese quality press.

It should be noted that even though most of the four English language newspapers used for this study most likely have native speaker grammar checkers who work there full time, there was a very limited “contamination” on the data collected. Diligent efforts were made to specifically select various articles written by the same Japanese writers which have shown consistent divergent tendencies. It is therefore possible to assume that those articles were either not checked or that the grammar checkers were unconscious of the consistency with which the divergent forms occur in those articles.

It could be argued that newspaper journalism has its own specialized conventions (O'Donnell and Todd 1980, 85) and may not reflect general usage as such. One believes, first, that it is representative of written English in Japan. According to Gorlach (1989, 10:2, 283) newspapers "are usually close to a written local norm". Secondly, we believe that the material appearing in newspapers, because of its pervasive nature, will be one of the most powerful models and authoritative sources of English usage for the Japanese. According to Todd and Hancock (1986, 7), today: "one may claim that the media, especially in the quality press ..., function like an academy in that they arbitrate on what is acceptable and they influence the entire population, encouraging a modification towards network norms".

The corpus also includes data collected from the articles published in English by the Japanese university professors, and data collected from MEXT publications. These and the English of Japanese newspapers are what we are associating with “educated English” (call it the “acrolectal”) in this study. These are the highest levels at which we are readily able to find a corpus from the daily communicative experience of the people, large enough to be well representative of the major forms, and quite convenient for detailed examination. Other bases, such as students’ writing collected at various levels, will show tendencies that are generally associated with early and middle learners (the “basilect” and the “mesolect” speakers). It is necessary to emphasize tendencies in relation to a data-base because there seems to be no objective way of dividing the cline of bilingualism. In sociolinguistic terms (Bickerton 1977; Stauble 1978; Bolinger and Sears 1981; Magura 1985), the levels of proficiency are group into those broad stages of the acquisition process, each of which is associated with a variety of the language.

The data for this study was collected manually, and was therefore very laborious. Each detected divergent form is then manually fed into the Word document which serves as the computerized “tool” and corpus for the study.

As we are interested in the description of data rather than the explanation of a theory or process, the approach is more inductive than deductive. The realization of the grammatical categories that are typically associated with the constituents of the noun phrase (NP), are examined in the English of the newspapers, in the writings of university professors, the government publications and the writings of university students. The environments where persistent patterns and tendencies emerge are described and tabulated with a view to determining the extent to which the patterns may



be said to represent stabilized usage based on a specifically Japanese syntax and semantics as opposed to (American) Standard English practice.

In the discrimination between different types of syntactic environment, our pedagogical aims will take precedence, and we shall be suggesting one grammatical approach or another. The main purpose, however, is not to prescribe any particular approach but to furnish the teacher-trainer, textbook writer and curriculum designer with an eclectic mixture of methodological frameworks which will be useful in approaching a particular problem.

The relations between the standard forms and the divergent forms, and their percentages of co-occurrence will provide helpful insights into various theoretical issues. For example, the corpus shows no grammatical categories that regularly occur divergently only and never standardly. If we accept the general view that there is a distinctive Japanese English usage that can be clearly distinguished from standard practice in terms of such tendencies as "omission of articles, pluralization of noncount nouns, etc.", then we must allow for a great deal of overlap between "Japanese English usage" and standard practice in the language produced by educated Japanese. It will be demonstrated that educated Japanese, for instance, do not consciously omit articles in every context where standard practice would require them, nor are noncount nouns consistently made to take the regular plural morph whenever they are expected to have semantically plural interpretations.

### **3.0. Constituents of the Noun Phrase: “Standard Practice”**

The term “standard practice” is used in this study in the pedagogical sense to refer to the defined standards of English that are recognized by the institutions of state, taught and examined in schools for educational and professional purposes, and observed in international communication (Quirk 1989; Trudgill and Hannah 1985, 1; Todd and Hancock 1986, 440). Although terms such as “Indian English”, “Singapore English”, etc., have emerged and gained wide currency, the English that is generally accepted by Ministries or Departments of Education and examined by recognized Examination Boards and Councils in the vast majority of English as a Second Language (ESL) and English as a Foreign Language (EFL) countries (cf. Schmied 1991, 108) is that described in works such as Quirk et al (1985), Crystal (1988); in dictionaries such as the *Oxford Advanced Learner’s*; *Collins Cobuild*; and in handbooks of usage such as Swan (1980). The notion of “correctness” (Warburg 1962) still exists in the classroom.

In this paper, we seek to examine the constituency of the noun phrase (NP) and the grammatical categories which are typically associated with the constituents. The “basic” structure of the NP we shall be concerned with is the combination of Article and Noun - Art + N (e.g., *a car*, *the table*). The article system is one area where writers have often identified what they claim to be regular differences between native-speaker usage and nonnative-speaker usage of English. Platt et al (1984) note that the definite/indefinite distinction which is made in native-speaker usage is often modified in nonnative-speaker usage to a specific/non-specific distinction. Huebner (1985) and Hakuta (1976) are among writers who identify articles as constituting a frequent area of difficulty for second-language users of English. According to Williams (1987, 167) the processing and production of articles is an area of “vulnerability”.

For instance, with specific reference to the English written by educated Ghanaians, scholars have found “error” or grammatical divergence involving the articles to be of the highest frequency. According to Tingley (1981, 41): “deviant usage concerning the definite and indefinite articles is far commoner than any other kind noted, involving, indeed, slightly more than 20% of all the examples of deviance found in the corpus”. This may be due to the fact (cf. Quirk et al 1985, 253) that the articles are “the most common and the typical central determiners”, which (cf. Krapp 1970, 40) occur in association with nouns, the largest word class. Not only are there many more nouns than any other form class in English (over 60% of entries in the *Cobuild Dictionary*); more important for our purposes, nouns also occur more frequently than other word classes in running text (cf. LOB corpus). Number realization, primarily associated with nouns, is also a commonly cited area of divergence in nonnative-speaker usage of English (Trudgill and Hannah 1985, 104; Tregidgo 1990).

### **3.1 Grammatical categories associated with the constituents of the NP**

In this section, we shall examine the issues which, for our purposes, constitute standard practice with regard to the NP.

#### **3.1.1 The Definiteness System**

The grammatical category of definiteness is realized by the articles, which, although they are not affixed to nouns, only occur in association with nouns. The opposition *the:a/an* has been traditionally described as one of definiteness, the category of definiteness having the terms

“definite” and “indefinite”. It is often explained (cf. Brown and Miller 1980, 199) that this is done on the grounds that in uttering a sentence like: a. *I want to buy the bicycle*, the speaker typically has some particular bicycle in mind, whereas in uttering a sentence like: b. *I want to buy a bicycle* no particular bicycle is in the mind of the speaker and any bicycle will serve. We may take this characterization as the most usual interpretation, and it suffices for our purposes here.

Justifying the terms “definite” and “indefinite” some writers (cf. Huddleston 1988, 90) also reiterate that definite *the*, in an NP like *the bicycle*, indicates that the description contained in the rest of the NP - in this case *bicycle* - is presented as sufficient, in the context, to “define” or distinguish the referent from all others. Indefinite *a* then simply indicates that the following description is not presented as defining..

Often claimed to derive from an earlier form of the word “one”, the variation between *a* and *an* is phonologically conditioned - i.e., depends on the initial sound of the succeeding word: *a* if the sound is a consonant, and *an* if it is a vowel (cf. *Collins Cobuild dictionary*; Quirk *et al* 1985, 253; Swan 1980, 64). Since the variation is generally seen as a phonological process - i.e., the result of the influence of adjacent sounds in connected speech - some writers explain it in relation to the general phenomenon of “intrusion” or “epenthesis” (cf. Bolinger and Sears 1981, Ch. 10; Gimson 1989, Ch. 8). According to this view, *a* is the unmarked form and when it precedes a noun beginning with a vowel sound, the two vowel sounds are then linked by /n/, e.g.: *an Englishman, an orange, an infant, an elephant*. Since the variation is based on pronunciation and not spelling, we cannot have *\*an European, \*an uniform, \*a MP, \*a hour*. The *a/an* variation before some words beginning with *h* (e.g., *hotel, historian*) depends upon whether the /h/ is pronounced or elided (cf. Swan 1980, 65).

The definite article displays a similar phonological variation. But the variation of the definite article, unlike that of the indefinite article, is realized only phonologically and not also morphologically - i.e., the definite article has got only one form in English (*the*). In view of the foregoing analysis, we shall take it that the phonological variations of the articles are not crucial with regard to written English, and we shall therefore consider them no further. From the point of view of divergence, it may be noted that forms such as *\*a orange* or *\*an table* do not occur in English written by educated Japanese.

### 3.1.2. Number in the Noun Phrase


For our purposes here we shall be interested only in the category of number, which has the two terms “singular” and “plural”, and whose realization divides nouns into the two classes “count” and “non-count”.

We would like to distinguish between the strict morphological considerations of number (i.e. number analysis of single words or an analysis into morphs) and concord or syntactic considerations of number (i.e. number agreement between some words in a sentence). The classroom teacher might find it convenient to keep the distinction apart, especially when it comes to dealing with errors. Consider, for example, the following divergent forms:

- a. The *equipment* were received by Professor X ... at a ceremony in Tokyo.
- b. All *traffic* to Osaka should divert *their* course ...
- c. *Furnitures* are being manufactured in Akita Prefecture.
- d. The passengers lost all their *luggages*.

In general terms, the divergent pattern or tendency manifested in these examples is the use of noncount nouns as though they were count. In specific terms, however, the issue will involve syntactic considerations in examples (a) and (b) - i.e. agreement between the subject noun and other elements in the sentence (e.g., auxiliary verbs, pronouns, quantifiers, etc.). Taken individually (i.e. in terms of a pure morphological analysis) no form is divergent in these examples. Any discussion of examples (c) and (d), on the other hand, will include morphological considerations because the forms *furnitures* and *luggages* are by themselves morphologically divergent. They do not occur in the models of English “accepted” for pedagogical purposes (cf. Quirk 1989). A divergent form such as \*a furniture or \*furnitures might suggest that the speaker is thinking in terms of “measure, quantity, items, pieces, etc.”, which in itself is not divergent because the so-called noncount nouns can in fact be expressed in a “count sense” in terms of separate items, pieces, types, kinds, etc. For example, we can have *a piece of advice*, which expresses the semantic notion of “oneness” and *pieces of advice*, which expresses the semantic notion of “more than oneness”. It is this issue of “semantic notion” or “polysemy” (cf. Huddleston 1988, 89) which allows such expressions or forms as *beers*, *waters*, *butters*, *sugars*, *coffees*, etc. The divergence in a form such as *a furniture* or *furnitures* is the realization of the “semantic notion”. Whereas we can say *a beer* or *beers* to express some “measure or quantity of beer” we will have to say *a piece of/pieces of* to express “some quantity of advice”. The semantic notion of creating “count” forms from

“noncount” nouns or using noncount nouns like count nouns is not unusual. Quirk *et al* (1985, 299) refer to this phenomenon as “reclassification”. What needs to be emphasized in the classroom therefore is how the (re)classification is realized by specific nouns or groups of nouns. Perhaps, this is what Quirk *et al* mean by the assertion that the justification for the count/noncount distinction is based on the grammatical characteristics of the noun. Quirk *et al* (p.247) summarize the main noun classes as follows:



We may regard this treatment as maintaining the traditional classification of nouns.

#### 4.0. Data Analysis:

##### **Environments in which non-Standard English NP forms occur with some degree of frequency in English written by educated Japanese.**

We shall now look at environments in which the realization of the constituents of the NP regularly produces forms or patterns which are divergent from Standard English practice. To do this, we shall focus on the article and the noun separately. This as we explained in the above, would enable us to generalize conveniently about the environments in which the divergent tendencies relating to the constituents are manifested.

It must be noted at the outset that some of the issues we shall be looking at in this section, and in fact concerning the question of divergence in general, are quite idiosyncratic and are not clear cut even among educated native English speakers. Writers do agree (cf. Swan 1980, 64; Huddleston 1984, 236; Burton-Roberts 1988, 137) that these are complex or difficult points in English grammar.

#### 4.1. Divergent tendencies relating to articles

Three major divergent tendencies relating to articles are identifiable in English written by educated Japanese: (1) omitting the article where Standard English practice would require it - i.e., where the apparent absence of an article would be considered an error by the classroom teacher applying Standard English customs, practices and principles; (2) inserting an article where the zero article would be the standard norm; and (3) using the indefinite article where the definite article might be preferred by the teacher and vice versa. We shall look at the environments in which each of these tendencies is manifested. The examples include those that teachers of English (e.g., Tingley 1981) have actually cited as being “clearly unacceptable”.

##### 4.1.1. Omission of articles

By omission of an article is meant environments in which the apparent absence of an article is divergent from standard practice. This will apply to both the definite and the indefinite articles.

###### a. The definite article

- i. there is a tendency to omit the definite article in an NP where its presence is described as being customary - i.e., the head of such an NP is said to be customarily preceded by the definite article. Such nouns include names of: local, national and international bodies, public facilities - hotels, hospitals, restaurants, cinemas, etc.; certain countries, universities and schools, newspapers, etc. (cf. Quirk et al 1985, 289, 296). Out of 1080 such NPs counted in our corpus, the article was omitted in 650 (60% of) cases:
  1. Mr. X, Secretary General of *Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization*, met the Prime Minister yesterday ... .
  2. Mrs. X, secretary for *National Council on Women and Development*, chaired the function.
  3. Mr. X ... has flown to *United Kingdom* to undertake a management development course ... .
  4. Twenty-eight volunteers have arrived in Myanmar from *United States of America* to work in various institutions in the country.
  5. The national baseball competition ... enters its third day today with matches at *University of Tokyo* ... .
  6. The interpreter was the late X, then President of *Wesleyan Mission School* ...

7. Also on the plane is Mr. X, senior staff writer, who will cover the match for *Daily Yomiuri*.
8. *Daily Yomiuri* has not reported the news.
9. The ¥100million laboratory with modern equipment ... is primarily designed to complement services provided at *Akita University Teaching Hospital* ... .
10. He described the conditions at *Akita University Teaching Hospital* as appalling.

As we have noted, these NPs (names) are less central members of proper nouns. The article here is idiosyncratic. It does not vary the meaning of the NP, and, consequently, some writers (cf. Swan 1980, 63) even argue that its omission may not matter too much. For our pedagogical purposes, what may be interesting to say is that probably because of its idiosyncrasy it is an area prone to divergent and inconsistent usage though some uses are standard.

- ii. We stated above that modification allows both the zero article and the definite article to be used with the same noun head. Perhaps, as a result of some confusion from this, there is a tendency to omit the definite article where the head of the NP is *of*-postmodified. It happened 55% with noncount nouns, 38% with plural count nouns and 27% with singular count nouns:
  1. ... he has ... *drawn attention of Japanese and the world* to the power of Love and Peace.
  2. The workshops ... aim at stepping up *confidence of women in rural areas* ... .
  3. Perhaps tonight's panel on will help viewers know more about ... what plans are being made to curb *activities of drug peddlers* in this country.
  4. In fact the company has come at the right time when *transportation problems of the country* have reached their peak.
  5. The leaders stated their awareness of the fact that both nuclear and conventional disarmament could not be accomplished without *participation of all international bodies*.
  6. Noting that there could be no stability ... without reducing disparities in *level of global development*, IMF suggested a number of strategies ... .
  7. Speaking at the closing ceremony ... X denounced *ideology of capitalism* and called on the people to wake up to *realities of poverty and disease*.
  8. X noted that one of the major causes of *dislike of Mathematics* by students was the way in which it was presented to the student.

9. He said the government was determined to correct the existing anomalies in *distribution of petroleum products* and improve the system in order to ensure *availability of the products* all year round.
  10. The training programs and materials for *upgrading of media research facilities* involve expenditure in foreign currency ... .
- iii. In NPs with “sporadic” definite reference - reference to an institution which may be observed recurrently at various places and times - there is a tendency to omit the definite article. The concept of sporadic reference extends to expressions referring to modern transport and mass communication (cf. Quirk et al 1985, 269). The article was omitted in 15 out of 252 (6% of) cases identified:
1. The accused was arrested on his way to *bank*.
  2. The State Assembly has passed an unpopular law forbidding school children to go to *cinema*.
  3. These days *post office* closes before 4p.m.
  4. He was listening to *news* when the armed robbers broke into the house.
  5. She took *train* from Akita to Tokyo ... .
  6. Arguing against some government policies, X noted that there is no freedom of *press* in Russia.
  7. In his welcome address, the governor ... said that *radio* serves a wider section of the population than *television* does.
  8. He also noted that with *satellite* gradually replacing cable TV, there is the need for a satellite station in the Prefecture.

It might be worth noting that in some cases, the sporadic use has become so institutionalized that it requires the zero article. For example, in expressions such as:

1. He was *in temple* when the earthquake occurred.
2. His son is *in college*.
3. She visited them *in prison*.

The phrases *in temple*, *in college*, *in prison* may be described as prepositional phrases of place. But they actually refer to the “institutions” associated with such places and not the actual buildings or places. Quirk et al (1985, 277) describe such phrases as “quasi-locative”, and the zero article in such phrases as being “frozen” as part of idiomatic usage. The classroom teacher may note how this phenomenon could be related to the tendency to omit the definite article in sporadic definite reference. Compare, for example:

- a. X was arrested on his way to *church*



- b. \*X was arrested on his way to *bank*

Can we not say that *bank* is as much an “institution” of human society not necessarily associated with a particular place or building as *church*?

- iv. There is a tendency, manifested in 63% (400 instances in 640) of cases examined, to omit the definite article (and for that matter also the indefinite article) in the expression - *majority of ...* , e.g.:
1. *Majority of people* seem to prefer TV to radio.
  2. *Majority of people* were not in favor of the proposal.
  3. In his sermon ... the minister ... noted that *majority of Christians* are only church goers.
  4. He also observed that *vast majority* of the members did not attend the rally.
  5. The head teacher decided to close the school for the day ... since *majority of pupils* were absent because of the bad weather.
  6. Contrary to expectations, *majority of members* did not attend the rally.

#### b. The indefinite article

- i. The indefinite article is sometimes omitted in NPs which are in a copular relation - i.e., where the article is required with a singular count noun as complement. This was found in 39% (210 in 540) of cases examined:
1. She said her son is *engineer*.
  2. X started out as *teacher* before he became *governor*.
  3. When the accused was arrested, she said that she was *secretary*, but when she was being cross-examined she said that she was *manager*.
  4. X noted that as *Assistant Director of Education* ... he was responsible for the payment of salaries.
  5. Finding X guilty ... , the Judge noted that as *teacher in the school*, he should have been more conscious of the teacher's code of discipline ... .
  6. She became *singer* when she was only 12.

We may note that where the complement (or an equivalent appositive phrase) names a unique role or task, it is standard practice to use the zero article:

Maradona is *manager of the team*.

Junichiro Koizumi was *Prime Minister of Japan in 2002*.

Following his promotion he will soon become *director of programs*.

The complement of a verb like *turn* has zero article even where there is no implication of uniqueness:

He started out as a teacher before he *turned politician*.

Perhaps because a unique role is implied, expressions such as *the post of*, *the position of*, and *the role of* take the zero article:

1. He accepted the post of *Director General of the Taiwan Education Service*.
2. He started performing the role of *adviser to the Minister of Education*.

ii. Another context in which the indefinite article seems problematic for educated Japanese is the expression of *a few*. Sometimes, in 38% (180 in 474) of examples identified, the form *few* occurs where idiomatic usage would require *a few*, but never the other way round:

1. X ... shot ahead in a field of 23 competitors *few minutes* from the start of the race ... .
2. Despite the safety measures being provided, fans should expect to encounter *few problems*.
3. He gave her money to buy *few articles*.
4. I may examine *few more applications*.
5. I have enough time to answer *few more questions*.
6. His theory is very difficult, but *few people* understand it.
7. Although there were *few eggs* in the house, she went to buy some more.

Alternatively, *some few* may be found in the context:

8. *Some few minutes* past nine I leave the office.
9. *Some few fishermen* may be seen.
10. I believe you had some, *some few months* ago.
11. I gave him *some few Yen* and he left happily.
12. Could you come *some few minutes* later? I'm extremely busy now.
13. *Some few days* before the conference, African foreign ministers started arriving.

We may look at the issue in two ways. We could see the divergence as involving the omission of the indefinite article where idiomatic usage would require it (with reference to examples 1-7). However, the forms *few*, *a few* and *some few* are three different forms. We might therefore see the divergence as actually involving the use of one form (*few* or *some few*) for another (*a few*). Both points of view would point to the conclusion that *a few* is relatively rare in English produced by educated

Japanese. The effect of all this is that educated Japanese hardly make the finer distinctions in meaning between *few*, *a few*, and *some few*.

#### 4.1.2. Insertion of articles

We are concerned here with environments where the zero article would be the standard norm, and where the classroom teacher would therefore consider the presence of an article an error. This will apply to both the definite and the indefinite articles. As regards the indefinite article, our main concern will be the issue of number realization - the insertion of the indefinite article in singular expressions containing noncount noun NP head, which we shall consider in the second half of this section. Our emphasis now will be on the definite article.

The tendency to insert the definite article where the zero article might be more acceptable or preferable occurs in four major environments: (a) where the NP is the name of an industry, a factory, or a commercial company; (b) in multi-word or complex place names of various kinds consisting of a common noun premodified by a proper noun; (c) where the "logical interpretation" of certain items would normally require the definite article; and (d) in generic reference with a noncount noun NP head. We shall now look at examples of each environment.

a. The insertion of the definite article before names of commercial companies - 2% (8 in 402) of examples identified:

1. Mr. X, chairman of *the Sony* Japan came to Osaka at the week-end...
2. *The Lever Brothers* will now concentrate on the production of key laundry soap, Lux, Omo...
3. Mr. X, Managing Director of *the Wayo Distilleries Limited*, was arrested yesterday...
4. Speaking at the function...X...of *the Nippon Fisheries* supported the idea...failed to enter the university.
5. She is now working at *the Lever Brothers* having failed to enter the university.

It may be noted that, like the classes of names which are said to be customarily preceded by the definite article, the issue involved here is often not clear cut. Names of "commercial companies" are supposed to take the zero article but names of "public facilities" are supposed to take the definite article. Sometimes it is not easy differentiating between the classes of names, and there appears to be a great deal of overlap between

the zero and the definite articles in these areas among educated native English speakers.

b. Another environment where the definite article is sometimes inserted - 8% (16 in 200) of cases examined - is before a complex place name consisting of a common noun premodified by a proper noun:

1. He is ...Doctor Honoris Causa of *the Bucharest University*...
2. X...met the woman who is now his wife when they were both students at *the Waseda University*.
3. The Prince and his entourage...were met at *the Narita Airport*...
4. X...disappeared from the group...at *the Kansai Airport*...
5. 32 Koreans deported from Japan...arrived at *the Seoul Harbour*...

We may note that in other contexts, some of these forms (e.g., names of universities and schools) will be expected to take the definite article rather than the zero article.

c. The definite article is also sometimes inserted unidiomatically in an environment where the "logical interpretation" of certain items would normally require the definite article - 4% (15 in 380) of cases examined. These items include postdeterminers and adjectives whose meaning is inalienably associated with uniqueness, e.g.: ordinals such as *first*, *next*; superlative adjectives like *last* and *largest*.

1. *The last* but not *the least* I would like to thank X...who supplied the drinks for this occasion.
2. He was *the best man* (i.e., "groomsman") at the wedding.
3. She came *the last* in every event...
4. One issue which never came to *the mind* was the way in which the workers were treated...
5. It came to *the light* that X was involved in the case...
6. He always comes *the first* in his class.
7. He also won *the first prize* for being gentle.

It may be worth noting that where idiomatic usage distinguishes between the zero article and the definite article in such contexts, the divergence may be semantic and may not be obvious morphologically or syntactically:

- (a) X is in *possession* of Y vs. (b) X is in *the possession* of Y

In (a), X possesses Y; in (b) it is the other way round - Y possesses X - although both sentences have the same surface structure except for the article. We can therefore envisage (b) being divergent in a situation where

(a) is intended, since the tendency generally is to use the definite article in all such contexts.

d. There is a tendency, manifested in 3% (13 in 420) of expressions examined, to insert the definite article in generic reference containing a noncount NP head:

1. And in an attempt to save the situation, the bank provides long-term loans for the residential development and commercial real estate development.
2. Let's hear what the contributions of the school towards education in general and to the Japan womanhood in particular are...
3. The speaker noted that some of us appear to be still living in the childhood ignorance, and he appealed to everyone to be realistic in his or her criticism of the government.
4. The Parent-Teacher Association...expressed concern about the increase in the juvenile delinquency in the country as a whole but particularly in the urban centers.
5. They observed that some of the children lack the parental control.
6. In her closing remarks, the chairperson...stressed the importance of the parental love in a child's upbringing.

It might be noted, as these examples illustrate, that the cases very often involve the reference of the noun head being restricted by premodification. With reference to the above examples for instance we can have the following pairing or alternation:

*residential development* ~ *the development of residences*  
*Japan womanhood* ~ *the womanhood of Japan*  
*childhood ignorance* ~ *the ignorance of children*  
*parental love* ~ *the love of parent, etc.*

#### 4.1.3. Using one article for the other

Both the omission and the insertion of articles which we have seen in the foregoing subsections, in one sense or another, involve the use of one article for another. What we have in mind in this subsection is the tendency to use the indefinite article with a singular count noun (which would have been normal standard practice) but where the reference is definite and standard practice would therefore require the definite article. This occurs especially where the head of the NP is *of*-postmodified – 80% (388 in 484) of cases examined:

1. X,...who started his prison life at an early age of 19 pleaded guilty to stealing the money.

2. Every Friday and Saturday, X is ready...to give you a treat of your life.
3. X...was having a time of his life when he was arrested...
4. His wife had a shock of her life when the news was broken to her.
5. They suffered an agony of watching him burn to death.
6. He spoke in a fashion of Junichiro Koizumi.

#### 4.2. Divergence involving noncount nouns

The central divergence involving noncount nouns in English written by educated Japanese is that noncount nouns are frequently realized in singular and plural expressions just as count nouns are realized. In singular expressions they are made to take the indefinite article, and in plural expressions they occur with the plural morpheme which is often realized by the regular plural morph -s. Sometimes the divergence in number realization occurs not in the article or plural morph, but in other elements in the sentence (e.g., quantifiers, auxiliary verbs, pronouns, etc.). We shall now look at examples of the various ways in which the divergence is manifested.

##### 4.2.1. Singular expressions

Noncount nouns are sometimes made to take the indefinite article in singular expressions just like count nouns - 76% (280 in 368) of cases examined:

1. The man...failed in his suicide bid when a furniture on which he stood...collapsed...
2. "Cheer up! It may never happen" is a good advice...
3. ...Mr. X received an applause after his speech.
4. If a work is to be done in a one-party state it is done quickly.
5. America has now reached a stage where a stern action is needed in combating economic crimes
6. ...despite the several difficulties...the corporation has done a tremendous work.
7. Now he begins to feel he must have a woman who is cultured, knows how to use a Japanese cutlery at table...
8. The passenger told the driver that he had a luggage...

##### 4.2.2. Plural expressions

Noncount nouns are made to occur in plural expressions with the plural morpheme, which is often realized by the regular plural morph -s - 73% (155 in 212) of cases examined:

1. *Furnitures* are being manufactured in Akita.
2. He wanted to count the *vocabularies*...
3. There *were no casualties* but all the *luggages* were burnt.
4. ...you can attend to your *correspondences*...
5. A woman...lost all her *livestocks* when she mistakenly fed them on poisonous cassava peels.
6. ...provision of proper school buildings with modern *equipments*.
7. A lot of *damages* were caused during the recent rainstorm in Tokyo.
8. One can find a cool place to relax under the *shades* of the pine trees.
9. All his *cattles* were stolen...
10. The survey revealed that these *vermins* are widespread in the cocoa growing areas.

#### 4.2.3. Other elements

Sometimes the divergent number realization of noncount nouns occurs not in the article or plural morph, but in the use of other elements in the sentence (e.g., quantifiers, auxiliary verbs, pronouns, etc.) which suggest the singular-plural distinction that the writer wishes to make - 47% (324 in 695) of cases:

1. *The equipment were received* by Professor X...at a ceremony in Nagoya.
2. In the present world economic order, there are *two main politico-economic machinery* for social development. These are Socialism and Capitalism.
3. A leading Chinese industrialist has announced plans for a chain of communal cold stores designed for the preservation of plantains, yams, rice and *several perishable agricultural produce*.
4. Considering the size of his family, the manager needs more than *one accommodation*.
5. All *traffic* to Kakunodate should divert *their* course...
6. The police were disappointed that they could not get *many information* from the witnesses.
7. Her father wondered whether she actually needed *all these money*.

The issue of number agreement between the units of a sentence will be looked at in some detail in another study (on Concord). The emphasis here is only on the point that the nouns involved in the examples above are noncount.

## 5.0. Conclusion

By way of summary, we might subcategorize the nouns that are often involved in divergent tendencies, as exemplified in the foregoing subsections.

- a. Nouns of dual class membership - i.e., nouns which have both count and noncount functions, e.g.: *action, work, correspondence, shade, damage*.
- b. A noncount noun which is semantically (and sometimes also formally) identical to a count noun, e.g.: *machinery/machines; equipment/tools; correspondence/letters; work/task, job*. Sometimes one or both of the nouns so related can be both count and noncount, e.g.: *shade/shadow; property/possession, belonging; produce/product; damage/loss*. With reference to *damage/loss* for instance we can think of a sentence such as:

*The accident did such a lot of damage to the car that it had to be abandoned as a total loss.*

- c. Non-count nouns which need partitive constructions in their realization of “countability” or “boundedness”. Noncount nouns are seen as denoting an undifferentiated mass. However, their expression of quantity and thus countability may be achieved in some cases by means of certain general partitive nouns, in particular *piece, bit, item*, followed by an *of*-phrase (cf. Quirk *et al* 1985, 249), e.g.:

### Singular Partitives

*a piece of advice*  
*an item of news*  
*a word of information*  
*an article/a suite of furniture*

### Plural Partitives

*pieces of advice*  
*several items of news*  
*words of information*  
*articles of furniture*

- d. By using partitive NPs, therefore, we can have corresponding singular and plural expressions involving the same noncount noun, as in the above examples, or count equivalents of noncount nouns:

### Noncount noun

*a lot of abuse*  
*warm applause*  
*The interest is only 5%*

### Count equivalent

*a term/word of abuse*  
*a round of applause*  
*a (low) rate of interest*

It may be worth noting that in the case of some noncount nouns, the expression of quantity may also be achieved by the phenomenon of reclassification in which case the partitive noun is omitted:

<i>two cups of tea</i>	-	<i>two teas</i>
<i>a lump/teaspoonful of sugar</i>	-	<i>one sugar</i>



- e. Nouns which are not marked for plural but occur in plural expressions, e.g.: *sheep, cattle, livestock, vermin*. It may be noted that some of them can enter partitive constructions: *flock(s) of sheep; herd(s) of cattle; twenty head of cattle* (e.g., twenty cows).

We may distinguish between two types of nouns which do not mark for plural: (a) those such as *cattle, livestock, vermin* which are plural only and cannot be singular; and (b) those like *sheep, aircraft, grouse* which can be both singular and plural. Quirk et al (1985, 303, 307) describe the former as “unmarked plural nouns” and the latter as “zero plural nouns”, and we have examined how such nouns could be morphologically analyzed.

It may also be worth noting that zero plural nouns which are names of some animals can mark for plural with the regular morph in certain environments. Zero tends to be used partly by people who are especially concerned with the animals, partly when the animals are referred to in the mass as game. This phenomenon, as we noted earlier, is described by some writers as “collectivizing”, e.g.: *Have you ever shot duck?* The regular plural may be used to denote different individuals, species, etc., e.g.:

Can you see the *ducks* on the pond?  
The *fishes* of the Mediterranean.

In some cases usage seems variable, e.g.:

He caught *five fish*  
He caught *five fishes*

- f. Noncount nouns which appear to be superordinate terms or hypernyms for co-hyponyms - i.e., noncount nouns which consist of several different countable items, e.g.: *cutlery - knife, fork, spoon; luggage/baggage - suitcase, bag, etc.; furniture - table, chair, etc.* We may note that some of them occur in partitive constructions (cf. categories 3 and 4 above), e.g.: a piece of furniture; a set of cutlery.

In conclusion, what the data has shown is that whereas the rate of divergence is high (in some cases up to 80%), there are a lot of other high instances of standard American English practice. In most of the texts examined for this study the divergent forms and the standard forms alternate with each other without any apparent contextual determinants. This would appear to underscore inconsistency in handling the complexity and idiosyncrasy of standard practice with respect to article

usage rather than manifest an “institutionalized” divergent article usage. However, the data seems to also suggest that either there exists something called ‘English usage in Japan’ or that there exists something called ‘Japanese English’. There is in fact a large area of overlap between the two interpretations, and the second could even be seen as included entirely within the first.

I must add that from my formal and informal discussions with teachers at all levels of English education in Japan, I strongly believe that in Japan the aim is to teach, learn and use Standard (American) English. And, to teach something else might be “a great disservice to the Japanese student” (D’Angelo 2005, 347).

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## Principles, Visuals and Assertive Questioning: Learning Japanese Culture through Evidence-Based Teaching

Percival Santos

**Abstract:** *A lecturer's personal knowledge and experience of what works and what doesn't in the classroom is probably the single most important component in his teaching repertoire. This paper will argue that individual experience alone is not sufficient. It needs to be supplemented with the best available pedagogical evidence from systematic research. This paper will introduce an approach to the teaching of some key aspects of Japanese culture and society; rites of passage, symbols, and taboos, through the use of Evidence-Based Teaching (EBT). EBT is the systematic use of those classroom methods, activities and techniques that show strong evidence of effectiveness. In short, EBT uses classroom methods that really work. I will argue that educators should selectively incorporate certain elements of best practice in teaching that are illuminated by research in EBT with their own preferred teaching techniques and methods.*

Keywords: Evidence-Based Teaching, social science pedagogy, Japanese culture

### Introduction

University professors and lecturers' individual experiences of what works and what doesn't in the classroom is probably the single most important component in their teaching repertoire. Indeed, when they are asked why they chose to teach a lesson in a particular way, many reply 'it works for me'. Nevertheless, that sort of answer begs the question of how you know that it works, and more importantly, how it compares to other, competing methods. I will argue that the most important criteria for choosing a particular classroom intervention should not be, 'will it work'. Instead, it should be 'which one of the many competing interventions is the best for producing a desired outcome?' and 'why does it work?'



Many variables come into play in the process of student learning and achievement. The school setting, the teacher's quality, skill, experience and personality, the students' age, social background, intelligence, aptitude, and gender, all play a part in determining academic success and achievement. It is thus not a straightforward task to measure the effectiveness of a particular intervention in relation to another competing intervention. Nevertheless, there currently exists an instrument that reliably differentiates various teaching methods in terms of their ability to improve learning. This article is concerned with the differential effects that various teacher interventions have on learning and achievement.

This paper is a contribution to the growing field of the pedagogy of the social and human sciences. It will introduce a new approach to the teaching of some key aspects of Japanese culture and society through the use of Evidence-Based Teaching (EBT). In particular, it will highlight 3 specific EBT teaching techniques; a focus on principles, graphic representation and whole class interactive teaching, all of which have significantly increased student learning and achievement. This paper will apply these 3 techniques in a Present-Apply-Review format in the teaching of 3 key areas of Japanese culture and society- rites of passage, symbols, and taboos.

What is good teaching? The mainstream theories on education and pedagogy have produced templates of 'good' lessons, but the problem is that 'there are many diverse educational theories. The models of good teaching derived from contrasting theories can be quite different in nature' (Kember 2007, 1). What is the best teaching method? Will it work equally well in all settings and will all types of students? However, it is not possible to arrive at simple solutions because of the existence of rival, competing theories of teaching and learning. Also, the search for a panacea, one single 'best' teaching method is illusive and 'claims that any one method, whether e-learning or enquiry-based learning, or whatever, is the way to present course material cannot be sustained, either logically or empirically' (Entwistle 2009, 2). In the words of Dahllöf:

Too much attention is directed toward finding... 'the best method', even though fifty years of educational research has not been able to support such generalizations. Instead, we should ask which method- or which combination of methods- is best (Dahllöf 1991, 148).

How then can we know which combination of methods is best? Can we compare one particular intervention's effectiveness with that of a rival, competing one? Is it the case that lecturers need to look at those teaching

interventions which have been proven by systematic research to be comparatively more efficacious than other competing alternatives?

### **Evidence-based Teaching**

EBT is the systematic use of those classroom methods, activities and techniques that show strong evidence of effectiveness. In short, EBT uses classroom methods that really work. Moreover, EBT compares the effectiveness of certain techniques relative to other ones. 'In order to evaluate an educational initiative or strategy, you must compare it with any alternatives that might achieve the same goals. However good a strategy, there may be another that is even better' (Petty 2006, 4).

EBT is inspired by Evidence-based Medicine (EBM), which aims to use scientific inquiry to assess the quality of evidence, usually in the form of randomized controlled trials in order to make a well-founded decision on the relative risks and benefits of different treatments, or even the lack of treatment (Elstein 2004). The British Medical Journal describes EBM as:

the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of EBM means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research...Good doctors use both individual and clinical expertise and the best available external evidence, and neither alone is enough. Without clinical expertise, practice risks becoming tyrannised by evidence, for even excellent external evidence may be inapplicable to or inappropriate for an individual patient. Without current best evidence, practice risks becoming rapidly out of date, to the detriment of patients' (Sackett et al. 1996).

Can we apply the lessons from Evidence-Based Medicine to teaching? Is it possible to find evidence-based interventions that are proven to have the greatest influence on student learning? This paper will argue that it is possible to find certain teaching interventions whose effectiveness is supported by rigorous research. In particular, this rigorous evidence often takes the form of well-designed and implemented randomized controlled trials. These trials 'are considered the "gold standard" for evaluating an intervention's effectiveness, in fields such as medicine, welfare and employment policy, and psychology' (Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy 2003, 1).

‘Effect-size’ is a particularly reliable and accurate tool for measuring the quality of a given initiative or instruction. It is a tried and tested experimental research method carried out by real teachers in real educational institutions wherein hundreds, even thousands of students are randomly divided into ‘control’ and ‘experimental’ groups. It is not possible to ensure that the ‘control’ and ‘experimental’ groups are identical in terms of students’ ability, social background, etc. Nevertheless, it is still possible to compare 2 groups where the most important factors are controlled for, ensuring that they are similar in many significant ways.

The control group is taught using a conventional teaching method while the experimental one is taught using a different teaching intervention and the effect size consists of the expected higher achievement experienced by the latter group. This difference in achievement is determined through the administration in both groups of a ‘pre-test’, before the teaching intervention is applied, and a ‘post-test’ afterwards. Ideally, both groups will get a similar score in the pre-test, and the experimental group should show a relative improvement over the control group in the post-test. The difference between the average marks between the 2 groups is the ‘effect-size’ (Petty 2006, 53-5). Although it is important at this point to point out that effect-sizes are averages for the studies that were examined, some of the studies have effect sizes higher than average and some have effect-sizes much higher than average.

John Hattie, Professor of Education of the University of Auckland believes:

An effect-size provides a common expression of the magnitude of study outcomes for all types of outcome variables, such as school achievement. An effect-size of 1.0 indicates an increase of one standard deviation, typically associated with advancing children’s achievement by one year, improving the rate of learning by 50%, or a correlation between some variable (e.g., amount of homework) and achievement of approximately .50. When implementing a new program, an effect-size of 1.0 would mean that approximately 95% of outcomes positively enhance achievement, or average students receiving that treatment would exceed 84% of student not receiving that treatment (Hattie 1999, 3).

We do not perfectly understand the precise mathematical significance of a teaching intervention whose effect size is 1.0. But what Hattie does make clear is that those techniques with an effect size of one could mean that

students' understanding and achievement, when measured in objective tests, would situate them one year ahead of comparable students who did not receive the intervention. Alternatively, the 1.0 score could also mean that students receiving the new intervention will learn 50% faster than those who have not.

The precise mathematical significance of an intervention whose effect size is 1.0, 0.5 or 0.3 is beyond the scope of this article. What this paper is concerned about is that certain interventions have been demonstrated to have differential effect sizes, and that the higher the effect size, the more effective the intervention is in raising student learning and achievement. My point is that students may show significant academic improvement to the extent that teachers employ teaching interventions that have the highest effect sizes.

Educators will be surprised to discover that there are literally thousands of such studies focusing on the effect-sizes of dozens of variables in teaching and learning. A few academics have even produced meta-studies that compare teaching methods with a view to finding the most effective, powerful ones. For example Robert Marzano has studied factors influencing achievement that teachers and students could change, typically classroom strategies, and has found 4,000 effect sizes (Petty 2006, 71). John Hattie has analyzed over 500,000 'effect-sizes' from over 300,000 studies that represent experiments involving tens of millions of students and covering a truly vast range of strategies and innovations' (Ibid, 61). Table 1 below is Geoff Petty's ranking of the top teaching methods (Ibid, 83- 161) and Table 2 is Robert Marzano's Categories of Instructional Strategies that Strongly Affect Student Achievement (Marzano et al. 2000, 4):

**Table 1: Geoff Pettys' Top Teaching Methods**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Intervention</b>	<b>Mean effect-size</b>
1	Feedback	0.81 (Hattie) 0.74 (Marzano)
2	Whole-class interactive teaching	0.81
3	Visual representations and graphic organizers	1.2 to 1.3
4	'Decisions, decisions'	0.89

5	Cooperative Learning	0.59 (Hattie) 0.73 (Marzano)
6	Reciprocal Teaching	0.86

**Table 2: Robert Marzano's Categories of Instructional Strategies that Strongly Affect Student Achievement**

Category	Average Effect-Size	Percentile Gain
Identifying similarities and differences	1.61	45
Summarizing and note taking	1.00	34
Reinforcing effort and providing recognition	.080	29
Homework and practice	0.77	28
Nonlinguistic representations	0.75	27
Cooperative learning	0.73	27
Setting goals and providing feedback	0.61	23
Generating and testing hypotheses	0.61	23
Activating prior knowledge	0.59	22

This paper will apply the 3 strategies that appear in red; summarizing, visual representations (also known as graphic organizers or nonlinguistic representations), and whole class interactive teaching (or feedback). These techniques rely on various pedagogical and educational theories and principles for their effectiveness.

When looked at as a whole, these particular interventions may resemble a theoretical patchwork quilt that does not hang together very well. However, demonstrating the theoretical coherence behind these chosen interventions is not my main aim. What I think is really important is the fact that all the interventions mentioned above are compatible with each other and that there is no compelling reason to use one particular combination in preference of another. I have chosen this particular combination for the simple reason that the initiatives mentioned in the 2

tables are some of the most effective interventions that an educator has at his disposal.

### **Principles First**

John Hattie (2003, 1-2) argues that teachers alone can account for 30% of the variance in students' achievement (with students account for 50% and effects of the home another 10%). Thus a major task in education should lie in identifying the qualities that differentiate excellent, expert teachers from merely experienced and novice ones. One salient dimension of expert teachers, Hattie points out, is that they 'can identify essential representations of their subject' (Ibid, 6). That is, expert teachers teach the key rules and principles first and then add details later. He further states:

We can make a distinction between surface and deep learning. Surface learning is more about the content (knowing the ideas, and doing what is needed to gain a passing grade), and deep learning more about understanding (relating and extending ideas, and an intention to understand and impose meaning). The claim is that experts are more successful at both types of learning, whereas both experienced and expert teachers are similar in terms of surface learning (Ibid, 11).

The obvious conclusion is that we should teach principles first, add detail later. 'If content is delivered too fast the working memory and short-term memory soon get swamped. Key points, relations and subject principles get obscured by the detail' (Ibid, 26). We need to 'cut content to the bare bones'.

The instructional strategy known as teaching principles first has an effect-size of 1.00 (Marzano et al. 2000). Likewise, introducing new material by using advance organizers, wherein students are given summaries in advance of what they are about to learn, has an effect-size of 0.78 for deep-learning, as well as 0.56 for surface learning only (Petty, 2006, p. 76).

This paper will employ the *rule based summarizing strategy* developed by Brown, Campione, and Day (1981) for presenting new material:

1. Delete trivial material that is unnecessary to understanding.
2. Delete redundant material.

3. Substitute super-ordinate terms for more specific terms (e.g., “flowers” for “daisies, tulips, and roses”).
4. Select a topic sentence, or invent one if it is missing.

### **Nonlinguistic Representations**

The previous section illustrated the importance of deep as opposed to surface learning. This section will talk about the need to get students to perform tasks that require deep understanding, not just superficial reproduction of the newly learned material. Deep understanding of abstract concepts may require tasks wherein students represent, organize, manipulate the content graphically, i.e. in a non-linguistic, visual manner.

Much research has shown that the human brain processes sensory data and information in linguistic, nonlinguistic, and affective modes. Nevertheless formal instruction and schooling privileges linguistic forms of delivery, storage and retrieval of content and information. ‘Knowledge is most commonly presented linguistically and students are most commonly expected to respond linguistically’ (Marzano 1998, 12-13). Although the exact nature of these mental images has ‘perplexed psychologists for ages’ (Pinker, 1997, 286), it is undeniable that the human brain processes and stores a lot of sensory data and information in the form of mental images. ‘Mental images are a key aspect of nonlinguistic thought’ (Marzano 1998, 21). Geoff Petty calls these nonlinguistic mental representations that the brain makes of sensory data ‘mentalese’:

...evolutionary pressure ‘bolted on’ to the brain a remarkably small language module, but the brain continued running with the same ‘computer code’, ‘software’ and ‘operating system’. It still thought and remembered in mentalese. But the brain could now translate mentalese into spoken language, enabling us to express our thoughts. It could also translate spoken language into mentalese when trying to comprehend someone else’s speech (Petty 2006, 8).

The more teachers use both linguistic and nonlinguistic systems of representation in the classroom and lecture hall, the better students are able to store and retrieve the information that they store in their heads:

All the modules of the brain still communicate in mentalese. So classroom learning requires the learner to translate the language of instruction into the language of meaning and understanding: mentalese. When students achieve this they sometimes experience the

‘penny dropping’ or ‘I get it’ feeling. The instruction has not changed, their interpretation of its meaning has (Ibid, 9).

Tasks that require students to represent information visually, i.e. nonlinguistically, have an average effect-size of 0.75 according to one meta-study by Marzano, Gaddy & Dean (2000, 4) and 1.2 to 1.3 according to Petty (2006, 113). There are various ways of generating nonlinguistic representations: graphic organizers, pictures and pictographs, mental pictures, timelines, mind maps, Venn Diagrams, flowcharts, etc. Graphic organizers use words and phrases in conjunction with visual icons such as arrows and other symbols. The former highlight key points and the latter represent relationships. There are ‘6 common patterns into which most information can be organized. Each one organizes information differently and so is more suited for some sorts of information than others (Marzano et al. 2000, 70):

1. Descriptive patterns
2. Time/sequence patterns
3. Process/cause-effect patterns
4. Episode patterns
5. Generalization/principle patterns
6. Concept Patterns

### **Whole Class Interactive Teaching**

If the 1<sup>st</sup> stage of the lesson is about presenting new material in skeletal form and the 2<sup>nd</sup> the opportunity for them to try their hand at making sense of the material, in the process making a ‘weak’ visual construct or nonlinguistic representation of the basics concepts, the 3<sup>rd</sup> stage is about finding out what they have got right so far and what they’ve got wrong and letting them know. The 3<sup>rd</sup> stage is essentially about giving students optimum feedback. Feedback can and should occur during all 3 stages of the lesson. However, for the sake of simplicity, this paper will concentrate on the role of feedback during the final, review stage. Hattie believes:

The most powerful single moderator that enhances achievement is feedback. The simplest prescription for improving education must be “dollops of feedback” (Hattie 1999, 9).

However, the evidence is that the occurrence of feedback in classrooms is way too low, and that it usually takes on the form of quizzes and formal



tests (Ibid, 9-10). The problem with most formal tests is that they are too often seen as an indication of a student's innate talent or intelligence, rather than as an indication of a teacher's teaching skill. Seen this way, tests are an inefficient form of feedback. Marzano, Gaddy and Dean make their case for the optimum form of feedback:

...simply telling students that their answer is right or wrong has a negative effect on achievement. Providing students with the correct answer has a moderate effect size (.22). The best feedback appears to involve an explanation as to what is accurate and what is inaccurate in terms of student response. In addition, asking students to keep working on a task until they succeed appears to enhance achievement (Marzano et al. 2000, 108).

Whole class interactive teaching, or assertive questioning, has an effect size of 0.81 and feedback has effect sizes of 0.81 (for Hattie) and 0.74 (for Marzano). The former consists of a variety of highly structured methods which is very active for the learner, gives optimum levels of feedback and involves a high level of teacher control. The teacher uses assertive questioning to explore the depth of students' grasp of the material, as well as any misunderstandings, and involves the whole class in correcting the misconceptions. The questioning strategy below consists of a thought provoking question asked by the teacher, who doesn't give away the answer until the end, after many students have volunteered their opinions and evaluated that of others (Petty 2006, 176):

1. Ask the question- e.g. 'Why do taboos exist in a rite of passage?'
2. Monitor the reasoning- e.g. 'Does anyone need help?'
3. Check for completion – e.g. 'Does anyone need any more time?'
4. Get most of the answers- e.g. 'What does *your* group think?'
5. You get the class to 'interrogate' the answers- e.g. 'Do you agree...Why?'
6. You confirm the answer – e.g. 'Taboos mark an anomalous, dangerous phase'
7. Thanks and praise- e.g. 'Thank you and well done'

I shall be using the 3 stage format in my Japanese culture and society lessons: Present-Apply-Review. New material is presented in the 1<sup>st</sup> stage in a skeleton structure, then students are given the opportunity to try their hand at creating a 'weak' visual construct or nonlinguistic representation of the novel material in the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage, finally, the teacher uses whole class assertive questioning techniques to ascertain what they did and didn't get right in the 3<sup>rd</sup> stage.. This 3 stage format allows students to actively

engage in the learning process, requires them to make a construct of the new material, involves them in reasoning and not just reproduction tasks, and finally gives them optimum feedback. This 3 stage format will now be applied to 3 separate lessons on different aspects of Japanese culture and society; rites of passage, symbols and taboo.

### Japanese Rites of Passage

Rituals may be seen as a set of behaviors, like etiquette, wherein individuals have little choice about its execution and rites of passage are a form of ritual (Hendry 2008). Japanese life-cycle ceremonies are very ritual bound and are rich in symbolism. The rite of passage of childbirth in Japan is full of taboos during pregnancy and immediately after childbirth. It involves a number of rituals that may have originally had religious connections, but are now disguised under a thin veneer of scientific justifications and reasons. One example is the wearing of the *obi* (corset) from the 5<sup>th</sup> month of pregnancy. Doctors and midwives may prescribe it, saying it helps firm up the abdominal muscles. However, its religious connotations are very clear once we find out that it can be purchased at shrines or temples and its acquisition is celebrated by a public announcement of the expected birth, on the Day of the Dog, presumably, to signal an easy delivery (Hendry 2003).

### Present

**Rites of passage** are rites that celebrate the move of one person or group from one ‘class’ or ‘social category’ to another.


All rites of passage can be broken down into **3 parts**:

1. **Separation** – activities that symbolize the ‘leaving’ of the old category
2. **Transition** – period when you are neither of the ‘old’ nor the ‘new’ category
3. **Incorporation** – these symbolize ‘joining’ a new group, or ‘being’ a new person

The transition stage is seen as particularly dangerous or strange because the person involved has, in a sense, left or stopped belonging to the previous category, but he or she still does not yet fully belong to or has entered the new category or class. The person is literally ‘in between’. It is during this stage that taboos are observed.

**Apply**

Students read a detailed description, or alternatively, they can watch a DVD showing the rite of passage of childbirth in Japan. Their task is to create or fill in the timeline below:



**Revise**

- Teacher** What does the ‘separation’ stage signify...Masaki?
- Masaki** The people are removed from their normal lives and are in the 1<sup>st</sup> stage of the process of moving from one class or category to another.
- Teacher** So what acts fall into the ‘separation’ stage of childbirth...Ayaka?
- Ayaka** The pregnant woman wears the *obi* (corset) and the date of the expected birth is announced, and the umbilical cord is severed and kept in a box.
- Teacher** What kind of restrictions or taboos apply during this rite of passage and why...Orie?
- Orie** The woman should not smoke or drink alcohol during pregnancy and should rest immediately after childbirth. And both women and babies cannot enter the shrine or public bath either during or immediately after childbirth. It’s because they are polluting.
- Teacher** Why are they polluting...Natsumi?
- Natsumi** Because childbirth used to be dangerous and both mother and child had a high chance of dying, and death is polluting.
- Teacher** That was certainly true before modern hospitals appeared. Can anyone think of a symbolic reason...Daisuke?
- Daisuke** All rites of passage have a transition period wherein the person is *in-between*, that means he is no longer part of the previous category, but is not yet fully part of the new category, so taboos are a marker of this *in-between* status.
- Teacher** Good, and how do we know that they have fully entered the new category...Ayumi?
- Ayumi** The taboos disappear and they perform ‘incorporation’ activities to show that.
- Teacher** Right, and can you name some ‘incorporation’ activities for childbirth...Chie?
- Chie** The naming ceremony, the baby visits the shrine for the 1<sup>st</sup> time, etc.

**Japanese Symbols**

The left hand in Japanese funeral practices is perceived as the expression of pollution of death. The use of the left hand in funeral practices

indicates the principle of reversal (*sakasa*) or inversion. The right hand is associated with events in daily life as well as with auspicious, happy events like marriages, births and other celebrations. A funeral is the opposite of daily life or of happy and auspicious events like birth and marriage (Matsunaga 1998).

### Present

**Symbols** are things that represent or recall something else. The following grid shows the link between auspicious events and the right hand, and the funeral with the left:

Event	Marriage	Birth	Daily life	Funeral
<b>Auspicious</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Hand</b>	Right	Right	Right	Left

### Apply

Students either watch a video or read a description of a Japanese funeral and they fill in the ‘similarities and differences’ grid below. It emphasizes the use of the left hand (*hidari*) to indicate the principle of reversal (*sakasa*) or inversion in Japanese funeral practices as opposed to the right hand:

Normal and Auspicious	Funeral
For auspicious and ordinary occasions right binding books are used	<i>hidari-toji</i> 左とじ- left binding book
In daily life or happy occasions such as weddings the serviettes are folded so that the right fold should be uppermost.	Before the start of the funeral, visitors to funerals are served with cake and tea. The paper serviette containing the cake will be folded so that the edge of the folded paper on the left side is uppermost
Dishes are laid out and eaten from the right side to left	After the funeral ceremony, visitors are served <i>hidari-zen</i> 左膳 – left dining room table. The dishes are arranged from right to left. This is a reversal of the normal way of arranging food in ordinary life and on happy occasions
Kimonos are worn with the right side underneath the left	The dead body must be dressed in a kimono where the left side is placed underneath the right.

	This is called <i>hidari-mune</i> 左胸 ( <i>hidari-mae</i> 左前) or <i>sakasa-kimono</i> 逆さ着物 – (wearing a kimono the reverse way)
	<i>sakasa-hishaku</i> 逆さひしゃく– using the ladle in a reverse way, also known as <i>sakasa-mizu</i> 逆さ水- ‘reverse water’
Folding screens are in normal position	<i>sakasa-byobu</i> 逆さ屏風 - erecting a folding screen upside-down

### Revise

- Teacher** What is the right hand associated with...Sayaka?
- Sayaka** Normal events in daily life as well as with auspicious or lucky events like marriages, births and other celebrations.
- Teacher** What would happen if you used the left hand to shake hands, hold chopsticks, or write a letter, etc.?
- Akino** People would find it strange or unacceptable.
- Teacher** What is the left hand associated with...Yui?
- Yui** Stupid people or clumsy things.
- Teacher** Can anyone give examples of words or adjectives that involve the idea of left in Japanese?
- Yukio** *Hidari-kiki* used for left-handedness, can also mean “heavy drinker”, *sasen* "to be moved left," is used when a corporate employee is transferred to a lower section.
- Teacher** Can anyone think of more examples?
- Kohei** *Hidarimaki* refers to stupidity or insanity, *Giccho* has a negative connotation.
- Teacher** So why is the left hand or things associated with the left used at Japanese funerals...Asami?
- Asami** A funeral is the opposite of daily life or of happy and auspicious events like birth and marriage.
- Teacher** Can anyone add to that?
- Kohei** Funerals are an inversion of normal life, so the use of the left hand is symbolic of that.

### Japanese Taboos

Anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney believes that modern societies like Japan ‘where the knowledge of biomedicine has been widely disseminated to the public, we often assume that all hygienic practices are based on germ theory’ (Tierney 1984, 21). However, many so-called hygienic practices in Japan have little or nothing to do with hygiene in the

biomedical sense. Many practices seem to be based on a separation of what is seen as ‘clean’ or ‘pure’ from what is ‘dirty’ and ‘impure’.

### Present


**Taboo** is a prohibition against contact with a thing, a person, or an activity. The subject of the taboo may be regarded as sacred or polluting and breaking the taboo involves polluting something that is considered clean or sacred.

The diagram below represents some Japanese taboos regarding hygiene:

<b>Inside (uchi)</b>	<b>Outside (soto)</b>
Above	Below
Pure	Impure

### Apply

Students watch a video or read a description of various hygiene taboos regarding spatial classification and they fill in the principles flowchart below to show the rationale for the taboos:





**Revise**

- Teacher** Why are we supposed to take our shoes off inside the house, and why are children not supposed to sit on the floor or touch their shoes...Mako?
- Mako** Because shoes have been outside are 'dirty' and the floor is dirty as well.
- Teacher** Does anyone disagree?
- Yoko** Not all outside places are dirty and some floors are very clean. I think that these taboos are not about 'dirt' in the hygienic sense.
- Teacher** So in what sense are they 'dirt' then...Hisayoshi?
- Hisayoshi** Well the outside and the floor in Japan are considered 'dirty'. Children are taught the word *bacchi* (dirty) for things on the floor and to do with the outside. So they are taught not to touch 'outside' or 'below' objects.
- Teacher** What happens when we touch 'outside' or 'below' objects?
- Hisayoshi** The taboo for maintaining the boundary between spatial classifications is violated.
- Teacher** Can anyone think of another example where the taboos for 'inside' and 'outside' are broken...Yu?
- Yu** Keeping dogs inside the house.
- Teacher** What would happen if you crossed or violated the 'inside' and 'outside' boundaries...Takako?
- Takako** People would see it as dirty or disgusting.

**Conclusion**

A much greater weight needs to be given to the systematic use of those classroom methods, activities and techniques that show strong evidence of effectiveness within the Japanese culture and society curriculum. This paper has outlined one approach that seeks to supplement a teacher's repertoire of favored classroom techniques and methods with classroom methods that are proven to work according to the best available pedagogical evidence from systematic research. Lessons like the ones described in this paper allow students to actively engage in the learning process, require them to make a construct of the new material, involve them in reasoning and not just reproduction tasks, and finally give them optimum feedback. I have found that the activities described here motivate learners and enlivens class discussion. Students seem to be much more engaged with the material and my experience has been that they find the lessons very enjoyable.

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# Creating Authentic Japanese Language Environment for International Students: an Application of Community Psychology to Language Learning Pedagogy

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## Introduction

This article is a report on the development of a system of support for students participating in study abroad programs. It is written in order to share experience gained at Akita International University (hereafter AIU,) an international liberal arts university in Japan. The influence of the international character of the university and of the educational goals of liberal arts school on this approach does not preclude educators from other types of higher education institutions to utilize reported experience.

One of the educational commitments of AIU is to create an international environment for students. There is no doubt that for Japanese students, the AIU campus is a fully international environment providing them with an intercultural experience and linguistic opportunities fitting their educational goals. However, for international students whose main purpose in coming to Japan is to develop or improve proficiency in Japanese language, some aspects of this internationalization of the campus are limiting their foreign experience.

Since the emphasis at the university is on global scale issues and almost all the education is in English, which motivates Japanese students to avoid using their mother tongue even outside of the classroom, international students might not have a very good linguistic and cultural environment to improve their Japanese language proficiency and to have direct contact with Japanese culture. The location of AIU in a rural area, as well as lodging in a dorm on campus amid such beauty, is all well and good, but being in such a sparsely populated area additionally limits student's opportunities to use Japanese language and to experience

contemporary Japanese style of life. The recognition of these factors has motivated my attempts to develop a system of support for international students who sometimes openly complain about insufficient opportunities for getting the experience which they expected to gain during their stay at AIU. Some students, of course, find their own ways to overcome such limitations and sometimes they create different kinds of challenges. Some students might feel happier without using Japanese language. However, from the very beginning of student exchange between AIU and its partners, there has been a very clear need for some sort of intervention.

#### Community Psychology Approach

My work on creating a good linguistic and cultural environment for international students has been guided by the concepts of community psychology, which in application to the learning process is shifting attention from the purely individual characteristics of the student (such as his/her educational background and prior preparation, level of motivation, learning skills, learning style preferences, individual effort) to a more holistic approach which takes into account the student's interaction with the social environment and all circumstances which can influence his/her performance.

Community psychology is a relatively new discipline with rather practical orientation, but applying in its methods strict academic rigour. This approach seemed to fit very well my objectives. Since the principles of this discipline guided my efforts, I will elaborate little more on it.

According to Dalton, Elias, and Wandersman (2001, p. 5) "*Community psychology* concerns the relationships of the individual to communities and society. Through collaborative research and action, community psychologists seek to understand and to enhance quality of life for individuals, communities, and society."

There are four fundamental characteristics of the discipline which emerged in the process of its consolidation in the form of trends concerning:

1. Prevention and competence promotion
2. Community- building, citizen participation, and empowerment
3. Understanding human and cultural diversity
4. Developing "adventuresome" research methods to match the complexity of community phenomena.

For our purpose, the first two trends are of special importance. Thus, the emphasis is not on repairing what already shows signs of malfunctioning,

but on improvements which prevent occurrence of problems. The improvement, it is believed, comes with the increased level of competence of individuals involved, with building their mutual cooperation, engagement, increased sense of responsibility for quality of own life and of others, and with the knowledge how to achieve goals.

The most characteristic for community psychology is its shift of the perspective to include broader picture of the circumstances in which problems occur.

“Community psychology involves a shift in perspective. That shift means that the focus of community psychology is not on the individual alone but on the linkages between individual and social structure, including friendship networks, organization membership, communities and societies and culture” (Dalton, Elias, and Wandersman, 2001, p.21-22)

I was writing about the occurrence of problems, because community psychology has very clearly an active orientation:

“Community psychology’s theory and concepts flow from involvement in community interventions and change, which are to be rigorously studied. Findings from research are then used both to build theory and to guide further community action. (Dalton et al, 2001, p. 5)

The most fundamental concept in community psychology is that of the ecological levels which determine the forms of intervention applicable in solving problems. There are five nested ecological levels considered: individuals, micro-systems, organizations, localities, and macrosystems. At the first level interventions apply to changing patterns of individual behaviour by strengthening competencies or coping skills. The second, consisting of for instance families, social support networks, mutual help groups involve in intervention changes in patterns of relationships and interactions within existing groups or creation of a group with specific objectives of mutual help. The third consists of larger and more formally organized groups in which individuals interact only selectively. The fourth is of relatively large scale in which political forces and governing bodies become important. The fifth of the largest scale exclude any forms of direct contact and interaction.

Community psychology has majority of its applications in the three lower

ecological levels, but does not exclude interventions at the higher levels. Its value in solving problems is in the recognition of the necessity to identify methods of problem resolution at more than one level, and definitely in going beyond interventions at the lowest level. I was focusing in my work on the second and third levels.

The analogy to natural ecological systems motivated community psychologists in developing the four basic principles providing context to their research. Kelly (1966, 1970, 1979, Trickett, Kelly & others, 1972, 1985) calls them Principles of Interdependence, Cycling of Resources, Adaptation, and Succession. Thus, first principle requires that we have to consider all networks of mutual interactions of the system without assuming that the components can be studied in isolation and only later assembled into the system.

The Principle of Cycling of Resources requires that the system can be only understood by examining how all its resources are defined, used created, conserved and transformed. For instance, time, nurturance, attention, emotional support, money and other tangible goods in a family ecology might be resources cycled in interactions of its members. In more relevant ecology of university student environment different forms of information regarding courses, faculty, social life, job opportunities, as well as emotional support, practical assistance and tutoring are resources exchanged by the members of the community.

The third principle, Adaptation, concerns person-environment fitting when individuals use resources in order to deal with demands and constraints of an environment. Here especially important is development of skills and competencies in the use of available resources, as well as development of new resources.

Finally, the Principle of Succession tells us that ecology, as every other dynamical system, is changing and the changes are governed by some underlying patterns. Proper understanding of the other three principles requires taking into account these patterns. The knowledge of the patterns of change may allow us more effective use of resources.

Examples of interventions at different ecological levels have brought several ideas of improvement which I was implementing both in the course activities and in initiatives regarding student life.

My interventions attempting to improve the situation of international students were frequently based on voluntary involvement of Japanese

students and they had form of activities outside of classroom which I could not observe directly. For that reason I was collecting data which could allow me to learn about the need for interventions and about their effectiveness.

Thus, I was collecting data regarding students' opinions about the environment of AIU in the form of answers to the question: How do international students perceive AIU environment, and how do they deal with its limitations?

The second question which was important for modification of interventions was: How much do international students use the opportunities provided at AIU and what do they think about them?

Analysis of the answers to these two questions gave me critical feed-back control, allowing for a smooth evolution of the mechanisms which I was trying to develop in order to improve the environment of international students.

Conducting this practice, there were three points I kept in mind. One is that the programs which I initiated should be independent in and of themselves, so that they don't have to depend on me to continue. The second point is need for developing student autonomy in the design of the system. It is especially important for the liberal arts university such as AIU, whose one of the most important educational goals is the development of student's autonomy. The third point is avoidance of the idea that international students are always only receiving support, which produces a feeling of weakness and dependence. It is difficult to implement, but with the use of reciprocal support, such as developing relationships based on equality, it can be managed. This idea empowers international students as real members of the community.

In the following, I will provide more specific description of the initiatives which I have designed and implemented in order to create better system of support for international students. As this paper is a general report, for more specifics I will be referring to my earlier articles. Not all trends and principles of community psychology had equal importance for my actual interventions. Nevertheless it can be easily recognized that my work was guided by several elements of this discipline. For instance, I tried to focus on developing structures which can prevent problems, rather than on repairing what does not work at present. My goal is always to raise the competence of students in order further that which been started in my intervention. For this purpose, I tried to stimulate community building, engagement of students and giving them opportunities to take initiative



and become empowered in creating environment more suitable for their needs.

In planning an intervention, I constantly looked for all forms of interdependence between multiple elements of the environment where university students live, in particular international students. I considered in-class activities, life outside of the classroom, extracurricular activities, and the community at large. Such interventions included many cases of developing new resources or encouragement to use existing ones. It was also important to consider mutual interdependence of Japanese and international students, who could offer each other different type of resources. The most obvious example could be involvement of Japanese students in improving international students' proficiency in Japanese language, which was giving them opportunity to build up their own confidence and competence in intercultural communication.

Development of a system helped international students to adapt on their new life in unfamiliar environment. This was my original main goal of my work. Finally, the presence of the fourth principle of community psychology was appeared in my work through an evolutionary approach. I have been carrying on not only interventions by involving students in a variety of activities, but also continuously collecting data regarding their perceptions, reactions, and opinions So that I could use these data to transform activities in the direction of increasing student autonomy.

### **Mentor Program (2004 - 2006)**

The most difficult time for international students in the adaptation to new life is right after their arrival on campus. It can be their first international experience and everything could seem unfamiliar and difficult. Some forms of support are provided by administration and faculty, but they cannot meet all needs of newcomers.

To support students in their adaptation to everyday life in this transitional period, AIU Counsellor and I as Dean of Students, prepared and implemented a "Mentor Program" (Matsumura & Abe, submitted 2010). In this program each newcomer has an assigned Japanese student (mentor) waiting for him/her at the time of arrival in the university dorm.

The role of a mentor is to provide information and guidance in all aspects of campus and personal life. We specially encouraged mentor students to eat meals together with students assigned to them at the first stage of their task.

The program was implemented on six consecutive occasions when new international students arrived at AIU from 2004 to 2006; with each new implementation being refined using the experience of previous implementations, as well as the results of students questionnaires and faculty observations. The programs were very successful in meeting needs of arriving students and brought some additional benefits valued by both Japanese and international students such as fostering friendship between mentors and newcomers. It helped not only international students to make smooth start in the new environment, but also Japanese students to gain confidence in intercultural interactions. This program did not include support in learning Japanese language or help in course work. According to the questionnaires, however, there were many requests for future inclusion of language support.

### **Conversation Partner Program (2004 -present)**

In order to meet the demand, I started “Conversation Partner Program” at the time of the second implementation of the Mentor Program. I recruited volunteers among international and Japanese students who wanted to have a partner for conversations in Japanese. For international students, there was a natural benefit of getting help in improving language skills, for Japanese students, an opportunity to find international friends. Since we have larger number of Japanese students, not all Japanese applicants could get partners, although most of International students normally were applying for that.

I had to make matching of partners, considering each of the students individually. I made the first meeting to announce the assignment of partners. At this first meeting partners were introducing to each other, making decisions regarding the next meeting time and place, and exchanging information about ways to make contacts between meetings. I made sure that this is an opportunity for international students to speak Japanese, even if for some of them it was difficult. I also gave some advice, especially to Japanese students related to language learning.

The grammatical and vocabulary material learned by international students at particular levels of classes were informed to Japanese students, and advice given with regard to speaking speed or appropriate phrasing of sentences, should their partners not understand. I emphasized the importance of not switching into English too quickly, but being patient and good listeners.

For those who had advanced level partners, I gave some examples of topics they could talk about. Also, later I suggested that some of the pairs could get together and do something, such as dining or watching DVDs, or to create some opportunities for having parties that anybody could join.

After the first meeting, I left the initiative to students. Some of them became very close friends; some only met a few times. According to the surveys that I conducted at the end of each semester, usually half of them continue to meet regularly and those who continue, they usually had very positive opinions about the program, evaluating it as very helpful for both language and culture understanding and also as a good way to foster friendships.

It is difficult to find out the reasons for failures, because I don't get enough responses from those who discontinued meetings, but as far as I can ascertain, most of them resulted from difficulties caused by time conflicts in scheduling meetings and activities. Occasionally there were some no shows, typically from the side of international students, and some students did not feel comfortable to interact with a particular person in their pair. Some international students who initially participated in the program because they wanted to find friends have found friendships outside of the program discontinued their participation considering this system as not necessary. But at the same time some students were very happy that the system required use of Japanese, as normally they feel that they should speak English at AIU, since most of the Japanese students want to speak English and their Japanese is not at good enough level for social situations. Participating in the Conversation Partner program, they felt comfortable to use Japanese because they knew that the partner didn't mind conversation in Japanese.

#### Foundation of Japanese Conversation Friends (2005- present)

Recently, there have been publications about positive results of peer learning or peer support programs. Blumenfeld et al. (1996) characterize peer learning as a way to improve attitudes toward school, to foster achievement, to develop thinking skills, and to promote interpersonal and intergroup relations. Students can benefit in many ways from peer learning according them:

"peer interactions can promote (a) student exchanges that enhance reasoning and higher-order thinking; (b) cognitive processing such as rehearsing, organizing, and integrating to others' ideas; and (c) perspective and encouragement among those involved with work" (p.

38).

Usually peers are classmates or people learning something together. Peer support is including some form of counselling. For instance, Cowie & Sharp (1996) mentioned that the beneficial support relations in peer support are: 1) fostering friendship, 2) counselling, 3) conflict resolution. The main purposes of peer support programs is in giving sensitive support to peers, by which supporters themselves develop, improve attitudes toward school, and help in finding access to the specialist when the peer has difficulties exceeding abilities of peer support provider.

Considering the benefits of peer support described in the literature of the subject, I wanted to shift the programs I had organized towards the format in which more is left to own students' initiative. In addition to benefits described above, such a system fosters students' autonomy which belongs to most important goals of liberal arts education.

While I was organizing the Conversation Partner Program, some Japanese students were completing my "Teaching Japanese as a Second Language" course. Since all these students were participating in the Conversation Partner Program, we often discussed about the issues involved in implementation of the program in the classes. I found that some of these students were willing to get involved even more in helping international students to learn Japanese Language through the discussion. That is how a small group called "Japanese Conversation Friends" (hereafter JCF) formed in 2005.

Besides the involvement in organization of the conversation partner program, JCF started some programs initiated by the members of the group, such as "Homework Night", which encouraged international students to bring their homework assignments in order to get assistance in the study of Japanese language, "Movie Night" when international students are watching Japanese movies with assistance in understanding more difficult dialogues from Japanese students, with whom they are later discussing impressions. JCF is also organizing some special events related to the calendar of Japanese traditional holidays or customs. Members of JCF welcome international, but also Japanese students when they need assistance or help. Last year, this originally small group of four students registered as an official AIU student club with more than 20 members and continues its activity with great enthusiasm.

### **Towards Local Community (2007 - present)**

Direct contact with the community at large was fostered by some activities in my “Cultural Background of Japanese Language” course. In the interviews which I conducted, many international students mentioned that “AIU is not a real Japan”, “I want to interact with *real* Japanese people”. Although they are happy to have warm and protected environment on campus in which they can easily switch into English, if they fail in their communication in Japanese, they have realized that it is not the authentic Japan, and they need harsh lessons off the campus to improve their proficiency in language.

In the part of “Cultural Background of Japanese Language” course, I have been arranging some forms of interaction between students and local community. I have found several beneficial aspects of these interactions for both international and Japanese students (Abe, 2009a&b).

These interactions with the community originally have been arranged as class activities. For the reasons explained above, I have been trying to shift responsibility for such interactions to students, whom I encourage to employ their own initiative, since last year. As it is an ongoing project, I have identified some sources of the difficulties that I have noticed so far. The hardest obstacle is the access to the community. Frequent and continuous interactions are difficult, especially in the winter time. The short period of interaction is another obstacle. International students stay at AIU only one year at longest and Japanese students leave for a year of study abroad in the middle of their study, which disrupts already existing connections making development of sustainable relationships very hard.

On the other hand, in spite of all difficulties, it is still worth for students and for the university to develop a system of the interactions with members of the local community. From the interviews I conducted, I can see that not only international students but also Japanese students benefited from such interactions through developing knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the local culture and by getting much stronger attached to the region and its people. I also believe that this is the best strategy for Akita prefecture in committing AIU students to contribute to the region in the future.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Thus far, the report has been focused on description of my interventions implemented by me in my effort to create a system of support for

international students. There are many other spontaneous forms of support for international students at AIU, however, such as a network of friendships, home-visit family programs, dormitory environment, multiple club activities, etc.

I should also mention about the remarkable role that AIU Secretariat Office plays. Student Services Division is dealing with multiple issues of both Japanese and international students. Community Outreach and Services Division (COS) is the pipeline connecting local community and students, providing a lot of opportunities for students to go out of campus to participate in many activities with people in local community. Through this office, students are frequently invited to various traditional festivals or events cultivating local customs or traditions, to visit local schools. Other divisions may not have direct contact with students, but their support has form of a contribution to the very warm and friendly atmosphere of the office.

Thus, all contributions to student support have high value. However, it is clear that the initiatives to involve international students in interactions should be always considered with the view of their educational objectives, to prevent situations where invitation of students does not provide opportunities for gaining authentic experience. There is high demand for visits of international students in schools or organizations, especially in the rural regions such as Akita Prefecture, which do not give opportunity to students to engage into meaningful interactions. The design of visits should take into consideration the benefit for both sides, the visitors and hosts. As discussed before, the question how international students can become authentic members of the community does not have obvious answer, but is of great importance.

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## Does Globalization Exist? An Analysis of the Economic, Political, and Cultural Dimension

Christian Etzrodt

The concept of globalization or globality became fashionable in academic research in the early 1980s. Since the 1990s the fashion has become hyped and “[c]ountless academics have rushed to claim the cliché of the day” (Scholte 2005, 51). However, until today the term globalization is not only poorly conceptualized (Scholte 2005, 52), but it is also unclear whether this concept describes any real phenomenon or not. In this paper I will provide definitions of the term globalization in connection to economic, political, and cultural questions, and I will discuss the relevance of this concept for an adequate description of reality. **My arguments in relation to the three dimensions (economic, political, and cultural) will follow the same structure. I will first describe three different scenarios for each dimension: the first scenario defines globalization, the third scenario emphasizes the strengthening of national or local elements, whereas the second scenario describes a mixture between these two extremes. The definition of these three alternative scenarios will make it easier to judge whether globalization is really the predominant phenomenon in each dimension. The surprising result of this broad analysis is that globalization is not in even one of the three dimensions predominant. Therefore, my conclusion is that globalization does not exist as an established fact.**

### **The three dimensions of globalization**

The process of globalization can be analyzed from different perspectives. Firstly, Globalization could be defined as an economic process of increasing cross-border activities (cf. Rodrik 2001; Kearney/FP 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004). International trade and foreign direct investments clearly fall into this category, but also tourism and immigration have an economic impact. In other words, globalization from an economic point of view would imply an increasing transfer of



goods, capital, and people from one country to another. But the economic dimension is not the only way to interpret globalization. From a political point of view globalization could be defined as a process that limits the power of the nation-states (cf. Ohmae 1990; 1995; Naisbitt 1995; Negroponte 1995; Bryan and Farrell 1996: 187; Thurow 1996). The decreasing power of nation-states could either result from a strengthening of liberalized global markets or follow from an increasing number of international treaties and agreements which restrict the ability of national governments to make policy. And finally, the third dimension of globalization is the cultural aspect of this phenomenon. From a cultural perspective globalization could be defined as a process of homogenization of values and life style patterns worldwide (cf. Latouche 1996, 3). The export of the Western or American way of life to the rest of the world would imply globalization in this sense. In the following I will discuss whether globalization is a real phenomenon from an economic, political, and cultural point of view or not.

### **The economic dimension: liberalization of global markets**

If globalization really exists as an economic phenomenon, we should expect an increase of cross-border transfers of goods, capital, and people worldwide. Furthermore, international transfers of goods and capital require a liberalization of national markets. International trade and foreign direct investments are only profitable strategies, if the nation-states do not limit access to their markets (e.g. through protectionist import taxes). In other words, the increase of cross-border activities is causally linked to a liberalization of world markets. **Another important aspect of a free market economy is a free labor market. A free labor market is a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of resources. In this sense, there cannot be a free global market without a free global labor market. But a free global labor market requires unrestricted immigration (the long-term cross-border transfer of people), because immigration will only increase, if the access to labor markets is liberalized (and not limited by national immigration regulations).**

One alternative to globalization in this sense could be regionalization. Regionalization is defined as a process in which the national borders inside one region are erased, whereas the borders of the region itself are strengthened. In many aspects regionalization is like globalization on a small scale. However, regionalization contradicts globalization, because by protecting the region against other regions it limits the

cross-border activities between regions. If regionalization is the predominant phenomenon in the world, then globalization cannot exist. Examples of regionalization are MERCOSUR (South America, 1991), the European Union (with the adoption of the single market framework in 1992 and the common currency in 1999), SADC (Southern Africa, 1992), AFTA (South East Asia, 1992), NAFTA (North America, 1994), and UEMOA (West Africa, 1994).

A third alternative to globalization could be protectionism. Protectionism is a strategy of nation-states that do not want to be a part of the global (or regional) market. This strategy usually would include high import tariffs in order to protect the home industry against the competition with the more efficient foreign companies. Obviously, protectionism is the opposite of globalization, and if protectionism is predominant, then globalization cannot exist. Examples of protectionist nation-states are Iran and North Korea.

Given these three alternatives is globalization really the most influential phenomenon in connection to cross-border transfers of capital, goods, and people? The global capital market comes closest to a fully liberalized market. For example, the pattern of foreign direct investment shows a clear increase of cross-border activities between regions, especially between the United States/NAFTA, European Union, and Japan (with Asia). The outward foreign direct investments were more and more directed to the other two key regions (e.g. Japanese companies invested in the United States and in Europe), and the percentage of capital invested in their own region declined (Glenn 2007, 84, Table 3.9). An exception is the high regional investment in the EU, which could be the “result of the ongoing process of integration” (Glenn 2007, 85). Although this pattern of foreign direct investment does not show a worldwide trend, because the importance of some regions of the world for foreign direct investment is decreasing (e.g. Africa’s share is declining; cf. Glenn 2007, 74, Table 3.2), the financial market is still best described as a globalized market. Another good example is the recent economic depression. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008—which led the subprime mortgage crisis in America to its peak—had immediately a severe impact on the financial markets worldwide. Because of a lack of money supply in America the global financial market was in danger to collapse. Therefore, as long as the cross-border transfer of capital is taken into account, it is reasonable to conclude that globalization exists. However, if the pattern of international trade is analyzed, the picture changes entirely. From the 1960s the intra-bloc trade increased

significantly, whereas the trade between regions declined (Glenn 2007, 82f., Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8). This was mainly the result of the formation of regional free trade organizations and the tendency to protect their own unified markets with high tariffs. Of course, also the massive inter-bloc direct foreign investments made it unnecessary to export so much. For example, the Japanese car companies could reduce their exports to America and Europe in order to avoid the import tax, because they are now directly producing these cars in America and Europe. Consequently the importance of inter-bloc trade declined. Nevertheless, trading patterns can be better explained by the regionalization thesis than by the globalization thesis.

Again an analysis of labor migration leads to a different conclusion. Long-term cross-border transfers of people are severely limited by nation-states. The regionalization of the right of abode in the European Union is here an exception. In all other cases, however, the nation-states restrict the access to their labor markets. This is even true for typical immigration countries like the United States. The United States would not need a fence at the Mexican border, if their labor market would be fully liberalized or regionalized. But this is neither globalization nor regionalization but protectionism. Therefore, a globalization of labor markets does not exist.

From an economic perspective the existence of global markets is highly questionable. Only capital markets seem to be integrated worldwide, but the markets for goods and labor markets are either regionally or nationally regulated. Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson (1999, 2; cf. Veseth 1998; Doremus et al. 1998; Zysman 1996) came to a similar conclusion: "as we proceeded [with our economic research] our skepticism deepened until we became convinced that globalization, as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth." In the economic dimension globalization as a fully developed phenomenon does not exist. It might be a process that is still going on, but I have my doubts that labor markets will ever be fully liberalized.

### **The political dimension: powerful markets or global governance**

The globalization thesis in the political dimension implies that nation-states lose their power to make policy and to regulate markets. The loss of power by the nation-states can be the result of two different processes (or their combination). On the one hand the nation-states' ability to intervene into the market could decrease as a result of the liberalization of markets on a global level. In this case national

government could not force multi-national corporations to accept national restrictions, because the multi-national corporation could reply with the threat to move its production to another less regulated state. The second possible cause of the limitation of the nation-states' powers could be an increasing global governance. Instead of a global market a global government or international organization would reduce the ability to make national policy, simply because international law and treaties would precede national law.

The alternatives to the globalization thesis in the sense of a dominating global market and/or global governance are regionalism or "nationalism." Regionalism can be defined as "a formal process of intergovernmental collaboration between two or more states" (Ravenhill 2005, 117). Obviously, the economic integration of national markets in a region (regionalization) requires to some extent also a political integration (regionalism). However, only the European Union went so far to introduce a regional parliament and government. Regionalism can be understood as a political reaction to the decreasing power of the nation-states to influence the global market or organizations. By transferring sovereignty from the national governments to a regional government, it is possible to create a more powerful entity, which again has much more abilities to influence global markets or organizations. In other words, regionalism would be an attempt to stop or control the process of globalization (Glenn 2007: 81). And if several powerful regions are predominant in the world, then globalization cannot exist.

Another alternative to globalization could be a strengthening of the nation-states. I call this alternative "nationalism." A rejection of global markets or organizations cannot only appear on the regional level (regionalism) but also on the national level (nationalism). The economic strategy of protectionism is for example implemented by nation-states. National governments could limit the scope of global markets and could decide to reject international agreements. Therefore, if nationalism is the dominant force in the world, then globalization cannot exist.

Which of these three alternatives is now the most accurate description of the status of nation-states? First of all, it is an interesting phenomenon that the number of nation-states increased dramatically in recent years. In the period between 1800 and 1939 0.3 new nation-states were created per year. Between 1940 and 1959 this number increased to 1.1 per year. The number of new states rose to 2.4 per year

between 1960 and 1989. And finally this development reached its peak between 1990 and 2003 with the creation of 3.7 nation-states per year (Cohen and Kennedy 2007, 127, Table 5.1). Obviously, this phenomenon of increasing disintegration of nation-states is hardly compatible with the globalization thesis. Before 1940 the world was much more politically integrated than it is today. From this point of view it could be concluded that nationalism is the predominant political trend. Instead of globalization it would be deglobalization.

However, this conclusion is not convincing, because the possibility cannot be excluded that nation-states lost power, although the number of independent nation-states increased. It is useful to apply in this context Held's (1989) distinction between sovereignty and autonomy. Sovereignty describes the state's ability to make policies, whereas autonomy refers to the state's capacity to achieve the policy goals. The increasing number of nation-states indicates that more entities received their sovereignty by splitting from or disintegrating larger entities. On the other hand nation-states were also willing to give away some of their sovereignty by accepting regional or international agreements. **It could be argued that the emergence of the UN with its primary judicial organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1945), and the International Criminal Court (ICC, 1998) would limit the sovereignty of the nation-states severely, but this is actually not the case. It is a voluntary choice of sovereign states to sign and ratify these agreements, and every country maintains the right to remove their declaration. In the moment the United States does neither accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ nor the ICC. Other countries, which have not signed or ratified the ICC agreement, are China, India, and Russia. In other words, as long as American presidents do not have to defend themselves at the ICC in The Hague against accusations of having committed crimes against humanity (for torturing EU citizens at Guantanamo Bay), as long it makes no sense to believe in a loss of the nation-states' sovereignty.** Since the international agreements were not significantly limiting the nation-states' sovereignty, and since the political integration (and the loss of sovereignty of the members) in the European Union is rather an exceptional case, it seems to me that regarding sovereignty nationalism is the dominating trend worldwide.

However, this perception changes with a shift of the focus from sovereignty to autonomy. The liberalization of global financial markets had a strong impact on the economic autonomy of nation-states. If capital can be moved freely between different nation-states and regions,

then we can expect that companies want to invest in countries where they can make the highest profits. Profits depend nowadays largely on labor costs and corporate taxes (transportation costs lost their importance with the fast technological progress). Labor costs again are mainly determined by supply and demand as well as the negotiation power of labor unions. Therefore, if nation-states want to attract investments, they have to lower the corporate tax rate, and they need to limit the power of labor unions. If national governments choose other policies, the global financial markets will not supply capital for investments. "In a poor country like ours, the alternative to low-paid jobs isn't well-paid ones, it's no jobs at all." (Jesús F. Reyes Heróles, the former Mexican Ambassador to the US; cited by Norberg 2003, 194) And this is not anymore only a problem for developing countries but for every national government. The constant pressure of global financial markets leads to a race to the bottom, in which one corporate tax cut will chase the other. As a result of the reduction of the corporate tax rate national governments will have less means to achieve their policy aims. The nation-states also don't have anymore the ability to increase the budget deficit, because a high budget deficit is regarded by private banks as a risk that nation-states will not be able to pay back their debts. This will lead to higher interest rates, which reduces the resources of nation-states even more to implement for example social welfare programs or to invest in the infrastructure or education. Therefore, if autonomy is taken into consideration, the conclusion can only be that nation-states are under severe pressure. Most nation-states have not yet lost their autonomy completely. But any attempt by the nation-states to resist the mechanism of the global financial market is very costly.

Furthermore, countries in need of financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank were forced to implement a neo-liberal vision of a market-led development. The "recommended" Structural Adjustment Policies implied radical trade liberalization, deregulation of financial markets, canceling of subsidies, privatization of state enterprises, and the reduction of budget deficits (Glenn 2007, 99). These reforms were severely limiting the autonomy of nation-states with high foreign debts, since the acceptable role of the state was restricted to securing peace and investments in the infrastructure.

Therefore, also from a political perspective the existence of globalization is rather ambiguous. An evaluation of the sovereignty of nation-states leads to a clear rejection of the globalization thesis. More

nation-states exist today than ever before, and there is no sign of a radical loss of sovereignty today. However, the liberalization of financial markets has limited the autonomy of the nation-states. But the fact that this liberalization was the result of the decisions of national governments to participate in the WTO and other international organizations which advocate free capital transfers (cf. Korten 1995; Reinicke 1998; Doremus et al. 1998; Weiss 1998; Kapstein 1999; Gowan 1999; Luttwak 1999) also means that these decisions can be reversed (Cohen 2001; cf. Helleiner 1994; Garrett 1998). It is still in the hands of the nation-states to decide the future of our globe.

### **The cultural dimension: Calvinization**

If globalization exists as a cultural phenomenon, we should expect a *homogenization of lifestyles and values worldwide*. Several researchers believe that the export of Western consumerism will destroy indigenous communities by transferring them into materialistic societies (Tomlinson 1991; 1999; Canclini 1995; Howes 1996). George Ritzer (1993) coined the term “McDonaldization” for the process of standardizing products and management techniques worldwide. Ulf Hannerz’s (1992, 217) concept of “cocacolonization of the world” and Benjamin R. Barber’s (1996) “McWorld” refer on the other hand to the cultural domination of the United States in relation to values and identities. Dependent on the answer to the question which culture will become the new global standard, globalization in the sense of cultural homogenization could be called Westernization or Americanization (or even postmodernization [cf. Pettman 2005], Confucianization, or Islamization). I prefer the term Calvinization instead of Westernization or Americanization, because historically mainly the British Empire (before World War I) and the United States (after World War II) had a sense of mission to make the world more British or American. The term Westernization seems to be too general for an accurate description of this phenomenon, whereas the term Americanization is too narrow.

An alternative to the thesis of a cultural homogenization worldwide is the thesis of *pluralization*. Roland Robertson (1995; cf. Kraidy 1999; Salcedo 2003) for example believes that the increasing cultural exchange will not lead to homogenization but to many local variations of the global trends. He described this interaction between the global and local elements of culture as “glocalization.” This local transformation of global influences can be described in two ways. The first is indigenization (Clammer 1992), hybridization (Bhabha 1986),

or creolization (Hannerz 1992, 261ff.) and can be defined as a process in which the “locals select particular elements from incoming cultures, endow these with meanings different from those they possessed in the original culture and then creatively merge these with indigenous traditions to create totally new forms” (Cohen and Kennedy 2007, 333). The second is reinvention or rediscovery of elements of the traditional culture that were forgotten or neglected (cf. Chase 1994, 75ff.; James 1996). Creolization and reinventions have a similar effect. They create local diversity. Therefore globalization would not exist, if creolization and reinventions are predominant phenomena.

Advocates of the globalization thesis can easily find examples of cultural homogenization: “Amazonian Indians wearing Nike sneakers, denizens of the Southern Sahara purchasing Texaco baseball caps, and Palestinian youths proudly displaying their Chicago Bulls sweatshirts in downtown Ramallah” (Steger 2005, 39f.). Such observations seem to support the feeling that a “global monoculture spreads like an oil slick over the entire planet” (Sachs 1992, 102). But these cases could also be interpreted as examples of creolization, because the Nike sneakers, Texaco baseball caps, and Chicago Bulls sweatshirts are combined with traditional clothes, and in this sense create an entirely new style. Furthermore, it is possible that for example the Amazonian Indian associates a different meaning to Nike sneakers than we would do (cf. Scholte 2005, 80). Obviously, an enumeration of cases like the ones above is not enough to prove the existence of cultural homogenization. A more interesting argument is the spread of English as the international language (cf. Steger 2005, 40). The number of people who speak English as a second language increased dramatically after the end of the cold war from 140 million in 1990 to 600 million in 2004, and for 2050 even 1.2 billion second-language English-speakers are projected (Cohen and Kennedy 2007, 88, Table 3.1). English is today the dominant academic language (more than 90 percent of academic papers are published in English; Cohen and Kennedy 2007, 88), and it is also the most used language in the internet (over 80 percent of the content is posted in English; Steger 2005, 40). On the other hand every year around 25 local languages are disappearing (Nettle and Romaine 2000; cf. Wurm 1996). This is indeed a strong argument for cultural homogenization, because the language is framing our perception of reality. The fact that more and more people use English as a second language should lead to more standardized attitudes towards lifestyles and values. But is it really that simple? In my opinion it is not, because the English frame is very likely in contradiction to the frame of the first language. And this



contradiction can be solved in different ways: by accepting the English frame (cultural homogenization), by mixing the frames (creolization), or by rejecting the English frame and by emphasizing the own traditional way of thinking (reinvention, which could be called also fundamentalism).

There is a strong trend towards cultural homogenization, but this trend provokes also a strong counter-reaction. The result is a rather complicated mix of globalization and deglobalization tendencies. But in this sense globalization cannot be the predominant phenomenon in the cultural dimension.

### **Does globalization exist?**

The discussion showed that globalization (interpreted as a finished project) is not the best description of economic, political, and cultural phenomena. Of course, globalization trends (interpreted as an ongoing process) exist in the three dimensions at least partially, but in none of these dimensions are they predominant. In all three areas we can find strong resistance against globalization. The cultural resistance is either connected to a blending of the global and the local or to a fundamental rejection of everything foreign. This cultural resistance often leads to a political resistance, which results in an attempt to limit the influence of global markets in order to strengthen the autonomy of the nation-states. This can be done by erecting barriers either on the regional (from regionalism to regionalization) or the national level (from nationalism to protectionism). This resistance in the cultural, political and economic dimension is in the moment at least as strong as the globalization trend itself, and therefore it is still undecided which of these trends will prevail.

I do not believe that globalization exist in this sense as an established fact. However, I do believe that it exist as a Calvinist project. From the beginning of the 19th century England was pushing not only for liberalized global markets but also exported British lifestyle and values (the “universal” human rights are basically Calvinist values) to every corner of this planet. This British sense of mission involved exactly the previously described globalization strategies in the economic, political, and cultural dimension. The British Empire tried to convince (if necessary also with military force) other countries that a weak nation-state and free trade are the best options for development, and that the British lifestyle will produce the highest quality of life. This first golden age of globalization vanished during the World War I. The

British dominance was broken and could not anymore be rebuilt. On the other hand the United States of America was not yet ready to take over the role as the main advocate of globalization. This changed with the end of World War II. The United States gave up their isolationist position and led the world into the second golden age of globalization, which could unfold unrestricted after the end of the cold war. But America's domination of the world was only of short duration. The continuous war on terror in combination with the subprime mortgage crisis has turned America into a paper-tiger with, however, still very sharp teeth. The future will tell whether America's globalization strategy will succeed or the rest of the world will beat back. In this sense the existence of a Calvinist globalization project could still lead to globalization. I just do not believe that this will happen.

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## Lessons from Japan's "Lost Decade" for Today's Global Economy

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(宮尾 尊弘)

In this article, we will examine possible lessons to learn from Japan's experience, particularly regarding policy failures, in its "lost decade," leading to its prolonged recession with deflation in the 1990s and beyond, and will suggest that no more mistakes, especially about the so-called "exit strategy," should be made by policy makers in major advanced countries to save the global economy from the same kind of stagnation as Japan in the 1990s. We will also point out that policy makers in any country must take into account the global nature of the financial crisis, which stemmed from huge financial bubbles, not just in the US, but also (even more) in Europe, eventually leading to the recent Euro problem and related financial turmoil in the global financial market.

It should be pointed out at the outset that this paper emphasizes the policy mistakes committed by the monetary authorities and their macroeconomic effects for the purpose of highlighting the importance of policy factors in the financial crisis. However, this does not necessarily mean that the crisis and bubble phenomena are created by policy factors alone. In fact, deregulation and other structural factors are also mentioned in this paper.

### **Contrast Between Now and Then**

Nowadays the world economy appears to be gradually recovering from the global financial crisis, although the recovery process seems quite shaky and uncertain, as has been reminded by the recent turmoil in the global financial market due to the "sovereign crisis" in the Eurozone economy. Many observers are still concerned about the distinct possibility of having a prolonged period of stagnation in the world economy, at least in the developed countries. In fact, some economists and policy makers are very much interested in Japan's "lost decade," and eager to learn lessons from Japan's experience to save the world economy from possible economic stagnation with deflation that Japan suffered after the bursting

of the bubble in the 1990s.

Aside from some obvious similarities such as the bursting of huge bubbles in the financial and real estate markets, however, it might be easier to point out differences between the global crisis now and Japan's crisis then. Actually, there seem to be more and more differences, rather than similarities, which have become apparent, as the world economy has been recovering up to date.

First of all, it is clear that Japan's crisis is "local" as it was essentially contained within Japan, whereas the current crisis is "global" by any definition. Japan's bubble bursting only affected its domestic real estate and financial markets, resulting in bad debts in the hands of Japanese banks without spreading to any other country or region in the world. This was mainly because real estate investments in Japan then were financed almost solely by Japanese financial institutions and not by foreign investors as in the current financial crisis.

Second, there is a clear difference in the reaction of the real economy to the crisis in the financial market between Japan then and the world now. Facing the crisis, the Japanese economy managed to avoid negative growth until 1998, that is 8 years after its bubble bursting, whereas almost all developed countries registered significantly negative growth rates within a year or so after the "Lehman shock" in September, 2008. On the other hand, we have already witnessed at least some recovery of the economy in terms of real GDP, if not employment, in various parts of the world for the last year or so, while Japan remained stagnant throughout the 1990s.

Third, Japan was somehow able to keep the unemployment rate under 5 percent with no visible disturbances in society throughout the 1990s, while most economies in today's world have experienced growing unemployment and are still suffering from a double-digit level of unemployment with social unrests in some cases.

These differences are truly surprising, especially when we take note of the fact that Japan's balance-sheet damage was huge and "the bubble's collapse destroyed 1,500 trillion yen in wealth.....equivalent to three years of Japanese GDP" as pointed out by Koo (2008). Then, do these differences simply mean that the Japanese economy was slowly digesting its balance-sheet losses over time, actually for more than a decade, while the global economy this time reacted almost instantly, cutting losses and restructuring businesses, which have led to a quick recovery in some

countries? If that is the case, no lessons would be needed, the world economy should already be in the process of bottoming out and everything, even employment, might well be improving sooner or later. But the reality is not that simple, and there are some lessons to be learned, especially from crucial mistakes on the part of policy makers in Japan.

### **Similarities in Causes for Bubbles**

It is important to realize that there exist a number of similarities between Japan's crisis then and the global (particularly the US) crisis now. Actually, it has become evident that a crucial factor for the both cases is huge financial bubbles, rather than real estate bubbles which tend to attract much attention, but should be regarded as a result or part of financial excesses. Real estate is only on the demand side of the financial market, and real estate bubbles could not occur unless they are financed from the supply side. Here an important point is that the financial market is "global," although the real estate bubble tends to appear as a "local" phenomenon.

Even in the case of Japan in the late 1980s, where the bubble seems domestic rather than global, we need to examine a bigger picture surrounding Japan's bubble economy around that time. It is now well documented that "speculative financial activity came to the fore in the late 1970s and the 1980s" (Kaufman 2009) with financial bubbles emerging and bursting almost everywhere in the world. And "Japan's bubble was only one of several outbreaks of speculative fever around the world during the 1980s" (Krugman 2009). So, in the 80s Japan was not alone in developing a bubble economy, which was bound to burst sooner or later.

This means that the well-known real estate bubbles in Tokyo and other major cities in Japan were caused not only by the Bank of Japan's low interest rate policy to deal with the yen-daka (high-yen) recession in 1986, but also by the overall easy credit condition with financial deregulation trends in the world economy around that time. Actually, the Bank of Japan's move to lower interest rates was partly facilitated by the efforts on the part of the Western countries as well as Japan to support the US dollar and the NY market after Black Monday in 1987. In other words, there existed global trends toward low interest rates and easy money policies, when Japan's bubble started to be formed.

The easy money condition along with financial deregulation in the world economy in the late 1980s may look very much like the situation in the



early 2000s. In those years, the speed of financial deregulation accelerated, due to keen competition among financial institutions in the US, EU and elsewhere, and the US Federal Reserve Board was hastily lowering interest rates to avoid the recessionary impacts of the bursting of the "high-tech (dot-com) bubble" in 2000 and the "9.11 incident" in 2001. Thus, the housing bubble was developing in the US by the mid-2000s.

We should also note that the US was not alone in developing such a bubble and some of the major EU nations experienced even more inflated bubbles than the US in their housing and financial markets, exemplified by sky-rocketing housing prices in the UK, Spain, etc. and extremely high leverage (debt-equity) ratios for financial institutions in Germany, Switzerland, etc. As a result, European economies in general have been more adversely affected by the current financial crisis than the US. This issue will be taken up in more details later in this article.

### **Lessons Partially Learned by the US**

Similarities between Japan then and the world economy (particularly the US economy) now become even more striking, when we look into the direct cause for bubble bursting, that is, the central bank's high interest rate policy. In the case of the Bank of Japan, the official discount rate was raised from 3.25 percent in mid-1989 to 6.0 percent within a year, and kept that high rate for one more year in an attempt to kill the real estate bubble "completely." Similarly, the US Federal Reserve Board raised the federal fund rate from 1.35 percent in 2004 to 5.24 percent in mid-2006, and kept it above 5 percent for more than a year. As a result, many subprime mortgage borrowers in the US were having serious trouble refinancing due to sharply higher interest rates resulting from the Fed's tight monetary policy. One could even say that if the US Fed had not raised interest rates so aggressively, the so-called subprime mortgage crisis might not have occurred, even though the global financial crisis would have happened anyway, probably due to massive failures in European financial institutions.

It has been widely pointed out that the Bank of Japan's over-killing of the bubble, along with the government's regulation on real estate financing, seems to have contributed to the destructive bursting of the bubble, damaging Japan's real economy in the early 1990s (see Turner 2008, and Calverley 2009, for example). Actually, the size of the bubble in Japan then was not much greater than the average bubble size in various countries around that time, whereas Japan's post-bubble recession was much longer than that in any other country, due to policy mistakes, as can

be seen in the Table.

Then, didn't the Fed learn a lesson from the Bank of Japan's mistakes? Obviously, it didn't as far as the mistake of monetary tightening to overkill the bubble is concerned. However, the Fed did learn from another mistake that the Bank of Japan committed, that is, too slow a move to cut interest rates when not only asset prices but also general price indexes were starting to fall, leading to the vicious circle of deflation (as pointed out by Turner, *op. cit.*, "When [interest] rates did start coming down, the decline was agonizingly slow. Real borrowing costs were up, not down [due to deflation]).

Having learned from this mistake on the part of the Bank of Japan, the US Fed lowered the interest rate hastily right after the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000, and also in the aftermath of the Lehman shock in 2008. It took 9 years since the bubble bursting for the Bank of Japan to subscribe to the zero interest rate policy, whereas it took only a few months since the Lehman shock for the Fed to adopt such a policy. This difference is crucial. Owing to such aggressive interest rate cuts along with other monetary and fiscal policies including various bailout measures, the US and the rest of the world economy seem to be recovering, at least from the brink of economic disaster. In the case of Japan, however, there were no such quick responses on the part of policymakers, and chances for economic recovery were lost almost completely.

### **Timing of the Exit Strategy**

Then, does this mean that we have already learned a lesson from Japan to avoid a "lost decade" this time? The answer is no. There is one more important lesson to be learned from another mistake by the Japanese policy makers, that is, the wrong timing of the "exit strategy."

Actually, Japan suffered what might be called a double-dip, or even triple-dip recession. "In 1997 the voices of fiscal responsibility prevailed and [the government] increased taxes to reduce the budget deficit. The economy promptly plunged into recession" (Krugman, *op. cit.*). Furthermore, the Bank of Japan lifted its zero interest rate policy in August, 2000, its first effective rate hike in 10 years. But that turned out to be a spoiler for Japan's economic recovery, and just several months later the Bank of Japan had to bring down the interest rate to zero again (BBC 2001)

What we should realize is that once the economy suffers from massive

asset price declines, it takes a long time to undo the balance-sheet damage and regain a clean bill of health for the economy as a whole. To be more exact, a financial crisis tends to cause both the liquidity problem and the solvency problem, and while the former problem can be dealt with by supplying adequate liquidity in the short run, the latter problem may be alleviated through continuous efforts to improve current profitability for a long time. For the economy as a whole, therefore, just an apparent recovery of the economy in terms of GDP growth or even employment would not be enough, unless such a recovery continues and accelerates for a sufficiently long period of time. Otherwise, a tightening of fiscal and/or monetary policy might well ruin the steady effort of economic stimulation and rehabilitation.

Then, one might ask how to avoid another round of bubbles and their bursting if stimulus policies are to continue for such a long time. There is no easy answer to this difficult question, but as far as fiscal policies are concerned, it seems clear that a long-term plan for stabilizing the ratio of government debts to GDP, based on spending and tax plans and economic growth forecast, should be formulated and announced officially to kill any expectations or suspicions for government insolvency, hyper inflation, or other disastrous consequences of current stimulus measures.

As for monetary policies, definitely the answer should not be monetary tightening to target the bubble, because that might well repeat the mistake of "over-killing" that was committed by both the Japanese and US monetary authorities in the past. Instead, what we need is a more stringent global regulatory system to oversee the financial markets and institutions in the world economy, where huge amounts of money are moving around freely across national borders, often creating and bursting bubbles.

Actually, such a global regulatory system is exactly what world leaders are currently discussing at such meetings as the G20 summits. Their agreements on reasonable regulations over the financial markets and institutions from the global viewpoint are badly needed, before unreasonable, distorting regulations along with fiscal and monetary tightening in individual countries are introduced. If such individual measures spread all over the world now, that would almost certainly lead to a double-dip or triple-dip recession of the global economy, most likely with deflation a la Japan for a long time to come.

### **"The Global Financial Crisis" Revisited**

After writing a short version of this article earlier this year (see the link in

the introduction of this article), the so-called "sovereign problem" in some of the Eurozone countries became serious and caused large disturbances in the global financial markets, almost leading to yet another global financial crisis. Some argue that the current problem in Europe is an indirect result of the US subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent global recession, which forced European countries to adopt fiscal stimulus measures, resulting in the worsening of the fiscal condition beyond limits on the part of some Eurozone countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, etc. In view of our argument in this article, however, it should be clear that the real problem in Europe is much deeper than that, and actually is directly related to the main cause of the global financial crisis in the first place.

First of all, before the Lehman shock in 2008, the leverage (debt-equity) ratios of financial institutions in Europe were generally higher than those of US financial institutions. In other words, European banks were more aggressive in lending and investing in various parts of the world than their US counterparts. Those leverage ratios were around 15 for commercial banks and 23 for investment banks in the US, whereas those numbers were more than 30 in the UK and even above 40 in Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and France (Komine, et al. 2009, and Watanabe and Mitsuhashi 2009). This is partly due to the so-called "universal bank system" that is adopted in most European countries, where investment banking and commercial banking are integrated with no firewall between them. Actually, the "Glass-Steagall" firewall at US financial institutions was gradually phased out in the 1990s, mainly because they had to increase their leverage ratios to compete with their European counterparts. It might also be said that financial deregulation tends in the US as well as in Europe, especially the UK, in recent decades are a result of severe competition among financial institutions, especially between US and European institutions.

Second, reflecting this financial situation, the housing bubble was inflated not only in the US, but also in Europe and many parts of the world. In fact, housing price inflation on average has been greater in Europe than in the US for the last 10 years (Komine, *op. cit.*). Especially in the last few years, at least before the Lehman shock, housing in Europe, most notably in the UK, appeared incredibly expensive even to many Americans who experienced a housing boom at home, due to both high housing prices and high currency values (particularly, Pound and Euro) in Europe compared to the US. Obviously, money was flowing out of the US into Europe through active financial transactions in London, Frankfurt, and other major European markets in those years.

Third, it is now well known that many of the financial innovations, including CDS (Credit Default Swap) and other derivatives and even the whole "shadow bank system," have been brought about in London and other European markets (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha 2009), where American financial institutions participated in various financial activities along with their European counterparts. In fact, most of the derivative products purchased by various institutions, not only business but also public, social, academic, etc. all over the world, were issued by financial institutions based in major European markets.

As a result, when the financial bubble started to burst in 2007, major financial failures occurred in Europe first, rather than in the US, such as the BNP Paribas shock in France (August, 2007) and the Northern Rock bank run in the UK (September, 2007), and even a whole country, Iceland, went bankrupt by the end of 2008 due to increasing financial debts and a declining value of the Icelandic krona in 2008. In any case, the European economy, badly damaged by the bursting of its own bubble, is still suffering from economic stagnation with virtually no growth even for 2010, while almost all other major economies are now showing steady recovery performances, at least in terms of GDP growth. It might be argued, therefore, that a global financial crisis and even an Euro crisis would have occurred anyway, originating in Europe, even if the US government and policy makers had handled the financial situation in the US more wisely to avoid the failure of a large US financial institution like Lehman Brothers in 2008.

### **Short-term Vs. Long-term Issues**

So far in this article no mention has been made to Japan's "structural problems" such as export dependency, the Keiretsu system, the aging and declining population, stagnant consumption, etc. Could any lessons be drawn from those structural problems to avoid a long-term decline in today's world economy? Interestingly, as pointed out by Koo (*op. cit.*), non-Japanese observers tend to emphasize Japan's structural problems, whereas Japanese economists often focus on the Bank of Japan's monetary policy issues. In fact, the well-known debate between Katz and Madsen (2009) on comparing the Japanese and global crises is entirely focused on structural problems by asking whether the US and the world economy today are showing structural problems similar to those that are supposed to have caused Japan's long-term economic decline.

It should be understood that structural problems generally concern

long-term supply-side capacities which affect growth "trends," in contrast to macroeconomic policy issues dealing with relatively short-term demand-side performance which determines economic "fluctuations" around the long-term trend (see the definition in the Table). In this sense, the phenomena of bubbles and their bursting are essentially short-term in nature, although Japan was, and still is, suffering from the long-term deflationary effects of the bursting of the bubble, due to the series of policy mistakes explained above. Needless to say, long-term capacities and trends by themselves are important issues, but they should be addressed separately from the bubble phenomenon.

On the other hand, this kind of distinction between short-term and long-term issues is crucially important, when we discuss the future of the financial system in the world economy. As briefly mentioned above, some kind of global regulatory scheme is urgently needed to prevent various financial institutions (including investment banks and hedge funds) from engaging in high-leverage activities, which could possibly lead to undesirable bubble phenomena. In the long run, however, such regulations are not sufficient, and a more fundamental restructuring of the international financial system is called for.

There seems to be a broad consensus that a new international monetary system should not be based on the US dollar as the sole key currency, which has so far contributed to the perpetuation of global imbalances in terms of trade between the US and China rather than Japan these days. This is not only a long-term problem, but also an underlying factor for short-term bubble phenomena in the world economy with excess US dollars, resulting from the global imbalances. Here we have to learn lessons, not from Japan's crisis 20 years ago, but from the post-WWII period 60 years ago as well as the Great Depression era 80 years ago.

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Table

	Bubble period	Size of bubble	Size of post-bubble recession
Japan	1987-91	7.8	-24.1
Austria	88-91	4.4	-6.1
Belgium		4.1	-3.8
Denmark	87-90	5.8	-1.7
Finland	82-86	5.2	-9.9
France	87-89	3.6	-7.0
Italy	86-89	3.2	-9.4
Sweden	84-89	4.9	-3.3

Switzerland	84-90	9.9	-5.9
Australia	84-89	7.2	0.9
New Zealand	83-87	9.8	-4.6
Average	-----	6.0	-6.8

Definition: The sizes of bubbles and post-bubble recession are measured by the sum of the differences between actual (real) GDP growth rates and their long-term trend.

Reference: Harada (2003)

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Authors wishing to submit articles for consideration should adhere to the following guidelines:

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4. No paragraph indentation but a single space between paragraphs.
5. Each header should contain the page number in the upper left corner and the article's title opposite the page number.
6. Sources must be cited using the University of Chicago Style Manual, humanities format for either footnotes or end notes.
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